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High-risk environments such as the control room of Nuclear Power Plants are 
extremely stressful for the front line operators; during accidents and under high task 
load situations, the operators are solely responsible for the ultimate decision-making 
and control of such complex systems. Individuals working as a team constantly 
interact with each other and therefore introduce team related issues such as 
coordination, supervision and conflict resolution. The aggregate impact of multiple 
human errors inside communication and coordination loops in a team context can 
give rise to complex human failure modes and failure mechanisms. This research 
offers a model of operating crew as an interactive social unit and investigates the 
dynamic behavior of the team under upset situations through a simulation method. 
The domain of interest in this work is the class of operating crew environments that 
are subject to structured and regulated guidelines with formal procedures providing 
  
the core of their response to accident conditions. In developing the cognitive models 
for the operators and teams of operators, their behavior and relations, this research 
integrates findings from multiple disciplines such as cognitive psychology, human 
factors, organizational factors, and human reliability. An object-based modeling 
methodology is applied to represent system elements and different roles and 
behaviors of the members of the operating team. The proposed team model is an 
extended version of an existing cognitive model of individual operator behavior 
known as IDAC (Information, Decision, and Action in Crew context). Scenario 
generation follows DPRA (Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment) methodologies. 
The method capabilities are demonstrated through building and simulating a 
simplified model of a steam/power generating plant. Different configurations of team 
characteristics and influencing factors have been simulated and compared. The effects 
of team factors and crew dynamics on system risk with main focus on team errors, 
associated causes and error management processes and their impact on team 
performance have been studied through a large number of simulation runs. The 
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Chapter 1: Motivation and Objectives  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent advances in technology have remarkably improved organizations’ ability to 
build and manage hazardous technologies. In the case of high reliability 
organizations
1
, the balance between safe and efficient actions has become a main 
objective in managing complex systems. In the 1960s, three organizations were 
considered as high reliability organizations: the US air traffic control system, 
organizations operating nuclear power stations, and the US Navy nuclear aircraft 
carrier operations (Juhasz et al., 2011). Recent research on high reliability 
organizations includes domains in health, public safety, and environmental protection. 
Much of the research has focused on the performance of the personnel flying aircraft, 
air traffic controllers, nuclear power stations operators, doctors and nurses in 
operating rooms and intensive care units, and fire fighters, since the operators in such 
systems are responsible for the ultimate diagnosis, decision making and control of 
extremely complex systems (Cacciabue, 2004). High levels of training for the 
operating crew are required to manage such high-hazard situations efficiently; 
training focuses on achieving the fundamental professional knowledge about the 
function of the systems, about events, and about the correct actions (Juhasz et al., 
2011). For example while the vast majority of operations in a nuclear power plant 
(NPP) are highly automated and personnel functions are limited to monitoring, most 
of the time the task load is at low or moderate levels. However, the personnel need to 
                                                 
1 High reliability organization and high risk environment concepts are used interchangeably to describe 
organizations such as a Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) where the idea of safety is not just a theoretical concept, and 
it is an eternal, conscious endeavor to maintain safety in the nature of the high hazard operation and environment 




be aware of possible system malfunctions external factors that threaten the safety and 
effectiveness of operations, requiring continuous alertness, one of the main causes of 
high task load in such a complex environments.  
In high reliability organizations, operations are technically complex, requiring the 
knowledge, experience, skills and abilities of more than one person. Hence the 
professional operating teams play a crucial role in the management of complex 
operations, where the team members need to interact and integrate their individual 
capabilities to cope with normal and abnormal operations (Juhasz, 2011). For instance 
in NPP control rooms, the workflow is totally structured around teams of operators. 
Clearly, individuals working as a team provide greater resource and power; however, 
teams introduce new issues such as interpersonal coordination, time and task 
management. Almost every activity in a power plant control room is time-based and 
has a time window which in most cases does not exceed a few minutes. Crews consist 
of highly trained individuals with special skills and knowledge. Each person is 
responsible for one specific area of the complex system. There is an intensive and 
constant pressure to perform efficiently and reliably. Also the expectations from the 
organization are high and this is a source of stress which can alter the way operators 
work under difficult circumstances.  
The existing research shows that the most important contributing factor to accidents 
and unsafe behavior is not the lack of professional knowledge related to technical 
aspects of the complex system, but rather to key contributions that come from the 
failure of efficient teamwork, such as inappropriate communication and coordination 




role in control rooms, especially after the occurrence of abnormal events. Such 
interactions are defined as the crew response to cue(s), including alarms and 
parameter changes. Crew responses are either control manipulations or 
communications. Response time begins with an observable cue and ends with the 
operator response to the cue in the form of an observable action (Mengzhuo et al., 
1997). 
Some control rooms (such as those in NPPs) are highly regulated environments in 
which the consequence of tasks are safety related, thus each activity inside operating 
teams is required to be largely coordinated and organized. However, often 
misunderstandings associated with perspectives characterize interpersonal relations 
even for teams that interact regularly and are mutually independent. The individuals 
in a team define, interpret and access the reality that surrounds them with a subjective 
point of view; social and technical backgrounds determine what one will focus on 
while interacting with others. Depending on the person with whom one is interacting, 
different expectations shape the way individuals perceive the situation. Differences in 
social realities, goals and strategies affect the way people in a team interact.  
In recent years the nuclear industry has increasingly recognized the importance of 
integrating non-technical team skills training with the technical training given to its 
control room operators. However, little has been done to determine the actual 
effectiveness of such non-technical training (Levi, 2007 and Harrington et al., 1992). 
Since critical conditions involve significant human-human interactions, under high-
workload and complexities posed by system malfunction, the reliability of such 




stressful conditions and lack of mutual situational awareness can lead to critical 
human errors.  
Research shows that most of past accidents in the nuclear industry have been a 
consequence of aggregated human error (Reason, 1997), (Gertman et al., 2002), 
(Carvalho et al., 2006) and (Dietrich et al., 2004). Some researchers such as Gertman 
et al. (2002) discussed that the impact of multiple human errors inside communication 
loops can result in major hazards and complex failure modes. In evaluating team 
performance, not only the standards for the individual operator performance should 
be considered, but also, new standards need be introduced which reflect a team’s 
perspective. Thus, it is important to study the role that team-related factors can play in 
systems risk.  
1.2 Research Motivations 
Human mistakes are rarely built into control room operator training simulators, and 
research has neglected to systematically study the reliability and accuracy of 
communication between control room and field operators, between operators within a 
shift and at shift hand-over. The sensitivity of the group decision process to individual 
human errors is a critical field of research that has not been studied systematically 
yet. Such issues apply to most of command and control structures. Research has given 
little attention to theoretical or conceptual issues on information integration and even 
less so to consequences of information distribution within groups. Little research has 
been done on how the individual efforts and skills of group members should be 
combined when those individuals work together as a group on a given type of task, 





Figure 1: Operating Crew monitor the Davis-Besse NPP, Ohio, US, 20042 
Systematic approaches to investigate team performance in the context of a high-risk 
environment such as a NPP use observational methods with limited applications, 
where results are hard to verify and generalize as discussed by Gibson et al. (2008). It 
is not always easy to interpret observed behavior, even when the data gathered are 
fairly specific. In most cases, it appears that more than one interpretation is possible 
(Pattron et al., 2002). Theoretical approaches leave significant gaps between 
conceptual models and complexities of dynamic interactions of teams and systems. 
Moreover, theoretical approaches such as the study by Kim et al. (2003) mostly aim 
to provide understanding of the work environment and taxonomies of 
communication-related Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) as well as their possible 
outcomes. The real impact of crew interactions on team effectiveness and, 
consequently, on the entire system has not been fully and quantitatively explored for 
operating crews in high-risk environments such as NPPs. In fact, existing Human 






Reliability Analysis (HRA) approaches have mostly approximated a plant crew as an 
individual human operator with team effects treated through a set of PSFs. Little has 
been done to investigate and explicitly model the crew and capture the effects of team 
factors and team dynamics on system risk. However, since a team is an interactive 
social system, team-specific issues need to be studied and evaluated by standards that 
are from a “team perspective” and are based on team dynamics and processes. 
Even though research has produced HRA-based techniques in order to improve the 
group processes and outcomes in general, only a few of researchers such as Petkov et 
al. (2004) have evaluated the techniques systematically.  
Since there are often insufficient resources to conduct empirical studies with human 
subjects, analytical approaches are required to investigate human performance in 
complex system contexts. More specifically, considering the large number of 
parameters and the flexibility needed in examining different configurations to obtain 
verifiable results, a model-based simulation approach is highly desirable.  
A suitable candidate is the class of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) 
methods with which the dynamic behavior of the system and crew can be 
probabilistically simulated by using models of system and crew elements and rules of 
corresponding external and internal interactions. Simulation-based DPRA focuses on 
the influence of time and process dynamics on risk scenarios. However, most of the 
existing representation languages are limited in scope and application. New features 
need to be integrated into existing DPRA approaches in order to model the dynamics 





The main motivation for this research is to investigate how team related issues and 
errors affect complex system risk and how the associated failures reflect the 
complexity and variety of team characteristics and interactions. To build the 
theoretical foundations and some of essential means to address the stated need, the 
following objectives were defined for this research: 
1. Develop a crew performance causal model leveraging the existing theoretical 
concepts and empirical findings, with focus on team characteristics, internal 
dynamics, and crew-system interaction.  
2. Integrate the developed crew performance model into a probabilistic 
simulation platform capable of generating system risk profiles due to systems 
and crew failure modes  
3. Demonstrate capabilities of the crew model and dynamic simulation platform 
through an example involving typical control room configurations seen in 
high reliability complex industrial facilities. Test simulated team macro-
behavior for its explanatory power and face validity, and draw insights in 
comparison with behaviors discussed in existing theoretical models and 
relevant empirical results.  
1.4 Methodology 
This research applies a systematic method to model and examine information sharing, 
distribution, and collection, building of shared mental models, team decision making 




the main focus being the team errors, associated causes, and error management 
processes.  
The dynamic behavior of an operating crew under high workload and upset situations 
is investigated through the application of simulation methods. An object-based 
modeling methodology is applied to represent system elements and different roles and 
behaviors within the operating team. The modeling style aims to be easy to integrate, 
modify and reconfigure and capable of representing the desired functionality, 
different roles and behaviors of the individual operators, as well as their dynamic 
interactions. The object-based methodology captures available sources of knowledge 
on system elements into representative formal models required for DPRA methods.  
Three different object categories are included: the hardware system (hardware 
elements such as pumps and valves); the operating crew composed of individual 
human operators; and the control panel (alarms and indicators and their activation 
processes).  
Development of representative probabilistic simulation models for system main 
elements involves a top-down approach for hierarchical decomposition and 
identifying object classes, and a bottom-up approach for defining object class 
association links and aggregation. Model implementation stage includes knowledge 
acquisition for scenario generation and development of model of system dynamics.  
The basic ingredients of individual operator behaviors are from the IDAC 
(Information, Decision, and Action in Crew context) cognitive model (Chang et al., 




decomposes the operator’s cognitive flow into: Information-processing (I), Decision-
making (D), and Action-execution (A). General characteristics are encapsulated as 
object class attributes and operations, with the flexibility of being edited to account 
for personal differences and PSFs. Extended IDAC model proposed by this research 
classifies team activities into three main categories: “Collaborative information 
collection”, “Shared decision making”, and “Distributed action execution”. 
Furthermore, another major category of operator activities is introduced to represent 
activities related to “error management” including: error detection, error indication 
and error correction. The approach is demonstrated through a case study for an 
operating crew of a steam generator feed-water system under a postulated accident 
scenario (pipe-break).  
A configuration of four operators is studied as a reasonable approximation of real 
operating crews. The team consists of two reactor operators (action-taker), the shift 
supervisor (decision-maker) and the shift technical-advisor (consultant). Each 
operator is responsible for a variety of tasks, all following the general cognitive steps 
of IDAC, with different associated individual characteristics as well as 
responsibilities.  
Human errors are only recognizable within the context by identifying mismatches 
between internal and external reference points and are categorized by considering 
their effects. The communication network is centralized around the decision-maker. 
The developed simulation models for the operating crew and the plant are integrated 




The case study aims to demonstrate the proposed modeling and simulation 
capabilities. A framework is developed inside MATLAB Simulink to accomplish the 
above tasks. CREWSIM
3
, a customized library of pre-defined blocks inside model 
editor, facilitates model development. The cognitive modules are modeled in 
Simulink via use of sequential function blocks. The Simulation controller is 
responsible for data manipulation, information dissemination, inference, calls to 
external routines and command implementation. The dynamics of behavior is 
captured by using a local controller inside each object structure, responsible for 
branch generation. The simulation algorithm generates a dynamic event tree based on 
branch points associated with the internal and external error reference points and the 
lowest level functionalities of each simulated module. Each branch in the simulation 
scenario represents distinct combinations of system and operator states. Once a 
system end-state is reached the scenario ends. A study is conducted on simulation 
results of different cases associated with different configuration of teams and team 
factors in order to provide face validity of validate the model and demonstrate the 
capabilities of the approach.     
1.5 Research Contributions  
This research proposes a framework to study the dynamic behavior of an operating 
crew and to explore the complexities arising from their interactions, using model-
based simulation. Extended IDAC, the framework designed and developed in this 
research, focuses mainly on the team aspects of operating crew behavior. It not only 
adds features to models of individual operator cognitive processes and the team’s 
                                                 
3 CREWSIM is a developed tool by this research inside MATLAB Simulink environment that performs realistic, 




shared problem-solving activities, but also adds communication-related aspects and 
additional model elements to cover error management activities at the individual 
operator and team levels. The domain of interest in this work is the class of operating 
crew environments that are subject to structured and regulated guidelines with formal 
procedures providing the core of their response to accident conditions.  
The Extended IDAC also introduces a significantly expanded model of PSFs that 
characterize the individual and team responses, and form the basis for quantification 
of human error probabilities in team context.  
This research implemented the Extended IDAC framework as a series of sequential 
cognitive and action blocks, with the behavioral effects of PSFs captured via 
influence diagram PSFs for each human activity. In developing the cognitive models 
for the operators and teams of operators, their behavior and relations, this research 
integrates findings from multiple disciplines such as cognitive psychology, human 
factors, organizational factors, and human reliability.  
The error management framework was introduced and used with a set of associated 
PSF models to support additional branching events in dynamic simulation of the team 
response, while providing a more explicit causal explanation of the crew behavior. 
Except for a few theoretical frameworks, error management activities have not been 
considered fully and explicitly in previous efforts. Collaborative information 
collection method developed and implemented in this research simulates the 
contributions of various team members in gathering important information under the 




A team decision-making model responsive to dynamic changes in situational context 
was also designed and implemented, covering team discussions and consultation 
activities inside the team. In addition, a distributed action execution model was also 
defined and implemented to cover the complexities associated with assigning tasks to 
team members and the effect of including redundancy in operator’s roles on team 
performance.  
To provide a rich contextual environment for the team response, the Extended IDAC 
model simulation was fully integrated with a detailed hardware model in order 
simulate accident scenarios involving hardware and crew interactions. The resulting 
simulation platform (CREWSIM), developed by applying object-based 
methodologies is a practical tool for simulating crew behavior in response to system 
abnormalities. 
Extensive simulation runs and quantitative and qualitative examination of the 
resulting scenarios provided ample evidence of face validity of the proposed team 
model and simulation platform. Further, while performing experiments with real 
crews and real scenarios to validate the model was not feasible due to resource 
limitations and other practical constraints, the International Empirical Study 
conducted at Halden Laboratories in Norway provided an opportunity to perform a 
limited comparison of the proposed model behavior with actual performances of the 
crews participating in the exercise.  This comparison showed the explanatory power 
of the proposed model with respect to some observable aspects of the crew 




a number of macro-level behaviors identified in several of the theoretical frameworks 
discussed in the literature.   
1.6 Overview of Dissertation 
Following this introductory Chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the literature, related efforts 
and current state of research on team behavior. Chapter 3 introduces the proposed 
modeling framework for the operating crew, describing the “Extended IDAC” model, 
its basic concepts and the fundamentals. The Chapter end with a comparison of  the 
proposed model and simulation approach with the methods and frameworks 
reviewed, highlighting the contributions of this research to the field. Chapter 4 
provides details on the implementation of Extended IDAC, and the development of 
CREWSIM platform (in MALAB Simulink). This chapter also offers an overview of 
the various causal models proposed for “Team Error Management”, “Team PSFs” 
and “Team Communication”. Chapter 5 explains the design of the case study and 
corresponding simulation models. Chapter 6 provides details on designing and 
conducting simulation runs and qualitative and quantitative analyses of the results, 
with the objective of verifying reasonableness of the macro-behavior of the integrated 
team model. It also offers a limited validation case using data from an experiment 
involving real operating crews. Chapter 7 discusses the findings, concluding remarks 




Chapter 2: Review of Team Behavior Research 
 
 
Figure 2: Safety is a major concern in high reliability organizations4 
This chapter provides a summary of the existing research results on team issues. The 
scope of this review is the research on high reliability organizations in general, and 
NPPs in particular. The existing literature has been studied and classified to better 
understand the finding on various aspects of team behavior. The main categories of 
literature covered are human error in complex systems, team behavior including 
communication and coordination, team PSFs, supervision and leadership, and team 
performance. 
2.1 Human Error in Complex Systems Operation 
Safe operation of complex systems requires close coordination between the human 
operators and the physical hardware. Bocanete et al. (2007) have stated that 90% of 
                                                 




all workplace accidents have human error as a cause. Flin et al. in their book, “Safety 
at the sharp end” (2008), mention that the analysis of a number of industrial sectors 
has indicated that up to 80% of accident causes can be attributed to human factors.  
In a high-risk environment such as a NPP, the primary functions are usually 
performed by a team of operators which collaborate with each other to achieve 
system goals. While most of operating teams are professional and tightly coordinated, 
under high-workload and upset situations, unexpected events happen and the 
interaction among operators becomes extremely crucial. Since operators working 
under high risk are subject to the cognitive and psychological changes imposed by 
external stressors, almost 65% of commercial nuclear system failures have been 
considered to involve human error (Carvalho et al., 2006) and (Dietrich, 2004).   
Managing the processes in such a safety critical system is very stressful for the front 
line personnel since every little deviation from the safe operational state, if not 
effectively monitored and managed, would lead to catastrophe. Incomplete 
information, little time and stressful conditions usually lead to critical errors. The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of United Kingdom has considered 
“communications” and “interfaces” among the top ten human factor issues (Health 
and Safety Executive of GB, 2005). Since a number of operators are involved during 
most accidents, it is the aggregate impact of multiple human errors that results in 
major hazards. While typical consequences are decreased efficiency and revenue, 
some operational failures in a complex environment such as a NPPCR, pose a threat 
to public safety (Carvalho et al., 2006). For instance, on March 28, 1979, Reactor 




because an event occurred that resulted in melted fuel, prior to the situation being 
brought back under control (US Department of Commerce report, 1980). One of the 
most important problems at TMI is considered to have been a total failure of 
communication. Internal radioactivity levels, for example, were reported as outdoor 
air readings. As the situation unfolded, operating and monitoring personnel 
continuously failed to recognize critical information cues and to coordinate their 
responses accordingly.  
Similarly, on April 25, 1986, several years after the TMI accident, the unit No.4 
reactor at the Russian Chernobyl power plant installation exploded during the test of 
the plant’s turbine generator system, resulting in 30 fatalities and widespread 
radioactive contamination (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1986). 
During the course of the events an operator error caused the reactor's power to drop 
below specified levels, setting off a catastrophic power surge that caused a major 
accident. Among the human factors issues contributing to the disaster, failures in 
preplanning for coordination requirements inside teams for such an incident, poor 
marking of roles and responsibilities and breakdown in communication among team 
members have been listed. In these two of the world’s most serious NPPs accidents, 
operator error relating to loss of situation awareness and poor decision-making played 
a major role (Flin et al., 2008).  
Similarly problems in communication and coordination were identified in the Vogtle-
1 nuclear plant incident (Patrick et al., 2003). In March 1990, the plant faced a near 




and the main reason for this situation was that the emergency diesel generators did 
not start.  
2.2 Team Related Issues 
Today’s complex systems are operated by teams of individuals whose interactions 
must be taken into account (Pew et al., 2007) and (Firth-cozens, 2004). Team related 
issues in recent years have become the subject of increasing interest for the 
organizations that rely on teamwork (Banbury et al., 2004). Many problems and 
issues in team performance are potentially answerable by research; however, the issue 
of group structure and functions has been ignored for a long time in systematic 
research except for the psychology context where a variety of investigators have been 
interested in how a group of people interact to accomplish their goals and tasks 
Examples are Interactionism
5
 Psychology (Bland, 2001), (Druckman et al., 1991) and 
(McGrath et al., 1994). However experimental psychology has not systematically 
addressed important team related variables such as information sharing and 
coordination (Waern et al., 1998).  
In the nuclear industry, research on teamwork has also been limited. Most of the 
existing literature in the human reliability field is focused on the individual operator’s 
cognitive processes and the crew as a unit, as opposed to an interactive social system 
of individual operators. Teams are complex, adaptive and dynamic systems embedded 
in organizations and they are responsive to situational contexts (Ilgen et al., 2004). 
Many studies have explored systematic approaches to investigate team behavior in 
the context of high-risk environments using field studies and observational methods 
                                                 




(Juhasz et al., 2007), (Bust, 2008) and (Carvalho et al., 2008). Such methods have 
articulated a number of important questions but have provided limited applications 
and are not reproducible. Since finding comparable groups is difficult, it is hard to 
verify and generalize the results. Theoretical approaches mostly aim to provide 
understanding of the work environment and taxonomies of performance shaping 
factors as well as their possible outcomes (O’Hara et al., 2004). Ilgen et al. (2004) 
reviewed existing literature on team performance and concluded that the domain of 
empirical studies is less cohesive and coherent than is theory and method. They also 
mention that the importance of dynamic conditions experienced over time is accepted 
by all. The empirical work is only beginning to consider the implications of time in 
research designs. Hence the authors conclude that theoretical and methodological 
approaches are preferred over solely empirical research.  
The real contributions of interpersonal relationships on team effectiveness and 
consequently on the entire system has not been fully and quantitatively addressed for 
groups interacting with complex technology in high-risk environments such as NPPs. 
Even though a number of studies have developed HRA-based techniques in order to 
improve the group processes and outcomes in general, only a few have been 
evaluated systematically (Boring, 2006) and (Petkov et al., 2004), and the available 
evidence does not provide clear support for the techniques.  
Most of the studies address the team skills, cognitive skills, or the ergonomic 
considerations of NPP control room personnel. GIHRE (Dietrich et al., 2004), was a 
joint research project between linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychologists and 




safety conducted from 1999 to 2004. GIHRE highlighted governing factors in relation 
to how people work together and handle technology in a high-risk environment. The 
main objective of GIHRE was to identify what governs the way in which people work 
together and handle technology in a high-risk environment.  
Improvement in training programs, education, control room procedures, norms and 
interfaces and ultimately the safety of process has been considered as major results of 
conducting research on team performance in control rooms. Waller et al. (2004) 
conducted a study on control room crews using simulation and examined adaptive 
behaviors and shared mental model development. Healey et al. (2006) studied 
teamwork behavior via a set of “behavioral constructs”. Carvalho et al. (2005) 
examined how control room supervisors make decisions and Patrick et al. (2003) 
measured differences in situation awareness among six control room teams.  
Considering the large number of parameters involved it is difficult to explore and 
determine how the various factors, constructs, and assumption, give rise to the 
“macro-behavior” of the team anticipated or assumed by the theoretical, or observed 
through experiments and actual operating data. This points to the potential value of 
systematic simulation approach to investigate team behavior.  
2.3 Performance Shaping Factors 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) characterize the roots and facets of human error 
and provide a basis for calculating human error probability and tailoring the values to 
specific contexts. The importance of these factors has been recognized by most 
researchers in the field and there is a large body of research on NPP operators with a 




on team capabilities in the Chernobyl disaster and communication conflicts caused by 
overgeneralization of the roles and responsibilities (Dietrich et al., 2004) and 
(Orasanu, 2003). The effect of the nature of team differences, their consistency and 
training implications on situation awareness was the subject of interest of Patrick et 
al. (2003) where observational methods were used in particular to study the effects of 
quality of communication and team coordination.  
A list of PSFs, based on field data, is presented by Groth (2009). This study regards 
communication, direct supervision, team coordination, and team cohesion and role 
awareness as the most important PSFs for teams. Taxonomies for team and 
organization PSFs are provided by Gibson (2008), and Kim (2003). The IDAC model 
for cognitive modeling and investigation of the NPP operating crew as well as 
implementation of the effect of individual PSFs are fully developed by Chang et al. 
(2007). In this study the effects of PSF sets that influence human cognitive processes 
are studied for different cognitive stages. Most of the research in this area is focused 
on classifying the factors and obtaining taxonomies rather than developing 
quantification methods to be used in simulation approaches. Such taxonomies 
consider the human operator vs. the hardware system, the situation and environment, 
the cognitive stressors and personal capabilities, the organization and the rest of 
operating crew.  
O’Conner et al. (2008) developed a nuclear team skills taxonomy including shared 
situation awareness, team focused decision-making, communication, co-ordination 
and collaboration. They used interviews and reviewing documentations in order to 




introducing an error making process and a model for error recovery. Sasou’s research 
provided the fundamental and basics for the team error management model used in 
this research. Taxonomy for team and organization PSFs has been provided by Bust 
(2008). Bocanete et al. (2007) categorized PSFs as external, internal and team related. 
They listed lack of communication, inappropriate task allocation and excessive 
authority gradient and over trusting as major categories of team PSFS. They focused 
on the relationship between team errors and PSFs and failures in team error recovery 
process.  
The considerations for creating a dynamic HRA framework necessary for simulation 
have been highlighted by Boring (2006); he studied the use of MIDAS, a NASA 
design and analysis system in simulation and modeling of human contributions to risk 
in NPPs and listed major PSFs as available time, stress, stressors, complexity, 
experience, training, procedures, ergonomics, HMI (Human Machine Interface), 
fitness for duty and workspace.  
Requirements and guidelines are provided by Mosleh et al. (2004) for the human 
reliability analysis methods that are used for probabilistic safety assessment of 
nuclear power plants. The training simulator for NPPs deficiencies has been 
investigated and those deficiencies have been identified via observation by Carvalho 
et al. (2006). The issue of simulation of human operator behavior and advanced 
knowledge-based systems powered by influencing factors for computer aided 




Sasangohar et al. (2010) studied the sources of complexity in the control room and 
listed environmental, organizational, interface complexity, and cognitive complexity 
as the main categories. Mengzho et al. (1997) studied real operators at both 
experienced and less experienced levels and observed their response, actions and 
communication. They used a questionnaire for different scenarios to study effects of 
crew experience, stress and quality of interface and found operators training level, 
experience and cultural background to be the most effective factors.   
The effect of the nature of team differences, their consistency and training 
implications on situation awareness is the subject of interest of Patrick et al. (2006); 
they used observational assessment of situation awareness, team differences and 
training implications and observed five teams in three scenarios using three observers. 
They listed planning, problem solving, team coordination, attention, communication 
and knowledge as the main factors contributing to building Situational Awareness 
(SA).  
Patrick et al. (2009) examined different aspects of situation assessment for 
understanding, analyzing and developing it using existing observed data and 
literature. They categorized main team activities as to achieve and maintain SA, to 
decide over a course of action and to perform the action. They listed the reasons of 
failure to detect the information from system to be poor instrumentation, ineffective 
communication and cognitive fixation.  
O’Conner et al. (2008) developed the nuclear team skills taxonomy with a focus on 




ordination and collaboration. Blackman et al. (2008) provided definition of a 
predefined set of PSFs and a method to quantify human error using those PSFs. 
2.3.1 Communication inside Team 
Hirotsu et al. (2001) reported that 25% of human error incidents in Japanese NPPs 
were due to communication failure. There is a significant body of research on the 
importance of communication inside a team and its effect on team performance. Most 
of such research used recorded data from real life control rooms in real or simulated 
situations. Lee et al. (2011) states that poor communication or communication error 
have been either a major or minor reason for incidents from 2001 to 2007 in NPPs in 
Korea (20 out of 27 cases). They present a qualitative and a quantitative method to 
analyze communication errors. They list communication errors, error modes and 
types with respect to timing, channel, contents, and sequence. They also classify 
possible causes as person, technology and organization related. They investigated the 
effect of these factors on communication by investigating a known failure scenario. 
Kolbe et al. (2009) provided taxonomy of coordination activities in the operating 
rooms (medical applications) and emphasized on the effects of “non-explicit 
communication” inside such environments. Strater {(2002), (1999)} realized that the 
importance of communication varies for different cognitive activities. His study is 
based on field data from actual control room operators. The researcher has divided the 
cognitive activities into six basic categories and has provided relative measures for 
importance of communication in each step. It has been found that the importance of 
communication is relatively high in activities such as coordinating, imagining, 




Park (2011) used a social network analysis technique to investigate crew 
communications in NPPs.  The communication data of an operating crew under 
simulated off normal conditions were collected, analyzed, and compared with existing 
knowledge of communication characteristics from literature. The research results 
show that the amount of communication declines with respect to increase in the level 
of workload; however, in a good performance crew the amount of communication 
related to observation and announcement increases. The crew performance scores are 
proportioned to the levels of communication cohesion in the network.  
Juhasez et al. (2011) studied the data available from a Hungarian NPP located in Paks 
along river Danube and empirical research on NPPs operating crews; they concluded 
that a high task load situation would increase communication. They linked team 
coherence to mental and cognitive processes. The importance of cooperation and 
stress management on communication quality is emphasized by this study using field 
observations and experiments as well. They provided an overview of IPO (Input-
Process-Output) models for team performance and investigated the relationship of 
team assertiveness and team agreeability to communication and emphasized the 
importance of implicit communication in order to save resources.  
Entin et al. (2001) used a variety of team-based measures to assess teams in 
simulation environments. They used observer and participants’ quantitative 
assessments. They characterized and analyzed team performance using these 
measures. Their work is based on qualitative ratings mostly on communication 
aspects. Firth-Cozens (2004) studied the reasons that communication fails in control 




resources. They have also listed individual causes such as personality, authority, 
language and the amount of shared training and knowledge. Stachowski et al. (2009) 
compared the high performance crew with the low performance crew based the 
complexity of the interaction patterns. In their research, the higher performance group 
exhibited fewer interaction patterns and less complex interaction, fewer behaviors 
such as verbal communication and fewer actors and less back and forth 
communication.  
A method is introduced by Petkov et al. (2004) to evaluate teamwork in accidents 
based on the concept of human performance shifts and is practiced using famous 
scenarios such as TMI and Chernobyl. However, the data sources that are used are 
very limited.  The communications within control room crews based on empirical 
data are analyzed and the study finds that operators use informal verbal exchanges (as 
opposed to procedural and formal communications) to solve plant problems and 
resolve conflicting goals in bringing stability to system performance.  
Other field studies such as a study by Vicente et al. (2001) have emphasized that 
information obtained via communication with local operators is of great importance. 
Carvalho et al. (2006) analyzed the communication within control room crews in shift 
changeovers and in the form of verbal exchange to determine the role of such 
communications in providing resilience and stability in system operation. They 
investigated how cultural and cognitive issues related to the work of NPP’s operators 
in control room impact plant safety. Carvalho et al. (2008) gathered empirical data 
from control rooms, using audio and video records, and investigated the content of 




adequate use of written documents and showed that people deal with the non-
compliance during the normal operation using porous communications to achieve a 
consensual coordination of actions and behaviors. Waller et al. (2004) conducted a 
study of 14 operators under simulators and examined effects of adaptive behavior and 
shared mental models on performance. They realized that group communication, 
when all team members are located in one room and engage in face-to-face 
communication, is more effective as they are more able to communicate verbally and 
non-verbally. The importance of implicit (nonverbal) communication was highlighted 
by their research.  
2.3.2 Supervision & Leadership 
The importance of supervision and leadership inside the operating team has been 
addressed and explored implicitly inside the existing literature on team performance 
shaping factors.  Harrington et al. (1993) investigated the effect of team skill training 
on behavioral markers such as communication, feedback, conflict resolution, 
workload management and leadership with real operating crews and pilots using 
questionnaires and realized individuals show more positive attitude post training. One 
of their fundamental findings was that the NPPs operating crews believe that the 
responsibility for the safe operation rests more with Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) 
than with the crew.  
Petkov et al. (2004) studied the performance evaluation method (PET), which uses 
two reliability models for cognitive processes and group communication. They used 




and compared them with PET algorithm. They highlighted the role of the supervisor 
as the center of the communication network inside the team of operators. 
Carvalho et al. (2005) observed control crews in control room during simulator 
training and used post-scenario interviews to see how cultural and cognitive issues 
affect the performance. They noticed that the supervisor holds the ultimate 
responsibility for team activities in the eyes of rest of the crew and serves as the main 
communication channel for inside and outside activities. (They also recommended the 
use of a senior operator to help the supervisor with his tasks). 
Brennen et al. (2007) studied the most appropriate team structure for the most 
effective performance; they used existing literature to derive theoretical concepts and 
formulated the concepts and implemented them by computer modeling. They listed 
monitoring, feedback and backup as main team activities. The result of their study 
shows that decreasing level of knowledge increases time to complete the task and 
engaging in positive team activities such as feedback decreases that time. Their 
conclusion was that the optimum case of knowledge distribution inside the team for 
highest performance is when the knowledge of the supervisor is the maximum. 
Broberg et al. (2008) used the simulator experiment to investigate the effects of PSFs 
on operator performance in a NPP steam generator tube rupture scenario both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. They mention the shift supervisor leadership style as 
the major factor in qualitative evaluation of PSFs. Effective leadership style is 
defined as good situational awareness and quick responses without consultation, and 




did not find any clear patterns in communication style of fast and slow groups and 
concluded that it cannot explain the differences in performance among crew behavior 
all by itself. 
2.4 Team Performance 
Theories directed at teams (small groups) provide different frameworks for 
addressing team behavior (Ilgen et al., 2004). Some researchers have used analytical 
and computational developments to handle more effectively the complexities of 
multilevel problems (Klein et al., 2000). There are also mathematical and 
computational models for aiding the understanding of organizational behavior in 
teams and other settings (Arrow et al., 2000), (Hulin et al., 2000) and (Losada 1999). 
These theories and methods provide a firm foundation for investigating team 
performance.  
Sebok (2000) compared the effectiveness of interface design and staffing levels on 
various aspects of team performance in the control room. It was also revealed that 
NPP crew cognitive activities are strongly related to successful NPP safety 
performance, particularly for emergency situations. He found that the workload is 
higher in smaller groups and in conventional plants, the normal crews performed 
better than minimum sized groups with higher situational awareness and lower 
workload. However, advanced interface increased the workload of a team.  
Petkov et al. (2004) studied safety investigation of team performance in accidents and 
developed a method based on well-known observed scenarios. The performance 
evaluation method (PET) had two reliability models for cognitive processes and 




training sessions for operator teams and they compared these data using PET 
algorithm. They also emphasized the role of team supervisor as the center or 
communication model. 
Boring et al. (2008) studied the effect of reduced staffing levels in advanced control 
rooms from a team performance perspective using simulations. Stachowski et al. 
(2009) focused on demographics & team effectiveness factors for evaluating team 
performance. They compared high and average-performing groups based on the 
complexity of their interaction patterns. They used exploratory study and investigated 
frequency and complexity of patterns. Better performing groups showed less 
systematic pattern for communication and less complex interaction with fewer 
actions.  
Sasangohar et al. (2010) studied team interactions as one of the sources of complexity 
in advanced NPP’s control rooms and developed a method to investigate their effect 
on performance levels. Smith et al. (2007) provided descriptive reviews of the 
methods and measures used for measuring task and mission performance in virtual 
environments. They considered measuring the individual performance, team 
performance and communication analysis. 
Su Ha et al. (2007) considered plant performance, personnel task performance, 
situation awareness, workload, teamwork and psychological factors for the human 
performance evaluation and introduced measures in each category. Furta et al. (1999) 




activities and a knowledge base and used simulation in order to evaluate the operator 
performance in three different layouts of control rooms.  
Waller et al. (2004) conducted a study on a number of NPPs control crews as they 
faced routine and non-routine situations and found out that higher performance 
groups do a much better job in information collection and building the shared mental 
model as well as multi-tasking which is considered to be the reason for the better 
performance.  
Lang et al. (2001) followed empirical investigation by Roth et al. (1994) and revealed 
that the NPP crew’s cognitive activities, which are the basis for crew performance, 
are strongly related to successful NPP safety performance, particularly for emergency 
situations. Flin et al. (2002) described the basic principles to enhance operational 
performance such as leadership, situation awareness, decision-making, teamwork and 
communications.  
Paris et al. (2000) provided a summary of research on human performance in a team 
setting, to identify team level elements of success and to measure these 
characteristics. They specified three important factors in performance as team 
selection, task design and team training and summarized the most effective PSFs. 
They also provide a taxonomy for human performance measures. 
Stanton et al. (2000) investigated the impacts of change in the company on system 
and team performance. Observing different teams at different stages of team 
development working in the same control room, they realized newer teams (with less 




provided a summary of the approaches that use this framework and realized that the 
wheel network is the optimized type of communication for faster performance inside 
control room. However, it can be overloading for the person in the hub (center), 
which would lead to censoring and poor decision making. They also emphasized the 
importance of informal communication.  
As mentioned earlier, Brennen et al. (2007) explored the most appropriate team 
structure for most effective performance; their conclusion was that the optimized case 
for knowledge distribution inside the team for highest performance is the knowledge 
of the supervisor. 
2.4.1 Team Performance Models 
Team performance has been the subject of study by many researchers, including 
Massaiu et al. (2011), Sasou et al. (1999), Kim et al. (2003), O’Conner et al. (2008), 
Helmreich et al. (1993), and Klein et al. (2010), who have studied. Many have 
developed taxonomies of Team PSFs as part of their approach. In this section the 
proposed models for performance evaluation are reviewed.  
One of the most relevant of the current literature on crew performance is work done 
by Massaiu et al. (2011).  They developed the Guidance-Expertise Model (GEM) to 
model NPP control room crews in emergency response situations.  GEM introduces 
two cognitive control modes that the operating crew uses during emergency 
situations: 1) narrowing and 2) holistic. The control modes are affected by external 
PIFs, such as the quality of the emergency procedures, and internal PSFs, such as the 
quality of the crew’s teamwork.  The outcome behaviors are generic types of crew 




at the Halden Reactor Project
6
 and the researchers used observations to derive a 
preliminary list of behavioral outcomes.  
Sasou and Reason (1999) put the emphasis on team errors in their research and 
offered definitions of team errors and team error taxonomy. Four types of error are: 
independent individual errors, dependent individual errors, independent shared errors, 
and dependent shared errors.  They defined three major error categories in a team 
context: Failure to detect, Failure to indicate, and Failure to correct.  They reviewed 
events that occurred in the nuclear power industry, aviation industry and shipping 
industry and concluded the proposed definition and taxonomy were useful in 
categorizing team errors. The analysis also reveals that deficiencies in 
communication, resource/task management, and excessive authority gradient and 
excessive professional courtesy are likely causes of team errors. 
Helmreich et al. (1993) developed a Crew Resource Management (CRM) program 
which is a training program created for the aviation industry that attempts to improve 
crew coordination and flight deck management.  CRM is an input-process-output 
model, whereby inputs translate roughly into PSFs. Similarly, many of the process 
functions in the CRM model describe the nature and quality of the emergent 
psychological mechanisms of team performance, such as communications, team 
formation and leadership, planning, and coordination of tasking. In addition, 
Helmreich (1999) proposed an Error Threat Taxonomy to further characterize team or 
crew performance.   
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Team Process Model by Pascual et al. (2001) has its origin in the team model concept 
by McGrath et al. (1994). The model consists of a series of input, team work 
processes and output variables. Input factors shape the way in which the team 
operates and the nature of teamwork required.  Outcome factors are domain-specific 
and are measurable.  
Boring (2008) discusses that that control room simulators do not offer the only 
effective way to gather data about crew performance and Simulation studies—
involving virtual crews and virtual control rooms—offer an increasingly powerful 
way to predict crew performance. Additionally, he discusses that data collection tools 
such as the US NRC’s Human Events Repository and Analysis (HERA) system are 
an effective way to evaluate human performance based on event reports. He 
recommends using a collection of methods such as research simulator studies, 
training simulator studies, control room simulations, and event reporting to create a 
powerful approach to understanding crew performance. 
2.5 Summary of Findings 
This section highlights the issues identified by this research based on the review of 
related literature on modeling and investigation of team behavior, and describes the 
way this research addresses such issues. 
The issue of group structure and functions has been ignored for a long time as the 
subject of systematic research except for the psychology context. However, 
experimental psychology has not systematically addressed important team related 
variables such as shared information and coordination. This research applies a 




individual and team influencing factors on the operator and team errors. Individual 
operators’ cognitive activities, team error management, communication and the 
causal influence of performance shaping factors are being explicitly modeled and 
integrated together as a single team model, and being investigated under different 
circumstances using simulation. 
Many studies have explored systematic approaches to investigate team behavior in 
the context of high-risk environments using field studies and observational methods. 
Such methods have provided limited applications and are not reproducible. Since 
finding comparable groups is difficult, it is hard to verify and generalize the results. 
Theoretical approaches mostly aim to provide understanding of the work environment 
and taxonomies of performance shaping factors as well as their possible outcomes. 
The empirical work is only beginning to consider the implications of time in research 
designs. The real contributions of interpersonal relationships on team effectiveness 
and consequently on the entire system have not been fully and quantitatively 
addressed. Even though a number of researchers have developed HRA based 
techniques, only a few have been evaluated systematically. Considering the large 
amount of parameters and the required flexibility for configuration to obtain 
verifiable results, a systematic simulation approach to investigate team behavior is 
highly desirable. This research addresses such issues by using a simulation method to 
explore the complexities associated with the dynamics of the crew behavior with 
focus being on timing properties and error management activities.  
Most of the research in the area of team PSFs is focused on classifying the factors and 




simulation approaches. Such taxonomies consider the human operator vs. the 
hardware system, the situation and environment, the cognitive stressors and personal 
capabilities, the organization and the rest of operating crew. This research conducted 
a full study on the existing literature on individual and team PSFs and developed 
detailed causal models which have been used in quantification of human error 
probabilities.  
Communication failure has been identified as have major contribution to incidents 
involving human error in NPPs. There is a significant body of research on the 
importance of communication inside teams and its effect on team performance. Most 
of such research has used recorded data from real life control rooms in real or 
simulated situations (Park, 2011). Some researchers have emphasized the effects of 
“non-explicit communication” inside environments such as control rooms and 
operating rooms in medical applications (Kolbe et al., 2009), ,however, this research 
did not model non-explicit communication inside control rooms. The effect of 
workload on communication inside teams has been studied by different researchers; 
however, the results are contradictory and differ for expert and non-expert teams. 
Some researchers (Stachowski et al., 2009) used the number of communication 
patterns and number of people involved as a measure for the complexity of team 
activities. This research has adapted the most popular idea from the existing research 
such as Stanton et al. (2000) and has used a star (wheel) communication network to 
pattern for operating crews.  Furthermore the effects of device-based communication 
have been considered by this research in modeling the communication between 




The importance of supervision and leadership in the operating team not only has been 
discussed and explored implicitly in the existing literature by using associated PSFs, 
but also has been highlighted explicitly by some researchers such as Petkov et al. 
(2004) and Carvalho et al. (2005). They realized that the knowledge and the 
leadership style of the supervisor have significant impacts on team performance. Our 
work uses a case study and explores the effect of such factors on team performance as 
part of the model validation process.  
There is a large body of research on team performance and contributing factors which 
has been fully studied by this research in order to collect a comprehensive set of those 
factors. Most of the existing team performance models are in the form of I-P-O (Input 
Process Output) models and define different performance measures such as number 
of goals achieved, number of completed actions, and timeline for those actions. This 
research used the response time and successful completion of tasks as team 





Chapter 3: The Fundamentals of the Crew Model 
 
This chapter provides a high level view of the Crew Model from a conceptual 
perspective. To this end the basics of the model are reviewed and definitions for 
technical terms are provided. The origin of the model is introduced and related 
methods applied in this work are discussed. A review of the fundamentals applied for 
the simulation approach is provided at the end of this chapter. 
3.1 Task-Oriented Teams 
Organizations are shifting toward team-based operations, which are based on the 
cooperation of people with different expertise and capabilities. Consequently, there is 
an increasing reliance on teams to respond to non-routine events in times of crisis. 
Team members work interdependently to accomplish goals and have the power to 
control at least part of their operations. Druckman et al. (1991) lists the general focus 
in studying teams as the team processes, organizational structures, and operating 
procedures that are required for optimal task performance. Teams, the tasks they 
accomplish, and the environment in which they operate are diverse, hence the 
problems associated with team performance and the means of solving those problems 
are specific to the task and work environment. Since this research is focused on the 
operating crew and the control room environment, team success is associated with the 
concept of “Task Completion”. Such teams are considered “task-oriented” teams. 
Task-oriented teams have structured and interdependent relationships, interactions, 
and mutual influence (Levi, 2007). Figure 3 illustrates important features of task- 




level of knowledge, skills, abilities and authority, and necessary group process skills 
that are compatible with the task. The task should also be suitable for teamwork. The 
team must combine resources effectively to complete the task.  
 
Figure 3: Task oriented teams 
A successful team has clear directions and goals, appropriate leadership, suitable 
tasks, necessary resources to perform tasks, and organizational support. In addition to 
these factors, an open and supportive communication climate ensures emotional 
comfort and focus. The characteristics of quality group communication listed by 
Pattron et al. (2002) include: atmosphere of the group, clear objectives and 
acceptance of roles, reaching consensus (cohesion and conformity), and balanced 
power. In studying teams, the group size, level of group cohesion, trust and 
cooperation are important factors.  
In evaluating team performance, both technical and non-technical skills of the 




“hard” and social “soft” skills of the team members. The cognitive “hard” skills are 
related to problem-solving activities,, and include professional knowledge, problem 
solving abilities and standard compliance. The social “soft” skills are team-relevant 
skills such as task load management, cooperation and communication (Juhasz et al., 
2011). In general, team interaction involves “soft” skills such as motivation and 
leadership style in contrast to technical skills directly needed for the job at hand. 
Team interactions take place in form of discussion and interpretation, negotiation, and 
argument. Communication is essential to any team interaction and activity. It is 
through team interactions which involve “soft” skills (such as discussion and 
interpretation, negotiation, and argument), that shared mental models are developed.  
3.1.1 Shared Mental Models 
All team activities are centered on building a shared mental model. Building a shared 
mental model lowers the load of coordination activities. Under high workload 
conditions communication inside a team becomes very important. Shared mental 
model means the shared cognition and understanding of the current situation. “Shared 
contextual knowledge” and “shared situational awareness” are alternative terms used 
to describe the mutual knowledge and beliefs about the ongoing situation, knowing 
each other’s goals, current and future activities and intentions. Team communication 
is essential in building a shared mental model, which in turn significantly lowers the 
load of coordination activities.  
Team members are involved in information collection activities and collaborate to 
build a shared mental model that provides a mutual assessment of the system state. In 




solution for any emerged problem. Finally each team member is responsible for a part 
of the action course.  
All these activities involve loads of communication and interaction among team 
members. Furthermore, since technical operating teams are usually led by a 
supervisor, all team activities are monitored and feedbacks are provided. Hence team 
members most likely face error recovery activities as well. These features are 
considered building blocks of the crew model developed in this research, while the 
basic ingredients of individual operator behavior of the proposed crew model are 
from the IDAC (Information, Decision, and Action in Crew context) cognitive model 
(Chang et al., 2007) and the scenario simulations follow typical DPRA 
methodologies. 
3.2 IDAC Model 
Since the development of IDA (Information, Decision and Action) cognitive model 
and error taxonomy (Smidts et al., 1997), extensive research was conducted on this 
framework which ultimately resulted in full development of IDAC model in 2007 
(Chang et al., 2007). IDAC (Figure 4) decomposes an operator’s cognitive flow into 
three main processes: Information Processing, Decision Making, and Action 
Execution. IDAC model specifically targets domains with highly trained operators, 





Figure 4: IDAC Framework 
In IDAC, the crew is modeled as a team of individuals working on different assigned 
tasks and communicating with one another. The individuals differ by the content of 
their knowledge bases, by their mental state, and by the goals and strategies they 
employ (Coyne, 2009). In IDAC the major focus is on developing the a model of 
individual operators. The IDAC cognitive model has been applied as the underlying 
framework for individual operator’s behavior in this research. The dynamic human 
response is derived from certain cognitive rules and physical and psychological 
factors that influence the behavior.  
“Information processing” stage in IDAC model represents the limitations of human 
perception and refers to the operator’s situational awareness of the external world. In 
“Decision-making” stage, the operator develops a situational assessment of the 
current plant state based on perceived information of the previous stage. In this stage, 
the operator uses the situational assessment to guide further activities and selects an 




state and selecting a proper action package. In the “Action execution” stage, the 
operator performs the action that is required. These processes are supported and 
influenced by the operator’s mental state (Coyne, 2009). The mental state is 
represented by a set of performance influencing factors and acts as an internal filter 
(Chang et al., 2007). 
A typical control room is staffed by a group of four people: two operators, a foreman, 
and a shift supervisor. When a malfunction of any subsystem occurs, the control room 
crew is required to recognize that a malfunction is occurring, to work through the 
requisite diagnostics, and to take the necessary corrective actions; all of which need to 
be done in a limited amount of time through a number of interpersonal interactions. 
There are and step-by-step procedures to guide the operations through unfamiliar 
situations. Each member of the team has a different function, but the members are 
interdependent with respect to addressing the larger problem. The original form of 
IDAC introduced three roles inside the team: Operator-Decision Maker (ODM), 
Operator-Action Taker (OAT), and Operator-Consultant (OCT). ODM is the shift 
supervisor and the leader of the operating team. Figure 5 lists the roles of operators 
often considered in studying the operating crew behavior. These roles include: 





Figure 5: An example of NPP control room arrangement 
3.3 Extended IDAC Framework  
This research introduces “Extended IDAC” framework (Figure 6) to model operator 
activities in a team context. The  model incorporates different aspects of teams and a 
number of theories on team dynamics into an integrated model of macro behavior. 
Extended IDAC summarizes team activities into three basic steps: “Collaborative 
Information Processing”, “Shared Decision Making” and “Distributed Action 
Execution”; all of which involve team interactions and generate a shared mental 
model, a consensual decision, and a coordinated action sequence at different stages. 
In this framework individual operators are modeled based on the IDA methodology 
while their activities follow Extended IDAC guidelines. Features of Extended IDAC 
can be summarized as: 
• Extended IDAC is customized for teams. IDAC-based human cognitive 
processes are implemented and encapsulated as internal sequential processes 




underlying network of PSFs which characterize the way operator 
accomplishes tasks. Together they form the operational profile of the operator. 
These object models are then integrated together via communication model to 
develop the model for the operating team.  
• In Extended IDAC there are three different categories of PSFs: Individual 
factors, Team factors and Organizational/Environmental factors. A 
combination of multiple factors through a mechanism of influence determines 
the availability of the operator and the probability of failure of operator’s 
functions. Extended IDAC develops a “PSFs model” and applies it to 
calculate human error probabilities; it captures the effect of static PSFs as well 
as dynamic PSFs such as information load and time load. 
• In Extended IDAC, individual cognitive activities are accomplished in parallel 
and independently by every team member and then merged through team 
dynamics. 
• Extended IDAC adds another team member to the current IDAC configuration 
to explore the communication related factors such as the quality of 
communication device. The additional team member is an equipment operator 
who is located inside the plant (outside of the control room) and takes an 
Operator Action-Taker (OAT) role.  
• In addition, since control room operations are all monitored by the shift 
supervisor, and the human errors are considered correctable inside the team, 
Extended IDAC introduces “Error Management” model and integrates this 




Extended IDAC Framework and the development of the Error Management and PSFs 
models are fully reviewed in the next chapter. In order to better understand the 
capabilities of Extended IDAC, next sections provide detailed information on 
theoretical concepts such as team error management, team performance shaping 
factors, and object based modeling approach as the core model building method 
adopted in this research. 
 
Figure 6: Team behavioral model in Extended IDAC 
3.4 Team Error Management 
Human errors have been embraced as the price of including human operators in 
technical systems and the focus has always been on dealing with the consequences of 
human errors. Most of the human errors which occur within the team of operators are 




likelihood of error in a statistical sense, a more important issue to be addressed is the 
identification of factors that limit human ability to adapt to or change a situation. The 
rate of human error in design and operation is high, but a vast majority of such errors 
are reversible once the operator realizes his mistake, and only cost the operators in 
terms of wasted time. Hence, the recognition of human error and managing it is of 
great importance.  
Figure 7 illustrates a general classification of human error.  An error of Omission is to 
forget or not to perform a task or sub-task. In case of control room operators we 
define these errors as missed actions (human functions), e.g. operator missed the 
message. Error of Commission is doing the task incorrectly and in our case is related 
to errors of planning and execution. For control room operators, we define these 
errors as actions performed incorrectly with respect to timing, direction, sequence and 
object, e.g. operator pushed the wrong button. 
 
Figure 7: Errors of omission and Errors of commission 
Sasou et al. (1999) proposed a model for error management inside a team structure 
(Figure 8). The goal was to develop definitions and error taxonomy and an analysis 
that determines the relationship between the team errors they defined and related 




excessive authority gradient as causes of team errors. Their study introduces three 
broad categories for human error from a team’s perspective: Individual, Shared and 
Team errors; 
• When an individual makes an error without the participation of any other team 
member it is called an individual error.  
• Errors that are shared by some or all of the team members, regardless of 
whether or not they were in direct communication, are classified as shared 
errors.  
• Team error is defined as human error made in group processes.  
Since most human work is performed by teams rather than individuals, when other 
team members fail to indicate or correct individual or shared errors (despite being 
noticed), there may be influences of  team factors and how the team members 
interact.  Figure 8 provides details on the error management activities inside teams. 





Figure 8: Sasou's model for Team error management (1999) 
Based on this framework, three different categories of team errors are identified; 
“failure to detect” an error, “failure to indicate” the occurrence of an error to the rest 
of the team and “failure to correct” the error. Hence the first step in recovering errors 
is to detect their occurrence via self-review or peer-check process. If the remainder of 
the team does not notice errors, they will have no chance to correct them. Once 
detected, the recovery of an error will depend upon whether the team member who 
discovers it brings it to the attention of the rest of the team. This is the second barrier 
to team error making. An error that is detected but not indicated may remain 
uncorrected. The last barrier is the actual correction of errors. Even if the remainder 
of the team notices and indicates the errors, the errors remain unless actual steps are 






Figure 9: Monitoring, feedback and fixing together for error management 
In general, team error handling process involves three different phases: “Monitoring”, 
and “Feedback”, as well as “Fixing and Backing up” (Figure 9). Monitoring is the 
process of tracking activities through watching and speaking or listening to 
colleagues. Feedback is when a team member offers an opinion and advice to a 
colleague. Fixing and backing up is when a team member intervenes to assist a 
colleague when the need for help is perceived. All of these phases involve 
communication in order to exchange information concerning the task and the control 
of the task (Brennen et al., 2007). 
3.5 Team Performance 
3.5.1 Team Performance Shaping Factors 
To achieve a quantitative estimate of the human error probability, most of the HRA 
(Human Reliability Analysis) methods utilize PSFs (PIFs
7
 ) which are a collection of 
factors that represent different aspects of human performance. PSFs characterize the 
roots and facets of human error and provide a numerical basis for calculating the error 
probability (Smith et al., 2007). Modeling these PSFs along with the system allow 
                                                 




simulation-based assignment of their levels, and help to obtain a more realistic model 
for simulation. However, to identify and quantify the PSFs is a highly subjective task.  
While most of the influencing factors are designed to capture human performance at a 
specific point in time, there are factors that evolve over time and the consequence of 
their evolution needs to be considered by an appropriate dynamic approach. The 
former group is known as “Static PSFs”, and in most cases they are assumed to be 
nominal at the outset of a scenario. The latter group, known as “Dynamic PSFs”, 
however, is usually set initially for the scenario and their value is frequently changed 
as a result of change in the system state. Since this research aims to observe system 
behavior over time, the dynamic PSFs as well as the static PSFs need to be 
considered. 
It should be noted that Team PSFs (TPSFs) are different from individual PSFs; Team 
PSFs are factors affecting the performance of a team and their subsequent 
effectiveness, arising from the fact that a group of people are working together in a 
team and on a common task; In contrast, individual PSFs are defined for each 
individual in general. For a team member, a new set of individual PSFs are defined 
which directly address the team-related aspects of individual characteristics. 
Examples are “Training for the role” and “Motivation for the role”.  
As discussed earlier, existing research on PSFs mostly is in the form of taxonomies. 
Researchers such as Hendrickson et al. (2010), Groth et al. (2009), Bust (2008), 
Dawson (2007) and O’Hara et al. (2004), consider the human operator vs. the 




capabilities, the organization and the rest of operating crew in order to categorize 
PSFs. Depending on the specific scenarios that are being simulated and the nature of 
the system under study, usually a subset of PSFs are modeled and applied (Patrick et 
al., 2006), (O’Hara et al., 2004) and (Mengzhuo et al., 1997). Since model developed 
in this research is inspired by NPP operating crews and their team failure modes, the 
applicable set of PSFs have been addressed by research on existing literature in the 
nuclear power HRA domain.  
Among individual PSFs, stress, attention, task complexity, availability of information, 
the quality of interface, the person’s experience/training, and time pressure (time 
constraint) have been research spotlights (Boring, 2006), (Mengzhuo et al., 1997), 
(Bust, 2008), (Hendrickson et al., 2010). Clearly defined roles and duties, standard 
communication structure and protocols, and the quality of procedures and leadership 
have been of great interest in existing research in this domain (Bust, 2008), 
(Hendrickson et al., 2010), (Groth et al., 2009).  
Although the number of group members is intuitively a very important factor, it is not 
been mentioned to have a significant difference, perhaps because the size of an 
operating team is usually the same in most cases (Bust 2008).  
The quality of verbal communications has been found to make a significant difference 
in providing resilience and stability in system operation as it affects knowledge 
sharing, problem solving, selection of goals and action processes by Carvalho et al. 
(2008) and Patrick et al. (2006). The importance of communication, cooperation and 




using observational experiments. Since communication is essential to any team 
activity, one of the most common team PSFs is “Deficiency in Communication”. An 
observational method has been applied in the study by Patrick et al. (2006) where the 
effects of quality of communication and the team coordination have been studied in 
particular. Other field studies have shown that in addition to the control room 
indicators and alarms, the information obtained via communication with local 
operators has a major impact on the quality of operator actions (Vicente et al., 2001), 
(Mumaw et al., 2000) and (Vicente et al., 1998).  
Bust (2008), Dietrich et al. (2004), and Starter et al. (2002) realized that the 
importance of communication varies for different cognitive activities. They have 
found that the importance of communication is relatively high in activities like 
coordinating, imagining, associating and identifying. Firth-cozens (2004) lists team 
instability, poor teamwork and organizational policies and resources as reasons for 
communication failure in teams; in addition, individual causes such as personality, 
authority, language and the amount of shared training and knowledge. Many of the 
recent studies such as Groth  (2009), Carvalho et al. (2008), Dawson (2007), Patrick 
et al. (2006), Boring (2006), O’Hara et al. (2004 ) and Kim et al. (2003) are dedicated 
to the study of systematic construction of PSF sets for NPP HRAs.  All of these 
studies have mentioned team cohesion, coordination and cooperation, and 
communication quality as the most notable Team PSFs.  
This research follows the guidelines and high level classification proposed by Groth 
et al. (2009) (Figure 10) for major categories of TPSFs and expands the level of 




Cohesion, Role-Awareness, Team Coordination, Communication and Direct 
Supervision. Details of the team PSFs model proposed by this research is discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
3.5.1.1. Communication 
Communication refers to the ability of team members to pass information to each 
other (Groth, 2009). Communication can be verbal, non-verbal, and device-based or 
via writing. Communication assists team members to build knowledge of a shared 
situation. It is often considered from two perspectives: Communication Availability 
and Communication Quality, meaning that no information is passed from sender to 
receiver, or the information passed is less than adequate, or miscommunicated. 
Communication is related to the Information Availability. The availability of 
information could be directly caused by less than adequate communication; however 
other organizational factors may interfere.  
3.5.1.2 Direct Supervision 
Direct Supervision serves as the link between management and the team members. 
Often direct supervision and management are collectively referred to as leadership 
(Paris et al., 2000).  In this research, direct supervision and leadership terms are used 
interchangeably since the supervisor plays the role of the team leader. The direct 
supervisor is a member of the team with additional authority and responsibility and 
has a key role in the team. The supervisor has the dual responsibility of setting goals 
for the group and also working with group members to accomplish these goals 





Figure 10: Major categories of team PSFs 
3.5.1.3 Team Coordination 
Team Coordination refers to the overall interactions of the team, including 
distribution of responsibilities and ability to work as a unit (Barnes et al., 2001). 
Communication and Direct Supervision can be considered as aspects of Team 
Coordination, but Team Coordination also involves additional factors that contribute 
to overall team performance. This includes planning and scheduling on the team level 
and decisions made during team discussions (Groth, 2009). Poor communication and 
other factors such as lack of knowledge and poor teamwork could be responsible for 
the poor coordination.  
3.5.1.4 Team Cohesion  
Team Cohesion refers to the way that team members interact with each other (Hoegel 
et al., 2001). Groth (2009) mentioned that team cohesion has been referred to as 




closely related to most of other team PSFs such as coordination; less cohesive teams 
are more likely to have less effective in coordination. Team Cohesion includes group 
morale and group attitude toward the task. Mullen et al. (1994) provide the 
characteristics of cohesive teams as interpersonal attraction of team members, 
commitment to the team task, and group pride and team spirit.  
3.5.1.5 Role Awareness 
The distribution of roles and responsibilities is very important in a team. How each 
team member perceives his/her duties, responsibilities, and role as a team member is 
called Role Awareness and is a critical factor in team performance. It is related to 
how the team divides tasks and how team members interact (Paris et al., 2000). Role 
Awareness requires workers to be aware of their place in the team and to act 
according to the expectations of the role (Groth, 2009). Operators in NPPs have 
defined roles; the compliance of each operator to the expectations of his/her role is 
mandatory. Groth (2009) distinguished two main functions of Role Awareness: to 
ensure that tasks are completed and to enhance team coordination. In order to reduce 
conflict inside the team and ensure the completion of all tasks, proper role awareness 
for all members including the leader is necessary. 
Since factors such as team cohesiveness and role awareness are necessary for almost 
every team activity, team  PSFs are considered to be interdependent by this research. 
This interdependency has been captured using a hierarchy of factors and will be 





Figure 11: Team PSFs are interdependent 
The development of a causal map offers a way of highlighting both the complexity 
within and the interconnection between the Team PSFs, in terms of their influence on 
each other. Causal maps highlight the relationships between team factors and the path 
of influence; hence it can be clearly seen that altering one factor will have an impact 
on others. Causal maps are modeled using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs)
8
. The 
performance of the team can be further characterized using the following 
classification of team factors: 
• Internal Team PSFs 
• External Team PSFs 
Internal team PSFs include factors that are related to: Task and situation (such as 
Cognitive load, Perceived workload, Work shift), Personal technical skills (such as 
Problem solving), Personal social skills (such as Communication), Team operational 
skills (such as Decision making), Team generic skills (such as Coordination), Team 
soft skills (such as Negotiation), Team structure (such as Goals) and Team roles (such 
as Leadership). On the contrary, External team PSFs are factors that are related to 
                                                 
8 A Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a directed graph, together with an associated set of probability tables. Such 




environment / workspace (including physical, social environment, and working 
conditions), and Organization (including organizational operations, atmosphere, work 
content and instability). Team PSF Model in Extended IDAC and the quantification 
process are discussed in details in Chapter 4.  
3.5.2 Team Performance Model  
Most of the team performance models in the literature are in the form of 
Input/Process/Output (IPO) models. The IPO model posits that a variety of inputs are 
combined to influence processes, which in turn affect team outputs (Juhasz et al., 
2011). Figure 12 illustrates a typical IPO model, which consists of: 
• Inputs: Individual, team related, task related and organizational factors 
• Processes: Team working and team activities 
• Outputs: Team performance and outcomes 
 
 
Figure 12: Typical IPO model 
Table 1 lists examples of inputs, processes and outputs of the IPO model. Inputs are 
classified as individual factors such as personality, attributes, skills, knowledge and 
abilities, team-related factors such as team size, team structure and team composition, 




factors such as support, resources and culture (Juhasz et al., 2011). In the case of NPP 
operator teams, the emphasis is on the team members’ professional knowledge, 
although the team members need to possess social skills and abilities for teamwork. 
Task characteristics are considered as: level of autonomy and control; level of task 
interdependence; different levels of task load, task complexity, and uncertainty. The 
different levels of task load that control room operators are faced with require a 
continuous behavioral adaptation from the team members. The organizational factors 
are organizational culture, training, performance appraisal, and reward system. In a 
NPP environment safety is the key concept and is the main focus of any 
organizational factor. 
Intergroup processes refer to interactions that take place among the team members 
and include conflict, efforts toward leadership and those communication patterns that 
differentiate teams from each other (Juhasz et al., 2011). Each team has its own 
communication style depending on the environment they are working in. “Team 
Processes” are basically different dimensions of team working; hence consensus, 
coordination, decision-making, information exchange, cooperation, participation, 
monitoring, conflict and stress management, and control room activities are all 
considered as team processes. For NPPs operating crew process variables include all 




Table 1: IPO factors for teams extracted from existing literature 
 
Team output refers to team outcomes associated with productivity, and performance 
as well as capability of team members to continue the work cooperatively (Juhasz et 
al., 2009). Examples of outputs in team performance model include critical success 
factors such as trust, commitment, efficiency, productivity, and innovation; work and 
life satisfaction factors such as work involvement, job motivation, life satisfaction, 
well-being, and happiness. Output variables are the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of team performance, effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, team members’ 
satisfaction, wellbeing, and commitment. The current and the future performances 
predict the capability whether the team continues to work together as a unit or not. 
The most important measure of team effectiveness is the current performance 
assessment of the team, which is based on either supervisor ratings of team 




3.5.3 Performance Measurement 
A number of performance measures (calculated per unit of time) are introduced by 
Smith et al. (2007) and Entin et al. (2001), which reflect the quantity, directionality, 
timing and type of such processes. Some examples of these measures include 
measures for quality of team communication such as number of requests and 
transmissions of information per unit of time, number of requests for information-
action per unit of time, frequency and complexity of interaction patterns that are used 
for sharing knowledge, directing attention, and determining next step, with respect to 
the number of team members that are involved and number of communication loops.  
The performance measures on team outcomes include: Accuracy of performance 
which usually considers the number of goals achieved, Timeline for action including 
the time to initiate and the time to complete important tasks, Number of errors (with 
respect to timing, sequence, and taking inappropriate or unnecessary actions) and 
Deviation in system parameters. Among these measures, Accuracy of team actions 
(with respect to timing, sequence, and taking inappropriate or unnecessary actions) 
and Time for action completion have been used in this research.  
3.6 Simulation Approach  
3.6.1 Simulation-Based Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
Among the advantages of using simulation studies is the possibility to adjust and 
change parameters repeatedly according to the aim of the researcher. Since this study 
is focused on the investigation of team behavior and interactions in the specific 
domain of a NPP, the application of simulation methods in human reliability analysis 




is focused on the identification of the human error and its contributors and is usually 
the result of task analysis or incident investigation while quantitative HRA is focused 
on translating identified event or error into a Human Error Probability (HEP). 
Qualitative and quantitative HRA are complementary however not all of the events 
are always well enough understood to be quantified. The ultimate purpose of the 
majority of human reliability analysis methods is to identify human responses and 
errors, estimate the response probabilities, and identify causes of errors to support 
development of preventive or mitigating measures (Kirwan, 1994).   
 
Figure 13: HRA approach 
In order to achieve such goals, these methods need to apply a systematic procedure 
for generating reproducible results, based on human cognitive and behavioral 
processes. A set of performance shaping factors and a structure that provides 
traceable links between its input and output forms a model; but no model is credible 
without real data, thus reliable sources of data should be available (Mosleh et al., 
2004). The application of computer simulation is necessary to support the study of 
time-dependent behavior of performance influencing factors. Computer simulations 
provide more precise and detailed information on scenario evolution and context for 
human response and explore a wider range of accident conditions. Since 




NPPs, the empirical studies of such situations can best be carried out by analyses of 
carefully chosen simulator sessions. 
3.6.2 Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
In practice, risk assessment is performed by first identifying how a system might 
deviate from its intended performance, second deciding how probable these 
deviations are, and third determining what the consequences of these deviations might 
be (Kaplan et al., 2001). Dynamic PRA basically involves the simulation of dynamic 
behavior of the system by using models of system elements and rules of their external 
and internal interactions. Simulation-based DPRA focuses on the influence of time 
and process dynamics on risk scenarios. DPRA methods are created and designed in 
order to study complex and dynamic systems (Chang, 1999). The goal is to generate 
scenarios involving the failure of a combination of subsystem and components with 
different nature by using simulation. Before studying a technical system, it has to be 
described and formalized. Hence, obtaining a formal representation of the system and 
its behavior is an essential part of any DPRA approach. Figure 14 shows the essential 
parts of any model-based simulation approach. The formal representation of the 
system consists of models of its elements and the model of system dynamics. The 
simulation controller is responsible for actuating accident initiating events and 
different failures as well as setting up sequence termination criteria. Based on 
simulation results, the influence of time and process dynamics are investigated on risk 
scenarios. Probability estimation and consequence determination processes are 
affected by the influence of the dynamics of the system on the failure rates and failure 




Dynamic event-based systems evolve in time by the occurrence of events at possibly 
unknown irregular time intervals. These systems are modeled using discrete events 
which cause the system to change from one state to another. Stochastic events are 
time based or demand based. For time-based events, the timing of the occurrences of 
the events is random, following a probability density function of the time of 
occurrence of events. For demand-based events, the outcomes of that point of time 
are random, with a probability of occurrence of each set of outcomes. 
 
Figure 14: Model-based simulation 
The idea is to dynamically change the states of various subsystems, components and 
operators’ responses within the system and generate possible time dependent 
scenarios. Discrete-event simulation models typically have stochastic components 
that mimic the probabilistic nature of the system under consideration. In this research 




The simulation algorithm generates a dynamic event tree based on the simulation 
model and the predefined branch points. The accident scenarios are created once 
certain conditions are met and associated branching points are activated. Each 
branching point includes two or more individual event branches, each of which 
represents distinct combinations of system and operator states. Once a system end-
state is reached the scenario ends. Branch points in the simulation model are 
associated with the error reference points and the lowest level of functions for each 
simulated module. At each time step some of the branch points are triggered, 
modifying the generated scenario. Together, the branch points describe the topology 
of a DDET which is associated with an initiating event. A specific accident sequence 
is defined by the unique path through the DDET branching points from the initiating 
event to an end state. Model based simulation techniques are becoming popular in 
system risk analysis. However, most of the existing representation languages are 
limited in scope and application. For instance, conventional methods and tools for 
DPRA do not fully account for the risk involved with the interpersonal relationships 
of the operating crew in the context of a complex system. New features need to be 
integrated into existing DPRA approaches in order to model the dynamics of such 
interactions and investigate their contribution to the entire system’s risk profile. To 
this end, this research chooses to apply an object-based modeling methodology for 
representation of different system components. This methodology is discussed in 




3.7 Features of Proposed Model in Comparison with Other 
Models of Team Behavior 
In this section a summary of existing models of team behavior is provided and their 
characteristics and features are discussed and compared and contrasted against the 
team behavior model developed in this research. The models are discussed under two 
categories: Theoretical Models and Simulation Methods. 
3.7.1 Theoretical Models: Team Cognition Models 
 
3.7.1.1 Macro-cognition Model 
 
Letsky and his colleagues (Letsky et al., 2007) introduced a “macro-cognition” model 
for team collaboration. The model was introduced for military applications. It 
identified macro-cognitive processes as: asynchronous, distributed, multi-cultural, 
and hierarchical (Figure 15).  The model includes four major team collaboration 
stages (knowledge construction, collaborative team problem solving, team consensus, 
and outcome evaluation and revision). The conceptual aspects of this model are 
helpful in developing a NPP-specific model for team behavior; however since nuclear 
power operations are highly regulated and are strongly governed by procedures, not 
all of the decision making aspects provided in this model may apply.  This model has 
strong theoretical ties to the psychological literature. This model has roots in four 
general categories of research: externalized cognition, team cognition, group 
communication and problem solving, and collaborative learning and adaptation; i.e. 
how and why a team uses tools and decision aids such as procedures or computers to 
help solving complex problem. This model provides guidelines on how teams use 
technology to assist in their coordination and generate a common understanding of 




affect the assumptions team makes about the situation, tasks, and problem space; and 
finally, how teams work together to create new knowledge. 
 
Figure 15: Macro-cognitive model of team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007) 
3.7.1.2 Macro-cognitive Function Model 
 
Klein et al. (2003) has presented an initial set of primary macro-cognitive functions 
and supporting macro-cognitive processes that are used as means for achieving the 
primary functions. The macro-cognitive functions include: Naturalistic decision 
making, Situation assessment, Planning, Adaptation/Re-planning, Problem detection 
and Coordination. The focus of their research is to encourage research at the macro-
cognitive level rather than to introduce a complete, validated list.  In Figure16, the 
blocks in the middle represent the macro-cognitive functions, while the items in the 




All of these processes are supposed to be shared by all of the functions.  Therefore, 
these functions and processes work together in a continuous loop. This model has 
been used as a starting place and was adapted for a specific domain of Space Shuttle 
missions.   
 
Figure 16: Macro-cognitive functions for individuals & teams (Klein et al., 2003) 
3.7.1.3 A Macro-cognitive Model for NPP Control Room Operations 
 
John O’Hara and his colleagues developed a generic NPP operator performance 
characterization that has been applied in some of the NRC HFE guidance 
development efforts (O'Hara et al., 2008).  This model describes the basic categories 
of operator activities to accomplish control room tasks. O’Hara referred to these 
categories as generic operator tasks.  According to O’Hara, operators perform two 
types of tasks: primary tasks and secondary tasks.  Primary tasks (Figure 17) include 
activities such as monitoring plant parameters, following procedures, responding to 




secondary tasks of interest are “interface management tasks.”  Figure 17 is a diagram 
of O’Hara’s model. 
 
Figure 17:  Cognitive model of control room operations by O’Hara et al. (2008) 
Monitoring/Detection, Situation assessment, Decision and planning, Action 
implementation; this is different from Klein’s view that the cognitive process can start 
from anywhere of the loop.  This difference may reflect a fundamental difference 
between the NPP and aviation/military operations:  NPP operations are procedure-
driven; therefore, human responses to events typically begin with 
monitoring/detection; and aviation and military operations are often driven by goals 
or missions, thus operational personnel can begin their cognitive activities by first 
making a decision or plan then seeking information to refine the decision/plan. 
3.7.1.4 Summary of Observations 
 
Among all the macro-cognitive models discussed here, Extended IDAC framework 
has some shared features with the Macro-cognitive model of team collaboration 
introduced by Letsky et al. (2007). In team macro-cognition model, each member of 
the team is involved in their own independent process of collecting data in parallel 




“individual knowledge building processes”, merge together and become the “team 
knowledge building processes”. Different stages of macro-cognitive model of team 
collaboration, i.e., Knowledge Construction, Collaborative Team Problem Solving, 
Team Consensus, Outcome Evaluation and Revision are similar to the stages of our 
proposed model; however, this model is a conceptual model with many psychological 
details, with a scope is limited to military applications. Hence it is hard to use it as a 
general purpose model. In addition, the last stage of this model is focused on building 
new knowledge and team learning instead of error management, which is an 
important feature of our proposed model.  
3.7.2 Theoretical Models: Team Performance Models 
 
3.7.2.1 Crew Resource Management by Helmreich ( 1999)   
 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a model and training program created for the 
aviation industry that attempts to improve crew coordination and flight deck 
management (Helmreich, 1999).  It focuses on team and managerial aspects of flight 
operations. CRM attempts to optimize the person-machine interface and execute a 
timely and appropriate action. In addition this model takes into account interpersonal 
activities such as leadership, effective team construction and maintenance, problem-
solving, decision-making, and maintaining situational awareness. CRM is an input-
process-output model, in this model inputs are characteristics of individuals, groups, 
and the organizational/operational environment that affect the performance of the 
team.  Many of the factors identified for this model are relevant to NPP crew 
performance, and translate into PSFs. CRM identifies group composition, 




factors” as PSFs that can affect crew performance. Group composition means the type 
of people that are working together in a team and their level of skill and experience. 
Similarly, many of the “crew and mission performance functions” in the CRM model 
consider “team processes” such as communication skills, leadership, planning, 
prioritization, and coordination of tasking.  Figure 18, shows some of PSFs that have 
been identified by CRM. CRM model is similar to our proposed model since it is in 
the form of an Input-Process-Output model and the model is focused on team aspects 
such as communication and leadership. 
 
Figure 18: CRM model and the influencing factors, (Helmreich et al., 1999) 
3.7.2.2 Model of Team Effectiveness by Shanahan (2001) 
 
Shanahan (2001) developed this model which has four main elements: Process, 
Inputs, Outputs and Structure. Process has been considered to be the heart of this 
model. A dynamic set of demands and a set of resources such as information and 
platforms are input to processes. The process uses resources to handle demands. 
Outputs collectively determine team performance and team effectiveness based on 
mission objectives. Process is divided into three parts (Figure 19): task work, 




outputs (team performance). Particular task work responsibilities are defined for each 
member in the team. The quality of task work is influenced by teamwork, and team 
leadership. The overall process is influenced by a variety of structural factors. These 
are physical resources (e.g., technical equipment, workspaces, buildings) or the 
results of prior organizational processes (e.g., selection, training, and planning) 
(Essens, 2005). These factors are assigned properly to cover the teamwork and 
leadership dimensions. Team effectiveness is measured through comparing team 
performance with the initial objectives of the team mission. 
 
Figure 19: Level model of team effectiveness, Shanahan (2001) 
3.7.2.3 Team Process Model by Rasker et al. (2001) 
 
This model proposed by Rasker et al. (2001) defines team effectiveness as the 
predefined concepts such as accuracy, timeliness, and the extent to which the goals 
are satisfied (Figure 20). The process criteria such as motivation and satisfaction are 
also considered to be important indicators of effectiveness. The operational context of 




Situational factors are factors imposed on the team from the outside world (e.g., 
uncertainty of the task, and time stress). Organizational factors are variables outside 
of the team which provide both direction and limitations on the functional abilities of 
the team (e.g., objectives, reward systems, support, and rules). Task factors (e.g., 
complexity, structure, interdependency, and load) are those factors that comprise 
what the team must do to achieve their goals (Essens, 2005). The final two factors 
represent the human elements of the model both at the team (e.g., size, structure, 
cohesion, leadership, composition) and individual level (i.e., knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes).  Teamwork has two kinds of behavioral aspects: task-related activities and 
team-related activities. Task activities include all of those individual behaviors 
directly related to the job at hand. Team activities include all of those behaviors 
which help to strengthen the quality of functional cooperation aspects of team 
members (e.g., communication and coordination). 
 




3.7.2.4 Team Process Model by Blendell et al. (2001) 
 
This model was introduced as the result of a ‘Workshop on Team Modeling’ 
conducted at TNO
9
 Human Factors, in the Netherlands (Essens, 2005). The basic 
objective of the workshop was to communicate and develop modeling concepts for 
understanding the effects of team organization and interaction. The input factors of 
this model (e.g., leadership style, experience, team composition, etc.) impact, or 
influence the process factors that are within the team, and the process factors in turn, 
impact the activities conducted by the team i.e., the output factors (e.g., team 
satisfaction, error rates, etc.). in this model (Figure 21) the emphasis is placed on the 
process factors that occur within the team (i.e., Knowledge, Leadership, Behaviors 
and Attitudes) and the identified input factors and output factors have been provided 
as examples and do not follow a specific structure (e.g., individual characteristics, 
environment, etc.). 
 
Figure 21: Team Process Model by Blendell et al. (2001) 
                                                 




3.7.2.5 Summary of Observations 
 
Most of the theoretical models discussed in this section were in the format of IPO 
models and describe how a set of inputs (influencing factors) affects team processes 
and as a result affect team outputs and performance. The model for team performance 
used in our approach has many aspects in common with the team process model 
introduced by Rasker (2001). However, in our approach team processes are explicitly 
modeled and the dynamics of crew and context are incorporated via a simulation 
approach, making it much more comprehensive and integrative model incorporating 
in an explicit manner many aspects of team performance, causal paths of error, 
influence of context. Table 2, presents a list of key elements of team models 
introduced in the reviewed research and shows the extent to which those elements or 




Table 2: Comparison among team performance models 
Category Elements for Effective Teams Shanahan (2001) Rasker et al.(2001) Blendell et al. (2001) Extended IDAC
Individual Skills √ √ √
Personality √ √
Knowledge √ √ √ √
Attitude √ √
Training √ √
Level of Stress √ √
Experience √ √
Team Norms √ √ √
Size √
Composition √ √ √ √
Cohesion √
Leadership √ √ √ √






Objectives and Goals √ √ √
Motivation √ √
Monitor, Feedback, Audit √ √
Mutual Trust √ √
Clear Role and Responsibilities √
Task Organizational Support √ √ √
Workload √ √
Complexity √  
3.7.3 Simulation Models 
This section provides an overview on a couple of approaches for modeling and 
simulating of the crew behavior. The models include Performance Evaluation of 
Teamwork (PET) introduced by Petko et al. (2004) and CREAM-based 
Communication Analysis Method (CEAM) for NPP crew communication, introduced 
by Lee et al. (2011).  
3.7.3.1 Performance Evaluation of Teamwork (PET) Method 
 
This method, introduced by Petkov et al. (2004), attempts to identify and analyze the 
potential errors of commission by using three basic concepts which determine the 
reliability of human performance: violated, cognitive, and executive erroneous 




these errors and introduces a measure based on the occurrence of deviations from 
expected paths. The PET method consists of two reliability models (Figure 22); one 
for human operator cognition, and the other for representing communication inside a 
team of four operators. These models are represented as directed networks which are 
solved by analysis of topological reliability of digraphs (ATRD) method. The current 
limitations are related to the equal weights of different paths in the accident and the 
action execution error probability.  In this model the team decision-making process is 
seen as a superstructure of the individual cognition. The decision-maker makes the 
correct decision when the situation is cleared up for him. In this case the group 
process is reduced only to the communication process. The project lists fundamental 
characteristics of decision-making as cognition and communication and indicates the 





Figure 22: Human cognitive & communication model (Petkov et al., 2004) 
3.7.3.2 CREAM-based Communication Analysis Method (CEAM) 
 
The descriptive model of the human communication process introduced by Lee et al. 
(2011) for NPPs operators defines the important elements as the sender, the channel, 
and the encoding and decoding phases of sender and receiver. It also considers factors 
affecting each process. The effects of influential factors either increase or decrease 
communication performance. These factors are situation awareness, long term 
memory (expertise) and stress (psychological state), attitude, time pressure which can 
contribute to the success of the communication process. There are also other factors, 
namely short-term memory, mutual awareness and stress (psychological state), 
attitude, time pressure, which can negatively affect this process and can contribute to 
either the success or failure of communication. Whether each factor ultimately 




They analyze the environment in which human communication is conducted to better 
understand and characterize this process and introduce context conditions such as 
adequacy of organization. 
 
Figure 23: Descriptive model of communication (Lee et al., 2011) 
3.7.3.3 Summary of Observations 
 
Table 3 presents a comparison among the discussed models and the model introduced 
by this research for operating crew behavior. The similarities and differences among 
the discussed models are highlighted based on the key features that have been 
modeled and simulated. Note that PET (Petkov et al., 2004) claims to address 
commission errors in the context but does not introduce a separate model for errors 
based on team tasks.  
Table 3: Comparison among simulation models 
Index Features PET CEAM Extended IDAC
1 Operator Cognitive Model √ √
2 Team Model √ √
3 Communication Model √ √ √
4 Leadership √ √
5 PSFs Model √ √
6 Error Model √




Chapter 4: Proposed Model & Implementation Approach 
 
This chapter describes the structural details of the Crew Performance Model 
introduced in this research, and the approach taken to use the mode in a probabilistic 
simulation of crew response to accidents and abnormalities in the systems they 
operate.  The model details cover four sub-models: 1) Extended IDAC model, 2) 
Communication model, 3) Error management model, and 4) PSFs model. In addition 
the methodology adopted for probabilistic simulation of crew-system interactions and 
associated risk scenarios is described at the end of this chapter. The specific 
realization of the simulation method in the context of a case study will described in 
Chapter 5.  
4.1 Extended IDAC 
Chapter 3 provided insights to IDAC model and an overview of the Extended IDAC 
framework. The original form of IDAC introduced three roles inside the team: 
Operator-Decision Maker (ODM), Operator-Action Taker (OAT), and Operator-
Consultant (OCT). The shift supervisor takes the team leader role in a typical control 
room setting. He is also the person who takes the most responsibility for the outcome 
of the operator’s activities.  
In “Extended IDAC” framework (Figure 15), the model of human cognitive processes 
is developed based on IDAC methodology guidelines and has been encapsulated into 
the object models for each operator as internal processes. Developed object models 
for operators are stored in the CREWSIM library in MATLAB Simulink. CREWSIM 
can be used to define any configuration of such object models for future applications. 




operating team. The “Extended IDAC” adds another team member to the current 
configuration to highlight the communication related factors such as the quality of 
communication channel; an equipment operator who is located inside the plant takes 
the Operator-Action Taker (OAT2) role. 
Extended IDAC summarizes team activities into three basic steps illustrated in figure 
15:  
1. Collaborative information processing 
2. Shared decision making 
3. Distributed action execution 
All of the above steps are accomplished on a sequential basis and involve team 
discussion and collaboration among team members, meaning that at each step two or 
more operators are involved actively. At step one, active members are ODM, OCT, 
OAT1 and OAT2. OAT1 and OAT2 provide the information and ODM recognizes 
the system state. If ODM is unable to recognize it, he would ask OCT for advice on 
the system state. Hence, after this step is accomplished the system state is considered 
known. Collaborative information processing is necessary to build a shared mental 
model inside the team to portray the system state. However, in order to have an 
accurate guess for the system state the information collected from the equipment 
operators needs to be complete. This step may include back and forth communication 





Figure 24: Extended IDAC framework 
At step two, ODM and OCT are considered active operators; based on the shared 
mental model, a decision needs to be made about the required plan for action. If 
ODM is unable to make the decision he would be involved in a conversation with 
OCT and ask for advice for the decision. The outcome of this step is the consensual 
decision, meaning that ODM and OCT have agreed on such a decision.  
Step three involves ODM and the equipment operators, and includes a request for 
action on the system and associated acknowledgment of the operation (Figure 24).  
In Extended IDAC model, individual cognitive activities accomplished in parallel and 
independently by every team member are merged through team dynamics. Major 
operator activities in Extended IDAC are:  
• Performing system control (corresponding to “Action” in IDAC framework); 
Equipment Operators 
• Human cognitive activities 
• Error management (detecting, indicating and correcting errors using the 
communication network) 




The content of messages being exchanged among operators is: 
• A request for performing action or providing advice 
• An observation on the system in the form of a report 
• A judgment/advice on the system state or judgment/advice on decision  
• Confirmation/acknowledgement for performing required action 
In Extended IDAC framework the individual cognitive steps and human functions as 
well as error management activities have been represented by sequential blocks, each 
of which are associated with a probability of failure on demand. These blocks are 
preceded by a chance for the operator to be available or not when demanded. These 
probabilities are the result of a set of related contributing PSFs. The mechanism of 
influence of these factors has been captured and is being discussed in section 4.3.  
4.2 Errors in Extended IDAC  
To understand the causes of human error, it is necessary to link the actions that lead 
to an error event back to the underlying cognitive model. In IDAC framework, 
individual errors are defined based on internal and external reference points. IDAC 
associates the human error with the failure to meet a plant need; the basic idea is to 
identify mismatches between internal and external reference points.  
 




Internal reference points are different cognitive stages within the IDAC model and 
include information collection, diagnosis/decision, and action processes. These 
produce:  
• Error in information collected due to receipt of incomplete information from 
the plant or from another crew member or an information filtering error;  
• Incorrect or incomplete assessment of a situation or solution to problem due to 
failure to adequately define the problem or error in problem solving strategy 
selection; 
• Decision error due to inappropriate selection of the solution from equivalent 
alternatives or selection of incorrect decision criteria;  
• Error in action execution due to high operator workload or poorly human 
factored environment.  
The possible mismatch between plant needs and actions are skipping steps, delayed or 
premature actions or action on the wrong object. These mismatches, based on IDA 
framework would be due to Failure of A (Error in Execution) or Failure of A due to 
Error in D, Error in D is caused by a Failure in D or Failure of D due to Failure of I, 
Error in I is caused by Failure in I or Incorrect I from External Source (Steps 1 to 6). 
Hence, the probability of Human Failure Event (HFE) would be the logical or of 
I+D+A (Figure 25).  
External reference points are defined as the plant system, procedures, and the 




caused by erroneous or incomplete information from plant or operator observation 
error; Procedure-Plant Mismatch: caused by erroneous or incomplete procedure; 
Crew-Plant Mismatch: caused by diagnosis, decision, or execution errors; Crew-
Procedures Mismatch: caused by procedure inadequacy from a human factors 
viewpoint or crew lacking knowledge to understand procedure; Crew-Crew 
Mismatch: caused by erroneous or incomplete communication. Errors in Extended 
IDAC framework have been identified using a “comprehensive task analysis” and 
including Individual and team level errors. For a list of emergency operating 
procedures which have been used as the basis for determining the accuracy of actions 
in this research, see appendix D. 
4.2.1 Error Management Model 
Sasou et al. (1999) introduced a model for error management in 1999. The objective 
of their research was to develop definitions and error taxonomy and perform an 
analysis that determines the relationship between the team errors they defined and 
PIFs (PSFs).  They defined error types as: independent individual errors, dependent 
individual errors, independent shared errors, dependent shared errors. They defined 
the error recovery process and classified the team failures as Failure to detect, Failure 
to indicate, and Failure to correct individual errors.  The method they used was to test 
their hypothesis by reviewing events that occurred in the nuclear power industry, 
aviation industry and shipping industry. They concluded that their proposed definition 
and taxonomy are useful in categorizing team errors.  They listed deficiencies in 
communication, resource/task management, excessive authority gradient, and 




modeling team errors provides an opportunity to reduce human errors. This research 
has used their idea and has developed an error module inside each of the operators 
that is responsible for error recognition and handling.  
Based on Sasou’s model, our research suggests that the process of team error 
management consists of the following major team activities:  
• Error Detection 
• Error Indication 
• Error Correction 
Error detection includes active exploration, review and monitoring. Error 
identification is accomplished by using an error reference list and previous 
knowledge of likely consequences. Error indication within a team is accomplished 
using feedback and communication. Finally error recovery includes a selection of 
appropriate control, repetition or back up actions. Such team processes are supported 
by dynamic knowledge (i.e., information from and about the situation at the time) and 
experiential knowledge (i.e., knowledge that an individual brings to the situation 





Figure 26: Error management in Extended IDAC 
Error management in Extended IDAC is a closed loop of reviewing, providing 
feedback and correction activities and involves extra communication inside the team. 
Each person reviews his/her own action, lets the rest of the people know in case there 
was an error and has a chance to correct it (Figure 26). In addition, since the decision 
maker (shift supervisor) is the leader of the team, all actions are monitored by him 
and he is supposed to recognize errors, provide feedback on them and ask for a fixing 
action. These activities, along with the messages that are exchanged regarding the 
error management process inside the team, are called “recovery actions” and 
“recovery messages”. The error management module is designed in a sequential 




and “Correction”. Each of these blocks is associated with a probability of failure that 
is calculated based on the associated performance shaping factors with the failure of 
each block. Entering this sequence is conditioned on the operator being “Available”. 
The application of these blocks introduces new errors modes that are directly a result 
of the nature of working in a team. These errors and consequently failure modes do 
not necessarily impose a system failure but have a potential to contribute to it; errors 
that can occur in the process of team error management are being considered among 
team errors.  
4.2.2 Team and Individual Operator Error Classification 
An essential element of the proposed team behavior model and simulation platform is 
a list of relevant errors at individual and crew levels. Such taxonomy forms the 
starting point for identification of communication, coordination, and action “failure 
mechanisms” and associated PSFs. Failure mechanisms provide the link between the 
PSFs and possible human failures. These failure mechanisms represent a mid-layer to 
the qualitative analysis approach.  The foundations of our proposed taxonomy is in 
the external and internal error “reference points” introduced in the Extended IDAC 
model and described elsewhere in this dissertation.  
This research introduces a comprehensive classification of human error based on the 
identified error reference points in the underlying models at the individual and team 
levels, which helps to identify those failure mechanisms. The error categories have 
been identified based on previously discussed error reference points as well as a 
complete task decomposition and functional view of the model for the individual and 




action) but also errors of commission such as executing the action on the wrong 
object or at the wrong time or generally in a wrong way. Such errors have been 
included to enrich this classification. Errors of commission are usually defined with 
respect to the direction of actions, the objects of actions, the quality of actions, the 
sequence and the timing properties of actions. Sasou et al. (1999) recognize the 
following classification of human error in a team context: 
• Individual errors: errors which are made by individuals without participation 
of any other team member. Examples include most of the errors which happen 
in executing actions. When all the information available to individual is 
essential correct, the error is considered to be independent; however, if the 
information is partially provided or incorrect the error is considered to be 
dependent.  
• Shared errors: errors which are shared by some or all of team members 
regardless of whether they have been in direct contact. Examples of such 
errors include errors caused by deficiency in organizational factors such as 
quality of procedures and interface. 
• Team errors: human errors made in group processes. Examples of such errors 
include mistakes and lapses mostly made during group thinking or planning or 
other group activities. 
In general, the actions associated with the operators and the team can be summarized 
as: 




• Actions performed as a means to coordinate and communicate activities inside the 
team (sending, creating and receiving proper messages and message contents in 
the form of requests and reports for performing other categories of actions) 
• Actions performed  as a recovery from an unwanted situation 
If any mismatch between these actions and the way that they are expected to happen 
by the plant (hardware system) or other team members occurs, it means that an error 
has taken place. This error might be a result of error in action execution or a 
depended error which is a result of errors happening at previous stages or in our case 
in any team activity. For example, if source information is not available or is 
miscommunicated it might be due to error in communication, interface or a faulty 
component. Errors in the context of the operating team need to be defined based on 
complete task decomposition at the level of team and individual operator so that all 
the complexities involved with human cognition and team processes can be reflected 
in the error context. Task decomposition provides a tool to better understand error 
making process; since we have included the error recovery process in our model, the 
task decomposition needs to be extended to include error recovery actions. 
In order to develop the error model at the level of the team and the individual 
operator, a comprehensive task study has been conducted. Major task categories have 
been recognized as: 
• System Status Assessment (Operator, Team) 




– Team: Task of gathering information via communication and 
collaboration 
– Individual: Task of understanding the situation 
– Team: Task of understanding the situation via communication and 
discussion 
• Response Planning (Operator, Team) 
– Individual: Task of deciding upon a plan 
– Team: Task of deciding upon a plan via communication and consensus 
• Action (Operator, Team) 
– Individual: Task of implementing the decided response 
– Team: Task of distributing the decided action course to be 
implemented by operators via communication and coordination 
In all of the discussed tasks, the “leader” is responsible for coordination activities at 
the team level and communication plays a major role. Previous research efforts to 
classify human error have always been classifying errors from an individual operator 
perspective and despite some efforts to provide error classification for communication 
such as Kim et al. (2011), most of them have neglected team processes and specially 
team error management. This research not only includes team processes such as 
communication and monitoring in task decomposition but also accounts for error 





– Individual: Task of reviewing self-actions 
– Team : Task of detecting teammate errors via monitoring their actions 
to discover mismatches 
• Indication 
– Individual: Task of reporting error in self-actions via communication 
– Team: Task of providing report/ feedback on teammate actions via 
communication 
• Correction 
– Individual: Task of correcting error in self-actions by performing a 
recovery action 
– Team: Task of correcting error in teammate actions by requesting a 
recovery action 
In all the above tasks the “leader” is responsible for coordination of activities at the 
team level. Table 4 provides list of general categories of error in the control room. 




Table 4: Error categories 
Index Category Description
1 Error in source information or message Critical information or message is missing
Critical information or message is corrupted or wrong
2 Error in interface or communication Critical information or message is not exchanged
Critical information is incorrectly exchanged
Critical message is miscommunicated
2 Error in information or message collection Critical information or message is not obtained
Critical information or message is not being attended to
Critical information or message is dismissed
Critical information or message is discounted
Critical information or message is overlooked
Critical information or message is not responded to
Critical information or message is incorrectly interpreted 
Inappropriate or wrong information or message is being collected
3 Error in problem solving or decision making Diagnosis on system state is not made
Inappropriate or wrong diagnosis is made on system state or message content
Decision on strategy or action or reply message is not made 
Inappropriate  or wrong decision is made on strategy or action or reply message
4 Error in action execution or message transferring Action is not committed
Incomplete action is committed
Inappropriate or wrong action is committed
Action is committed on wrong object 
Action is commited by wrong person
Action is committed in wrong time
Message is not sent
Incomplete message is sent
Inappropriate or wrong message is sent
Message is sent to wrong person
Message is sent in wrong time  
In order to look at the relationship between tasks and error modes, first one needs to 
assure that the information, the messages, and the individual operators are presented 
correctly to the operator by the system (control panel) or by the communication 
channels. Sometimes it is assumed to be true by default; however, we would like to 
provide a summary of the contributing factors (Table 5). Examples of errors in this 
category with regards to causal influence of PSFs include: Critical message is not 
exchanged since the sender (or receiver) was not familiar with using the 




Table 5: Availability of information and message 
Error mode PSFs
Critical information or message is missing Communication skills of sender & receiver
Critical information or message is corrupted or wrong Communication format of sender and receiver
Critical information or message is not exchanged Familiarity of sender & receiver with using the device
Critical information is incorrectly exchanged Availability of device
Critical message is miscommunicated Accessibility of device






Team cohesion  
Based on the provided task decomposition and the error modes presented in table 4, 
we suggest the framework proposed in table 6 to be used for activities involving plant 
status assessment. Note that in team activities such as discussion, the leader has a 
coordinative role; hence his individual characteristics would contribute to 
determining the probability of error in such activities. Examples of errors in this 
category with regards to causal influence of PSFs include team failing in 
understanding the situation because the critical message was not responded to by the 
off-site operator since the communication device was unavailable. 
Table 6: Error in system status assessment 
Task Error mode PSFs
Gathering information Critical information or message is not obtained Experience
Understanding the situation Critical information or message is not being attended to Training
Critical information or message is dismissed Stress
Gathering information via communication & collaboration Critical information or message is discounted Attention
Understanding the situation via communication & discussion Critical information or message is overlooked  Information load
Critical information or message is not responded to Time load
Critical information or message is incorrectly interpreted Quality of interface
Inappropriate or wrong information or message is being collected Team experience
Team training
Diagnosis on system state is not made Communication skills of sender & receiver




Ease of use of device 
Familiarity with using the device
Availability of device
Accessibility of device  
Based on the task decomposition and the error modes presented in Table 2, we 




response planning. Note that in team activities such as consensus building the leader 
has a coordinative role; hence, his individual characteristics would contribute to 
determining the probability of error in such activities. Examples of errors in this 
category with regards to causal influence of PSFs include: team failing in deciding 
upon the response because an inexperienced supervisor made an inappropriate 
diagnosis on system state. 
Table 7: Error in response planning 
Task Error mode PSFs
Deciding upon a response Decision on strategy or action or reply message is not made Experience
Deciding upon a response via communication and consensus Inappropriate  or wrong decision is made on strategy or action or reply message Training
Diagnosis on system state is not made Fatigue
Inappropriate or wrong diagnosis is made on system state or message content Stress
Decision on strategy or action or reply message is not made Attention
Inappropriate  or wrong decision is made on strategy or action or reply message Information load
Time load
Quality of procedures
Training for the role
Experience for the role
Commitment to the role
Motivation for the role




Communication skills of sender & receiver
Communication format of sender & receiver
Leadership
Role awareness  
Based on the provided task decomposition and the error modes presented in table 2, 
we suggest the framework proposed in Table 8 to be used for activities involving 
implementing action. Note that in team activities such as distribution of action the 
leader has a coordinative role hence his individual characteristics would contribute to 
determining the probability of error in such activities. Examples of errors in this 
category with regards to causal influence of PSFs include:  Action is committed on 
the wrong object because the operator was stressful and tired; message is sent to the 
wrong person (message regarding executing an action) because the supervisor was 




Table 8: Error in implementing action 
Task Error mode PSFs
Implementing the decided response Action is not committed Experience
Distributing the decided action course to operators via communication and coordination Incomplete action is committed Training
Inappropriate or wrong action is committed Fatigue
Action is committed on wrong object Stress
Action is commited by the wrong person Attention
Action is committed in wrong time Information load
Message is not sent Time load
Incomplete message is sent Quality of interface
Inappropriate or wrong message is sent Quality of workspace
Message is sent to wrong person Leadership
Message is sent in wrong time Team coordination
Team communication  
Table 9 lists the error modes that are a result of committing an error during error 
management activities with respect to the major task category of detecting, indicating 
and correcting the error. 
Table 9: Error in error management 
Index Category Description
1 Error in detecting an error Error is not detected




Error is not responded to
Error is not recognized
Error is misinterpreted 
Error is being detected incorrectly
Error is being detected in wrong time
2 Error in indicating an error Error is not being reported
Error is being reported incorrectly
Error is being reported to the wrong person
Error is being reported in wrong time
3 Error in correcting an error Error is not being corrected
Inappropriate or wrong recovery action is committed
Recovery action is committed in wrong time
No recovery action is possible  
Note that these error modes are considered to be a result of an individual or team 
error. A mix of these error modes usually occurs since the identification of error by 
the team is somehow related to the identification of error by the individuals. 




the individual; inappropriate or wrong action is committed because error is being 
detected incorrectly by the team. 
Table 10: General categories of errors in teams 
Index Categoy Description
1 Review, Monitor Error in reviewing an action by the individual and recognizing the error
Error in monitoring an action by a teammate and recognizing the error
2 Feedback Error in transferring the feedback on an action to a teammate
3 Fix Error in requesting  a corrective action from a teammate to fix the error
Error in performing a corrective action on the system to fix the error
Error in confirming performing of a corrective action to a teammate  
Table 10 lists errors made during common team activities such as monitoring, 
reviewing and fixing/backing up. This information helps to determine the roots of the 
error; i.e. the format of the statement (x occurred because of inefficiency of y) which 
is used in the next table.  
Table 11: Failure in error management 
Index Category Description
1 Error Detection Failure to detect the error by individual because action was not reviewed
Failure to detect the error by  team because error was not indicated by individual
failure to detect the error by team because of error in monitoring
2 Error Indication Failure to indicate the error by individual because error was not detected by individual
Failure to indicate the error by team because of error was not detected by team
Failure to indicate the error by team because of error in feed back
3 Error Correction Failure to correct the error by the individual because it was not recognized by the individual
Failure to correct the error by the individual because it was falsely corrected by the individual
Failure to correct the error by the team because it was not indicated to the team by the individual
Failure to correct the error by the team because it was indicated but not recognized by the team
Failure to correct the error by the team because it was falsely corrected by the individual and not recognized by the team
Failure to correct the error by the team because it was falsely corrected by the team  
Table 12 lists the contributing factors to Error detection activities by the individual 
and the team.  Examples of errors in this category with regards to causal influence of 
PSFs include: Error is not recognized during the task of self-review because operator 




Table 12: Error in error detection 
Task Error mode PSFs
Reviewing self-actions Error is not detected Experience
Detecting teammate errors via monitoring their actions Error is not being attended to Training
Error is dismissed Fatigue
Error is discounted Attention
Error is overlooked Information load
Error is not responded to Time load
Error is not recognized Quality of procedures
Error is misinterpreted Quality of workspace
Error is being detected incorrectly Leader training
Error is being detected in wrong time Leader participation
Enforcement and supervision
Authority inside team
Training for the role  
Experience for the role
Commitment to the role
Motivation for the role






Table 13 lists the contributing factors to Error indication (report) activities by the 
individual and the team.  Examples of errors in this category with regards to causal 
influence of PSFs include: Error is not being reported to the team after being 
recognized in self-review because the operator does not care about quality. 
Table 13: Error in error indication 
Task Error mode PSFs
Reporting error in self-actions via communication Error is not being reported Experience
Providing report/ feedback on teammate actions via communication Error is being reported incorrectly Training
Error is being reported to the wrong person Fatigue










Training for the role  
Experience for the role
Commitment to the role
Motivation for the role






And finally the next Table 14 lists the contributing factors to Error correction 




regards to causal influence of PSFs include: inappropriate recovery action is 
requested in the process of correcting the error by the team, because the leader is 
considered inexperienced for the role. 
Table 14: Error in error correction 
Task Error mode PSFs
Correcting error in self-actions by performing a recovery action Error is not being corrected Experience
Correcting error in teammate actions by requesting a recovery action Inappropriate or wrong recovery action is committed Training
Recovery action is committed in wrong time Fatigue










Training for the role  
Experience for the role
Commitment to the role
Motivation for the role






4.3 A Team Oriented Taxonomy and Causal Model of PSFs 
4.3.1 Introduction  
To develop a quantitative estimate of the Human Error Probability (HEP), most HRA 
methods utilize PSFs, which characterize the roots and facets of human error and 
provide a numerical basis for calculating the error probability (Boring, 2006). 
Modeling these PSFs along with the system response allows simulation-based 
assignment of their levels, and helps to obtain a more realistic model of relation 
between context and performance. However, identifying and quantifying the PSFs is 
a relatively subjective task. Most of the research such as the works of Boring (2006), 
Kim (2003), Gibson et al. (2008) and Patrick et al. (2006) are focused on classifying 




Depending on the specific scenarios being simulated and the nature of the system, a 
subset of PSFs have been modeled and applied.  
Team-related PSFs (TPSFs) are those factors that affect the performance and arise 
from the fact that a group of people is working together in the team on a common 
task. A complete taxonomy of Individual PSFs is defined and categorized by Groth 
(2009), which lists the most important TPSFS as communication, team coordination, 
team cohesion, role awareness and direct supervision (See section 3.5.1); however, no 
further categories are provided on this group of PSFs. The objectives of this part of 
the study are:  
1) To identify context factors that directly or indirectly affect team performance 
and for use as parameters of the crew model 
2) To develop a detailed causal model for TPSFs to be used for quantification of 
probability of various crew cognitive and physical actions 
In Extended IDAC the basis of the PSFs model have been extracted from the PSFs 
list provided by Groth (2009) and Kim (2003). We took the following steps to further 
study the major categories of TPSFs introduced by Groth (2009).  
1) Conducted a full study on the existing research on Individual and Team PSFs. 
The result of this study is described in this section and section 3.5.1 of the 
dissertation. 
2) Classified the contributing PSFs and provided detailed causal maps for each 




Table 15: Team PSFs model & suppoting literature 
Category Sub category Factor Supporting Research
Clear goals Kim 2003, Bust 2008, Smit 2007, Paris 2000, Stantoni 2000, Kim 2003
Clear roles Kim 2003, Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Paris 2000, Kim 2003
Clear norms Kim 2003, Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Paris 2000, kim 2003
Training for the role Blackman 2008,Bust 2008, Boring 2006, Mengzho 1997, Paris 2000, Kim 2003
Experience for the role Blackman 2008,Bust 2008, Boring 2006, Mengzho 1997, paris 2000, Kim 2003
Commitment to the role Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Boring 2006
Motivation for role Bust 2008, Boring 2006, Kim 2003
Clear responsibilities Bust 2008, Smith 2007
Quality of reference documents Bust 2008, Boring 2006, Kim 2003
Protocols/ Standards Bust 2008, Paris 2000
Concern for quality Bust 2008, Paris 2000, Stantoni 2000, Kim 2003
Concern for safety Bust 2008, Paris 2000, kim 2003
Commitment to the role* Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Boring 2006
Motivation for role* Bust 2008, Boring 2006, Kim 2003
Shared goals Bust 2008, Paris 2000, Stantoni 2000, Kim 2003
Compliance to procedures Blackman 2008, carvalho 2006, Paris 2000
Authority gradient Bust 2008, Bocante 2007
Training as a team Blackman 2008, Sasangohar 2010, Boring 2006
Experience as a team Blackman 2008, Sasangohar 2010, Boring 2006
Diversity Mengzho 1997, Kim 2003
Mutual trust Bust 2008, Paris 2000
Training as a team* Blackman 2008, Sasangohar 2010, Boring 2006
Experience as a team* Blackman 2008, Sasangohar 2010, Boring 2006
Following leader Bust 2008, Paris 2000, Kim 2003
Following protocols Bust 2008, Paris 2000
Members assertiveness Paris 2000, Kim 2003
Effective communication Bust 2008, Sasangohar 2010, Stantoni 2000, Kim 2003, Groth 2009
Role awareness Bust 2008, Smith 2007,Paris 2000, Groth 2009
Effective leadership Paris 2000, Stantoi 2000, Petkov 2004, Groth 2009
Supervision Bust 2008, Broberg 2008, Harrington 1993, Paris 2000
Enforcement of protocols Bust 2008, Broberg 2008, Paris 2000
Organizational autority Bust 2008, Harington 1993, Kim 2003
Leadership training Bust 2008, Mengzo 1997, Paris 2000, Stantoni 2000, Kim 2003
Participation of leader Broberg 2008, Paris 2000, Petkov 2004
Individual factors for leader Broberg 2008, Harrington 1993, Mengzho 1997, Paris 2000, Stantoni 2000
Role awareness Bust 2008, Paris 2000, Smith 2007
Team cohesiveness Paris 2000, Kim 2003, Groth 2009
Familiarity with device Hirotsu 2001, Kim 2003
Accessability Bust 2008, Hirotsu 2001, Kim 2003
Ease of use Hirotsu 2001, Kim 2003
Accuracy Hirotsu 2001, kim 2003
Communication procedures Blackman 2008, Carvalho 2006, Bust 2008,Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010
Communication skills Smith 2007, Patrick 2006, Kim 2003
Format / complexity Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Sasangohar 2010, Kim 2003
Terms / language Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Kim 2003
Protocols/ Standards Bust 2008, Hirotsu 2001, Kim 2003
Comfort Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010, Paris 2000, Kim 2003
External interruptions Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010, Paris 200, Kim 2003
Team cohesiveness Paris 2000, Kim 2003, Groth 2009
Communication procedures* Blackman 2008, Carvalho 2006, Bust 2008,Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010
Comunication skills* Smith 2007, Patrick 2006, Kim 2003
Format / complexity* Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Sasangohar 2010, Kim 2003
Terms / language* Bust 2008, Smith 2007, Kim 2003
Protocols/ Standards* Bust 2008, Hirotsu 2001, Kim 2003
Comfort* Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010, Paris 2000, Kim 2003
External interruptions* Hirotsu 2001, Sasangohar 2010, Paris 200, Kim 2003

















4.3.2 PSFs Causal Model 
This research carefully considered the literature on both individual and on team 
performance shaping factors, as discussed in the previous chapter. A set of team 
factors associated with accident management selected out of many that were 
addressed by literature, are listed in Table 15.  The detailed internal model for team 
PSFs and corresponding causal maps and the mechanism of their effect are shown in 
Figures 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.  
 
Figure 27: PSF model, Role awareness 
 
Role Awareness is related to how each of the team members perceives their duties, 
responsibilities, and roles within the team. It is related to how tasks are divided in the 
team and how team members are expected to interact with each other to accomplish 
them. We considered two different aspects (Figure 27) of role awareness; 1) Role 
awareness requires operators to be aware of their place in the team and to act 




outcomes and consequences of the actions they choose as part of accomplishing the 
tasks associated with their roles. 
 
Figure 28: PSF model, Team cohesion 
Team Cohesion refers to the way that team members interact with each other and the 
individual's desire to be involved in the group's activities. We considered team 
cohesion from two perspectives, shown in Figure 28; 1) Task cohesion refers to the 
degree to which members of a group work together to achieve common goals. 2) 
Social cohesion refers to the degree to which members of a team like to work with 
each other as a team. 
 
Figure 29: PSF model, Team coordination 
Team Coordination (Figure 29) refers to the overall interactions of the team, 




considers additional factors that contribute to overall team performance such as 
planning and scheduling on the team level and team decision making. Effective 
leadership and effective communication contribute to effective coordination in team 
activities.  
 
Figure 30: PSF model, Team leadership 
Leaders (supervisors) work with and assign tasks to personnel. The leader can be seen 
as a member of the team, albeit a member with additional authority and responsibility 
(Groth 2009). The supervisor sets a direction for the team and influences the attitudes 
of the team members. The supervisor has the dual responsibility of setting goals for 
the group and also working with group members to accomplish these goals. The 
individual PSFs related to the leader (Figure 30) also contribute to effective 





Figure 31: PSF model, Communication 
Communication refers to the ability of team members to pass information and transfer 
messages to each other. Communication can be verbal and face-to-face or device-
based (Figure 31). While team cohesiveness contributes to both types of 
communication, the quality of the communication device as well as the familiarity 
with using the device are other important contributing factors to effective 
communication.  
The discussed categories of Team PSFs affect all team members. The only exception 
is that communication is considered to be between two people at a time, hence the 
quality of communication can be viewed as the quality of channel/ device (applied to 
the specific communication link), the quality of context of communication (applied to 
the team), the quality of communication link that senders and receiver establish and 
the content they exchange (based on communication skills and format the use, this is 
applied to the communication link). Hence there are team related aspects of 




communication, and there are individual aspects of communication such as the format 
that the sender uses or the communication skills of the receiver. Based on this 
categorization and in order to we introduced the concept of “Team Factors”.  
4.3.3 Team Factors  
 
Major categories of Team PSFs have been introduced earlier (e.g., Team cohesion, 
Team coordination). We also presented a PSF causal model to that shows the 
influence and contributions of a set of lower level context factors to their group. 
These context factors are either measurable (such as “training as a team” or 
“experience in the same control room”) or assessed on a qualitative basis by expert 
judgment (example would be the “Mutual Trust”).  
One objective of this part of the research was to study, extract and list such context 
factors and classify them as team, individual, organizational, and task-related factors 
in order to use them as the adjustable parameters (attributes) of the operator’s object 
model (discussed in Chap 5). Based on this classification, “Team Factors” are context 
factors which affect the performance of the entire team (all team members) and along 
with other individual or even task related context factors, contribute to Team PSFs. 
Table 16 lists team factors that have been defined in this research. A complete list of 




Table 16: Team factors 







Not at all Less than adequate
Normal Adequate
Commited More than adequate
Not diverse Not at all
Average Average
Diverse Totally












Not clear Low quality
Average Normal
Clear High quality
Not clear Low quality
Average Normal
Clear High quality
Team norms Procedures for communication
Mutual trust External interruptions
Training as a team












Team goals Level of Comfort
Team roles Protocols for communication
 
Another categorization of context factors defines internal and external factors. 
Internal factors include situational and task related factors such as cognitive load, 
individual technical skills, individual social skills, team operational skills, team 
general skills, team soft skills, team structure, and team roles. External context factors 
include environmental, workspace, and organizational factors.  
4.3.4 Individual vs. Individual Team-related Factors 
An individual operator can be viewed from the point of view of technical skills, 
cognitive limitations or characteristics, and social skills; hence the perspective from 
which we are determining our context factors is important. For an individual there are 
characteristics such as “general experience in NPPs” that are important in 




However these do not consider the fact that the individual is part of a team. These 
factors in this research are referred to as individual PSFs. In addition, there are 
context factors that are about the individual operator but relate to the fact that he is a 
part of a team. For instance, “training for the role” or “commitment to the role” are 
such factors.  
These two categories of context factors along with the operator’s cognitive 
characteristics such as level of stress and task related factors such as information and 
workload shape the way the operator acts inside the team. Table 17 lists the 
individual factors used for this purpose and their associated levels. Note that “quality 
of workspace” refers to the perception of comfort that the operator has inside the 
control room.  
Table 17: Individual factors 
Factor Levels Factor Levels
Less than adequate Uncomforatble
Good Normal
Professional Comfortable
Less than adequate Less than adequate
Special training Special training
Normal training Normal training















Training Training for the role
Individual Factors: General
OAT/OCT/ODM OAT/OCT/ODM
Experience Quality of workspace
Quality of interface Concern for safety
Quality of procedures Concern for quality
Level of fatigue Experience for the role
Level of stress commitment to the role






There are other role-related context factors that are important in case of the team 
leader. These factors include: “Leader participation” and “level of enforcement” and 
so on. Hence there are additional factors that characterize the supervisor behavior; 
these factors are listed in Table 18. 





























PSFs are modeled using causal maps, which are directed graphs reflecting the 
influence path from a behavior metric into the error context via PSFs, and the 
“intervening variables” and their interdependencies. The development of a causal 
map offers a way of highlighting both the complexity within and the interconnection 
between the TPSFs.  
We reviewed the existing literature on PSFs in section 3.5.1 of Chapter 3. The quality 
of verbal communications, clearly defined roles and duties, standard communication 
structure and protocols, and the quality of procedures and leadership are among 
factors that have been identified as affecting knowledge sharing, problem solving, 




(2006), Gibson et al. (2008) and Groth (2009). Team cohesion, team coordination and 
communication quality have been addressed as potentially dominant team-related 
PSFs by Kim et al. (2003), Patrick et al. (2006), Boring (2006) and Groth (2009). 
Among individual PSFs, stress, attention, task complexity, experience/training, and 
time constraint have been mentioned as important PSFs in the studies by Gibson et al. 
(2008), and Boring (2006).  
Table 19: List of PSFs  
Category PSF Definition
Experience Familiarity with the task based on operational experience in a similar task
Training Familiarity with the task based on training for the same task
Level of fatigue Level of undesirable physical condition which lowers the productivity
Level of stress Level of cognitive and emotional pressure that impedes the operator from easily completing a task
Level of attention Cognitive resources directed to the task
Quality of procedures Existence and use of formal operating procedures
Quality of interface Human factor and ergonomics considered in the design of interface with system
Quality of workspace Human factors and ergonomics considered in the design of workspace
Training for the role Familiarity with the role within the team based on training for the same role 
Experience for the role Familiarity with the role within the role based on experience in a similar role
commitment to the role commitment to the objectives of the role and team
Motivation for the role Enthusiasm and interest in the role
Concern for quality Personal preferences on issues related to quality
Concern for safety Personal preferences on issues related to safety
Leadership knowledge Familiarity with the leadership role and its responsibilities based on knowledge
Leader's participation Willingness of team leader to participate in the task
adherence to procedures Encouraging team members to follow procedures
Supervision level of monitoring and feedback by team leader
Organizational authority Level of authority provided by the organization for the individual
Training as a team Extent and length of time this team has been receiving training together
Experience as a team Extent and length of time this team has been working together
Compliance to procedures Commitment to follow procedures
Team diversity Diverse team members regarding their qualifications and skills
Shared goals The extent to which team members share the objectives of the team
Authority gradient Shared authority inside the team
Mutual trust Level of trust and respect inside the team
Team goals The extent to which team goals are well defined
Team roles The extent to which team roles are well defined
Team norms clarity of team accepted behavioral tendencies
Team responsibilities The extent to which team members responsibilities are defined
Reference documents Existence and quality of additional supportive documents for the team's tasks
Standards & Regulations Existence and quality of regulations for team team's tasks
Following leader Willingness of team to follow the leader
Following protocols Willingness of team to follow protocols and standards
Responsiveness Speed and extent of team's response to change in system state
Team's ability to work in an environment  with disruptive characteristics such as non-task related
noise and presence of non team members
Level of Comfort Quality of workspace with respect to level of comfort
Protocols for communication Existence and adherence to format and standards of communication
Procedures for communication Existence and use of formal procedures dedicated to communication
Communication skills Sender and receiver's skills with respect to various modes of communication
Format Clarity of message with respect to format and use of language
Familiarity with device The degree of sender's and receiver's familiarity with use of communicational device
Availability of device whether the device is installed and functional
Accessibility of device whether the device is accessible to operators
Ease of use of device Ease or complexity of using the communicational device









The discussed model of context factors determines the operator’s profile which is the 
adjustable part of operator’s object model (See Chapt. 5) . Table 20 lists the 
operator’s functional model. This model along with the operator’s profile forms the 
operator object model. 
Table 20: Operator functions 
Operator Main Functions
Receiving input information/Receivig input Message
Processing Input Information/Processing Input Message
Making Decision/Creating Output Message
Executing Action / Sending Output Message
Detecting Error
Indicating Error
Correctiong Error  
Table 21 summarizes the human operator functions and team functions of Extended 
IDAC framework and lists how PSF categories have been assigned to failures of such 
functions. The PSFs model is used to quantify the probability of error for each of 




Table 21: Context factors and operator’s functions 
Function Performance Shaping Factors
Availability (individual) Fatigue, stress, attention, quality of workspace
Availability (information)
Since the plant is responsible for providing information, it is assumed that information is
always available unless there is a failure in plant that would be detected based on the other
information sources providing data
Device-based Communication: communication skills of sender & receiver, communication
format that sender and receiver, familiarity of sender & receiver with using the device,
availability of device, Accessibility of device, ease of use of device and accuracy of device,
team communication and team cohesion
Verbal Communication: communication skills of sender & receiver, communication format
that sender and receiver use, team communication and team cohesion
Information/ Message Processing 
(individual)
Experience, training, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of interface
Decision making (message)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
procedures, training for the role, experience for the role, commitment to the role,
motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, team coordination and 
team communication
Action execution/ message handling 
(individual)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
interface and quality of workspace
Error detection (individual)
Experience, training, fatigue, attention, information load, time load, quality of procedures,
quality of workspace, training for the role, experience for the role, commitment to the role,
motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, team coordination and 
team communication
Error indication (individual)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
procedures, quality of workspace, training for the role, experience for the role, commitment
to the role, motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, team
coordination and team communication
Error correction (individual)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
interface, quality of workspace, training for the role, experience for the role, commitment to
the role, motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, team
coordination and team communication
Information/ Message Processing (team) Experience, training, information load, time load, quality of interface
Decision making (team)
Experience, training, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of procedures,
training for the role, experience for the role, commitment to the role, motivation for the
role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, role awareness and leadership
Action execution/ Message handling 
(team)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
procedures, quality of workspace
Error detection (team)
Experience, training, fatigue, attention, information load, time load, quality of procedures,
quality of workspace, leader training, leader participation, enforcement and supervision,
authority inside team, training for the role, experience for the role, commitment to the role,
motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team cohesion, role awareness and
leadership
Error indication (team)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
procedures, quality of workspace, leader training, leader participation, enforcement and
supervision, authority inside team, training for the role, experience for the role,
commitment to the role, motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team
cohesion, role awareness and leadership
Error correction (team)
Experience, training, fatigue, stress, attention, information load, time load, quality of
procedures, quality of interface, quality of workspace, leader training, leader participation,
enforcement and supervision, authority inside team, training for the role, experience for the
role, commitment to the role, motivation for the role, concern for safety and quality, team






4.3.5 Dynamic PSFs 
This research also models a two dynamic PSFs associated with the dynamics of the 
system and change during the course of the scenario. The two Dynamic PSFs 
considered are: 
1) Information load 
2) Time load 
The load on team members increases when abnormal signals are detected. The effects 
of Information load on cognitive and nontechnical skills have been studied by 
researchers in different high-risk environments (McGrath et al., 1994), (Flin et al., 
2004) and (Flin et al., 1998). Overload comes in two forms: the tasks themselves are 
time-urgent and must be done within a certain limited time window or not at all. In 
such cases, task overload translates into a matter of speed of response. In the other 
form, overload simply refers to having too many things to do at one time, or too many 
stimuli to attend to at once, even though the tasks themselves do not have a critical 
time component. This kind of overload can be translated into a matter of priority and 
sequence of tasks.  
In this research the information load relates to the number of active alarms at each 
time step. Having too many alarms being on at the same time increases the 
probability of failure of human cognitive functions. The information load is 
automatically calculated by having access to the number of activated alarms (and 
indicators) vs. total number of alarms and indicators. The levels of Information load 




alarms is 8 and just 2 of them are activated, the information load is considered to be 
low. Similarly, high information load means having more than 6 active alarms at the 
same time. 
In order to calculate the Time pressure load, we used a fixed value as the critical time; 
the critical time refers to the average time needed for the system to reach the 
undesired state, if the operators do not interfere and perform the necessary control 
actions. This value is different for each setting and need to be adjusted before the 
simulation. Time pressure load is defined as the ratio between the perceived required 
time to perform the task and the perceived available time. Hence time load increases 
while team is approaching the end of the scenario.  
4 .3.6 HEP Quantification Approach  
Once the set of performance shaping factors associated with each functionality block 
is determined, the SLIM
10
 method (Embrey, 1984) is applied to calculate the 
probability of failure for each operator function. SLIM is a systematic method for 
positioning the likelihood of success of a task on a scale as a function of the differing 
conditions influencing successful completion of tasks.  The probability is calculated 
based on the following equation: 
 
“Pr0” is a basic value for probability of failure of the function, “a” is an adjusting 
constant and SLI is defines as: 
                                                 





Where “wi” is the weight associated with each performance shaping factor and “PSFi” 
is the value assigned to that factor. The probability of success for tasks based on this 
scale can be determined by calibrating the scale with reference tasks as assessed by 
the same judge or team of judges. The SLIM approach relies upon expert judgment to 
determine the weight (importance) of each PSF with regard to its effect on the 
reliability of the task. The experts assign a numerical rating for each PSF under 
consideration. Once the weights and ratings have been assessed by the judges, they 
are multiplied together for each PSF and then summed across PSFs to arrive at the 
Success Likelihood Index (SLI). Once the SLI is determined, HEP or in this case Pr 
can be calculated as discussed above. 
4.4 Communication Model  
Under high workload conditions communication inside a team becomes very 
important since the team attempts to create a shared understanding of the situation. 
Communication is a dynamic process involving the exchange of information and 
meanings between senders and receivers, both knowingly and unknowingly. Team 
members are simultaneously sending and receiving messages and communicate 
internally. 
The communication model used in this research considers a number of roles and 
contributing factors: 




• The message is the information that is being transferred. 
• The Receiver (listener) is the destination of the message, where the message is 
directed. 
• The channel which connects the sender and the receiver; usually different 
channels are available and the number of channels may vary. In Extended 
IDAC communication is explicit (verbal), and is either face-to-face or device-
based. 
• The feedback can be in the form of a nod, return message, or any kind of 
confirmation or acknowledgement for receiving the message. Since all 
communications in Extended IDAC are explicit, all feedbacks are in the form 
of verbal messages. 
• The distractions in communication serve as barriers, blocks, and create 
problems in communication. Distractions can be relative to time, external 
factors, internal factors, or semantics. In Extended IDAC distractions are 
captured and modeled via PSFs, e.g. “external interruptions” under team 
factors category. 
• The communication environment may be relaxing or stressful; the context of 






Figure 32: A typical closed loop communication link 
Any communication link in a control room has three important elements: Sender, 
Receiver and the Message (Figure 32). Characteristic of the sender, receiver and the 
message are the foundations to a successful communication. The figure shows 
essential parts of communication, whereas the arrows represent the communication 
channels. The most important sender characteristics are the credibility and 
attractiveness. The creditability of the sender is defined as the perceived expertise and 
trustworthiness of the communicator. The personality characteristics of the receiver, 
such as intelligence, level of language skills, and self-esteem are also important. The 
relationship of the receiver to the message is another factor since people are more 
open to arguments that are within their range of acceptability.  
The sophistication, level of emotion, and aesthetics of the message are considered 
among critical factors (Levi 2007). There are a few other issues about the team 
composition that are important for teams during operation such as unhealthy vs. 
healthy conflict, and distribution of power and diversity among team members. 





Figure 33: Wheel (Star) communication network 
There are a number of ways to organize communications networks, each with 
different advantages.  Networks of communications may be: 
• Centralized - where a leader directs the flow of communication 
• Decentralized - each member of the group has access to the ideas of all 
other members 
Communication in control rooms usually follows the structure of wheel networks. 
The wheel (star) communication network (Figure 33) is a centralized network around 
the supervisor. To communicate appropriately, the ODM acts as a 'hub', distributing 
information to the rest of the team. There is little or no connection among the rest of 
the team. In this structure the leader controls lines of communication and ensures that 
messages are passed efficiently. 
Collaboration is an important concept in the context of a complex system. 
Collaborative work entails cognitive aspects of communication (Levi 2007). Group 
members send, receive and store different kinds of information within the group as 
well as outside sources. Collaborative work also entails emotional and motivational 




interlocked communication cycles. Each cycle involves a series of operations on a 
message: composition, editing, transmission, reception, feedback (acknowledgment 
of receipt), and reply. Since nuclear power plant operators work usually in small 
groups having face-to-face and synchronous conversations, these cycles become 
extremely important in studying their communicative interactions. In face-to-face 
communications, each member can communicate to all others via a wide spectrum of 
communication modalities: verbal, Para-verbal (e.g. voice inflections), and Nonverbal 
(e.g. smiles and gazes) (Levi 2007).  
In communications with outside the control room, the reliability of the 
communication device and the environmental conditions should be taken into account 
as well. Communication analysis methods often involve using transcriptions of 
communication for in-depth examination. A post processing routine can be used to 
derive a number of different communication measures that reflect the quantity, 
directionality, timing and type of communications that occur. Most measures are 
calculated per unit time, and can be captured at the individual level or at the team 
level.  
4.5 Object-Based Modeling and Simulation Approach 
Model-based evaluation through simulation is an alternative to the use of control 
room simulators for human performance assessment and is mentioned here because of 
the large amount of ongoing research on this approach. Analytic simulation is a 
quantitative process that has been used to study systems early in the design process 
and to imitate the behavior of very complex systems. This method is useful in 




difficult to reproduce environmental conditions, and where the cost to develop 
systems for a complete simulator may be prohibitive.  
While model-based simulation techniques are becoming popular in system risk 
analysis, different representation languages for model development have emerged, 
each with strengths but also limitations in scope and application. An ideal technique 
should be straightforward, easy to manage, and capable of handling operator 
cognitive activities and interactions, as well as system dynamics and feedback loops. 
Object-based methodologies are the most preferred methods for real time and event 
driven system simulation. They are extensively used in knowledge representation 
applications. By applying this methodology, the behavior is managed automatically 
and inside the component (object) which facilitates the modification of individual 
object properties with or without affecting other parts of the system.  
Also the response to any change in the system is obtained intelligently. In object-
based modeling methodologies the main idea is to simply replace every piece of the 
system with an “intelligent” entity that represents its properties and mimics its 
behavior. The complex system is broken down into a number of domains whereas 
large domains are partitioned into subsystems.  
An object is defined as an entity that is uniquely identifiable and has attributes, states 
and operations that collectively determine its behavior (Sully, 1993) and (Rumbaugh 
et al., 1991). Objects collaborate by responding to requests from other objects to carry 




In order to identify objects, systems are broken down into a number of cooperating 
subsystems which are reasonably independent and self-contained. Figure 34 
illustrates this process. First the domains of elements are identified. These domains 
are a number of distinctly different subject matters. Then, large domains are 
partitioned into subsystems (Shlaer et al., 1992). Objects are identified in the context 
of the associated subsystems.  
A main advantage of using object based modeling is the fact that individual objects 
may be modified with or without affecting the other parts of the system. Objects 
having similar meaning and purpose are grouped together to form a class. Association 
links define the relationships among classes. Once the objects are constructed and 
submitted to the system, the associated blocks (simulation models) can be 
customized. The system is defined with a detailed infrastructure as a network of 
connected abstract block diagrams; and just the simple question, "connected or not?” 
identifies the links. A complex system is a collection of many of objects with 
different natures cooperating together toward the realization of its fundamental 
objectives.  
After objects in each group are identified, their behavior needs to be modeled; hence, 
the next step is knowledge acquisition for scenario generation, which is basically to 
acquire additional information about the system and its environment. This knowledge 
is used to automatically generate risk scenarios. In the case of object based models, 
this step includes translating the success logic into failure logic, assigning the 
probabilities of failure for objects or functionalities at each time step, and to identify a 




driven by the analysis objectives and the availability of data. Having the states of 
components and events, the failure logic of the system and enough rules and 
conditions, the final state of the system can be determined for any given condition.  
In order to replace a piece of system with its representative model for simulation 
goals, the properties such as time-to-failure distributions, as well as the probabilities 
of failures per demand are included in the model. 
 
Figure 34: Objects in the context of a complex system 
After development of object-based models for the operating crew and their 
interactions, simulation is conducted to generate operating scenarios and ultimately a 
set of failure modes. High-level behavioral models and predefined sets of simple rules 
are used to model the interactions among functional entities and are considered the 
basis of simulation autonomy and scenario generation.  
Hence, the representative probabilistic simulation models for system elements are 




(1) The Model Development stage including using a Top-Down approach for 
identifying object classes with attributes and behaviors, and a Bottom-up approach for 
identifying object class association links and development of integrated simulation 
model.  
(2) The Model Interpretation stage including knowledge acquisition for scenario 
generation and developing model of system dynamics.  
4.5.1 Application in Investigating Crew Behavior 
The structure of a complex system permits delivery of desired functionality through 
specific component interactions or behavior. The modeling paradigm should be 
capable of representing the desired functionality of the individual components, their 
structure, as well as their interactions. The components in such model do not act in 
isolation but instead interact with each other. A common source of error or system 
vulnerability is a mismatch at the interface of the blocks/components where data is 
interchanged that can lead to system failure in the form of an incident/accident. The 
complete communication model of the system elements needs to be developed as well 
to address the variety of interactions. The objective is to capture the operational 
knowledge of the complex multi-dimensional system, and to apply this knowledge for 
obtaining representative models for its elements.  
In modeling a NPPs control room, there are three different categories of objects that 
need to be constructed: the hardware system is composed of hardware elements such 
as pumps and valves; the operating crew composed of individual human operators; 
and the control panel composed of alarms and indicators. “Active objects”, such as 




informative messages. For the operating team, these ways include: create, send, or 
receive a message.  
Our methodology highly depends on the transformation of “functional block 
diagrams” into object diagrams to represent the structure of subsystems. By 
transformation of “reliability block diagrams” into object diagrams, the complex 
system is defined with a detailed infrastructure as a network of connected abstract 
block diagrams. High level behavioral models and predefined sets of simple rules are 
used to model the interactions among functional entities and are the basis of 
simulation autonomy and scenario generation. Since the simulation model needs to be 
defined by the user in the model editor, the application of custom-defined libraries 
facilitates the process of defining the simulation model.  
A framework is developed inside MATLAB Simulink to accomplish the above tasks 
that includes a customized library of pre-defined blocks. Since the target application 
domain for this research is the control room of a complex environment such as a NPP, 
the simulation library is a collection of pre-defined models of human operators, and 
different hardware components.  
While the general characteristics are encapsulated in the form of object class 
attributes and operations, there is a capability to add or remove to the set of embedded 
characteristics to account for personal differences in terms of basic attributes and 
PSFs. Once the objects are constructed and submitted to the model editor as a 
simulation library, the associated blocks are customized to facilitate defining the 




abstract block diagrams. The operators differ in their personal characteristics and 
cognitive capabilities, accounted for in the model by using different quantities for 
basic attributes and PSFs. These models are then incorporated together to form the 
integrated simulation model. The dynamics of behavior are captured by using an 
inside controller for each object structure. The controller is responsible for branch 
generation. 
The approach involves the development of object-based simulation model for 
individual operators, the plant, and the operating crew based on the conceptual 
framework for team processes: “collaborative information-processing”, “shared 
decision-making”, and “distributed action-execution.” It also involves the 
development and integration of an “error management module”, and team PSFs.  
Finally, team behavior under a specific scenario is studied and explained using 
simulation results. By representing the complexity of the system using modular 
decomposition, various attributes and methods are introduced for each module which 
combined together form the integrated behavior of the entire system (Mao et al., 
2008).  
After the development of the simulation model is complete, a simulator module 
(code) is used to assign control parameters and simulation variables for each run; the 
simulator module is developed to cover a wide range of possibilities in order to 
provide a complete and consistent system profile. The simulation controller is 
responsible for actuating accident initiating events and plant hardware failures as well 




the detailed behavior of the system based on the multilevel simulation model. Each 
transition for system state is conditioned on its duration, time, state of another 
component and other parameters. The branching points in the model are designed 
such that not only the failure of system elements and their functionalities but also the 
team-related errors such as miscommunication and misunderstandings generate 
different paths and scenarios in the system risk profile. During the simulation the 
states of various subsystems and operator responses dynamically change and time 
dependent scenarios are generated. 
4.5.2 Object-based Crew Model 
In object-based methodology, actors are active real world objects that produce and 
consume values during simulation (Chang et al., 2007). Actor’s attributes are 
periodically updated. This research considers each member of the team to be a 
modified version of an abstract class called “operator”. In this model, ODM, OAT1, 
OAT2 and OCT are actors which have been defined by customizing the same set of 
general attributes and functions by enabling or disabling some default features. 
Passive objects are data objects which are used for storing data or transition of data.  
Since the communication among team members is modeled through using messages, 
a message would be an example of a passive object. Active objects have methods to 
be used on passive objects. For the operating team, these methods include: to create, 
send or receive a message. The model of a single operator communicates to the other 
operators via sending and receiving messages and interacts with the system via 














Figure 35: Communication links 
The types of messages transferred in communication loops shown in figure 26 are: 
a) Request for information /action  
b) Request for advice on diagnosis  
c) Report of status information/acknowledgement  
d) Report of advice on diagnosis  
e) Report of judgment on diagnosis  
The operating teams are connected to each other via message transmission and 
responding activities. This model implements all interaction links via: 1) “create 
message”, 2) “send message”, 3) “receive message” functions. The perceived 
message is an input to the decision making module as well the perceived system state 
and the new message is created as an outcome of an action planning block; however, 
once the message is created it is being sent by the action execution module. The 
message is the center of any communication link.  
In object-based approaches, there is a separate class for the elements that make 
interactions possible. There are abstract protocol ports defined to accomplish 




between blocks. It is important to separate interface from internal behavior so that the 
communication and synchronization can be implemented.  
In the context of this system the message is either a request or a reply to a request or 
an acknowledgement / confirmation and is distinguished based on its sender, its 
receiver and the type of data that is transferred by the message (message content). 
Since the message is either a report on  observation or error, a judgment on diagnosis 
and strategy, advice on diagnosis or strategy or a request for action or message 
(including repeating an action) or simply just the confirmation, the message content 
would be information or a recognized error, a diagnosis, strategy, or action or simply 
nothing. The message is considered a passive object, which means it is the subject of 
manipulation for a group of active objects or actors. Table 22 represents the kind of 
messages used in this methodology. 
Table 22: Message categories 
Index Message Type
1 Observation from system
2 Request for more information
3 Request for action on system
4 Request for advice on system state
5 Request for advice on decision
6 Advice on system state
7 Advice for decision
8 Judgment on system state
9 Judgment on decision
10 Confirmation for receiving observation  
11 Confirmation for receiving advice
12 Confirmation for receiving judgment
13 Confirmation for performing request
14 Report of an error
15 Request for resending the message
16 Repeat message processing 




ODM is the person who is connected to the rest of the group both ways; hence, the 
communication network is centralized around the decision maker. The advantage of 
such communication layout is that the team communication is clear and facilitated; 
this also gives higher level of coordination inside the group. The disadvantage would 
be the fact that the team focuses on ODM judgments and beliefs rather than 
discussion. OAT, ODM, OCT can take the active roles of the communication loops 
(as Sender or Receiver) interchangeably. OAT is a licensed operator who is 
responsible for interacting with the equipment. He/she is responsible to receive 
ODM’s command to check an indicator or change a component state. Without 
ODM’s command OAT is not supposed to have any physical interaction with the 
control panel (e.g., change a component state). OCT is an operator who has 
professional knowledge of the operating system. In NPPs OCT (e.g., technical 
advisor) is not a licensed reactor operator, so he/she is not supposed to have any 
physical interaction with the control panel. The responsibility of OCT is to give 
advice to ODM. In order to develop object-based model of the operating crew, the 
main object classes (active and passive objects) should be identified, as well as the 
associations among classes. Extended IDAC introduces another role (OAT2) who is 
an operator action taker but is located outside the control room. 
4.5.3 MATLAB Simulink & CREWSIM 
MATLAB Simulink provides a wide range of capabilities for simulation modeling by 
supporting block diagram style object modeling and embedded MATLAB functions 
for modeling the behavior. A custom-defined library (CREWSIM) is developed to 




pre-defined models of human operator, communication links, initiator blocks and 
different hardware components. Such pre-defined classes of components can be 
desirably instantiated and customized to mimic the requested behavior in the specific 
domain. These component classes include some general characteristics encapsulated 
in the form of attributes and operations and as well as the blank states and the ability 
to add to or remove from the set of embedded characteristics. By assigning states and 
manipulating the set of attributes and operations for these classes, the user is able to 
obtain system model. The individual operator’s model structure is based on IDAC 
methodology. IDAC decomposes the operator’s cognitive flow into: Information-
processing (I), Decision-making (D), and Action-execution (A). General 
characteristics are encapsulated as object class attributes and operations, with the 
flexibility of being edited to account for personal differences and performance 
shaping factors (PSFs).  
The Simulation controller is a code that is responsible for data manipulation, 
information dissemination, inference, calls to external routines and command 
implementation and need to be modified for each application. The dynamics of 
behavior is captured by using a local controller inside each object structure, 
responsible for branch generation. The simulation algorithm generates a dynamic 
event tree based on branch points associated with the internal and external error 
reference points and the lowest level functionalities of each simulated module. Each 
branch represents distinct combinations of system and operator states. Once a system 




Chapter 5:  Case Study 
 
The approach is demonstrated through a case study for the operating crew of a four-
steam generator feed-water system under a postulated accident scenario (pipe-break). 
A configuration of four operators is being studied as a reasonable approximation of 
an NPP operating crew while interacting with the feed-water subsystem of the plant. 
The crew module consists of the Decision Maker, the Action Taker, and the 
Consultant roles as well as face-to-face & device-based communication channels 
among them. The integrated simulation model represents the complex system and 
consists of the plant model (hardware system) as well as the crew model. Five major 
subsystems for the hardware system are characterized and included. These 
subsystems are the following: main subsystem, intermediate subsystem, emergency 
subsystem, steam generating subsystem and output subsystem. The major system 
components are: boiler feed-pumps or main feed-pumps, emergency feed-pumps, 
control valves, pipes, steam generators, and heaters. The governing equations are 
mass balance equations, which generate system dynamics. The platform for 
developing the feed-water simulation model is MATLAB Simulink. The operating 
team consists of the equipment operator (OAT2), located in the plant, the equipment 
operator (OAT1), the shift supervisor (ODM) and the shift technical-advisor (OCT), 
located in the control room. Each operator is responsible for a variety of tasks, all 
following the general cognitive steps of IDAC, with different associated individual 
characteristics as well as responsibilities. The communication network is centralized 
around the decision-maker. All operators take active roles in communication loops (as 




MATLAB Simulink platform and has been added into the plat model to form the 
integrated simulation model for the complex system. 
5.1 Plant Model 
In a typical steam generator power plant (Figure 36), the steam is produced, 
transferred to the turbine, and used for energy generation; the condensed water is then 
returned to the boilers to be used again in the cycle. A four steam generator plant has 
four identical steam generators with integral pre-heaters which transfer the heat from 
the heavy water reactor of the primary heat transfer system side to the light water on 
the secondary side. The feed water system supplies normal feed water to the steam 
generators which transfer the heat from the heavy water reactor of the primary heat 
transfer system side to the light water on the secondary side. The temperature of the 
incoming feed water is increased to the boiling point and subsequently evaporated. 
The feed water system comprises the main feed water pumps power and auxiliary 
feed water pumps. The auxiliary feed water system supplies feed water to the steam 






Figure 36: Steam generator plant 
One of the main functionalities of the control room of any NPP is to maintain the 
steam generators’ water level at a desired value by regulating the feed water flow 
rate. Ineffective feed water control has been the root cause of many of reactor 
shutdowns, which leads to severe economic loss (Zhao et al., 2000). Therefore it is 
important to study the water level regulation process, through developing a technical 
model and application of simulation methods. The structure of this model need to be 
established based on the physical understanding of the process. Since this research is 
investigating the dynamic behavior of the NPP operating crew, to obtain a more 
realistic representation of the entire system, the crew model is designed to be 
operating on the feed water system model. The simulation model is the integration of 
the so called hardware and human models. The hardware model of interest is the 
model of a simplified representation for a feed water system in a four steam generator 
plant (Figure 37 and Figure 38). This model includes five subsystems, thirty four 
valves, six boiler feed pumps, four heaters and four steam generators. The control 




indicators and physical parameter indicators. The major system components are: 
Boiler Feed Pumps (BFP) or Main feed pumps (MFP), Emergency feed pumps (EFP), 
Control Valves (V), Pipes (J), Steam generators (SG), and Heaters (HTR). Table 23 
lists system major components. 
The steam generator level control system balances feed water to steam flow for all 
operating conditions. Control is performed by the distributed computer control 
system; the operators control the flow rate in pipes and the water level in steam 
generators by using the different control valves. Pumps, Valves and Heaters can fail 
on-demand during the system operation; such events are the basis of branch 
generation in the simulation. Once a component fails it is assumed unrecoverable.  
 
 





Figure 38: A simplified version of the feed water system 
The Main Sub-system is composed of two main feed water paths which carry the 
water to the water head. The Intermediate Sub-system includes four paths each of 
which leads to a steam generator. The Steam-Generating Sub-system includes four 
steam generators and their heaters. The Steam-Output Sub-system includes all the 
output paths from the steam generators to outside of the plant. The Emergency Feed 
water Sub-system includes four emergency feed pumps and their injection paths. 
Since the goal is to develop an object based model, identified active objects in this 
system are: Main and Emergency Feed Pumps, Heaters, Steam Generators, Valves, 
Pipes. This simple model is a good representation of plant operations (Chang, 1999). 
Components are modeled as objects to reflect their different nature and characteristics 
of elements and to improve model reuse. The governing equations are mass balance 




developed using the object based modeling methodology. The platform for 
implementing this model is MATLAB Simulink. Simulink works well for multi-
domain simulation purposes and provides customizable sets of block libraries for 
representing a variety of different concepts. The application of embedded MATLAB 
functions is allowed inside a simulation block which makes it a good choice for 
practicing the concepts of encapsulation and information hiding.  
Table 23: Hardware system major components 
Component Format No. of units
Main: JM1, JM2 2
Intermediate: JI11,.., JI44 4
Steam output: JO21,..,JO44 4
Emergency: JM11,..,JM44 4
Main: PMA, PMB 2
Emergency: PMC, PMD, PME, PMF 4
Main: VCC1,VCC3,VM1,VMM2,VMC1,VMC2,VMA1,VMA2 8
Intermediate:VIH1,..,VIH4,VIM1,..,VIM4,VIC1,..,VIC4 12
Steam output: VTS1,VTS2,VTC1,VTC2,VTH1,VTH2,VOA1,..,VOA4 10
Emergency: VMM3,..,VMM6 4
Heater Steam Generating: HT1,..,HT4 4
Tank Intermediate: SUMP1,..,SUMP4 4





There are four emergency boiler feed pumps (PMC, PMD, PME, and PMF) which 
provide emergency water injection into the SGs to prevent them from getting dried 
out in special cases. The water source for these four emergency pumps is also the 
CST. The electric power for heaters in the system can be cut off immediately in case 
of emergency. Each SG water input flow rate could be controlled by the valves 
located in the Intermediate Sub-system paths. If a pipe break occurs at time zero, 
certain flow mismatch alarms are activated; once the operator perceives the activation 
of alarm, the cognitive processes are initiated to recognize the event and perform 




reduced input after such an initiating event. When any SG water level is low (low-
level) the emergency pumps automatically start and become ready. If the SG water 
level continues to decrease and reaches the low-low-level, the corresponding safety 
injection control valve opens and the safety injection coolant injects into the SG 
(Chang, 1999). 
The major components, Boiler Feed Pumps or Main Feed Pumps (BFP or MFP) and 
Emergency Feed Pumps (EFP), Control Valves (V), and Heaters (HTR) are instances 
of a class named “Plant Component” (Table 24). Such components inherit a set of 
attributes (name, state, status, probability of failure) from their parent class; however 
there are certain specific attributes associated with each specialized child class; for 
instance, head and flow value are specific to pump class. These components are 
connected together with Pipes. The Pipe break incident, which is considered the 
initiating event for the accident scenario, has been modeled as an event with an 
associated probability of occurrence which is preset as a simulation parameter. The 
scenario of interest is initiated by a pipe break event occurring in either main or 
intermediate subsystems. The operating crew needs to perform the accident 
mitigation steps correctly and in time, otherwise the steam generators would become 
either solid or dried out. 
5.1.1 Normal Operation  
In the steam generation system, the coolant storage tank (CST) provides water for the 
steam generators. Its capacity is assumed to be infinite in the simulation cases. Two 
motor-driven main feed pumps (PMA and PMB) provide the water flow through two 




loops. The water flows into the steam generators, heated by the provided heating 
source and becomes steam. The steam flows through FWO1, FWO2, FWO3, and 
FWO4 to a steam head and then is distributed to the turbine and outside. FWi stands 
for flow meters which are located on different paths to provide the control crew with 
the flow value of water in each path. 
5.1.2 Emergency Situation 
 
There are four emergency boiler feed pumps (PMC, PMD, PME, and PMF) which 
provide emergency water injection into the SGs to prevent them from getting dried 
out in special cases. The water source for these four emergency pumps is also the 
CST. The electric power for heaters in the system can be cut off immediately in case 
of emergency. Each SG water input flow rate could be controlled by the valves 
located in the Intermediate Sub-system paths. 
If a pipe break occurs at time zero, certain flow mismatch alarms are activated; once 
the operator perceives the activation of alarm, the cognitive processes are initiated to 
recognize the event and perform mitigation activities. All of the steam generators’ 
water levels decrease due to the reduced input after such initiating event. When any 
SG water level is low (low-level) the emergency pumps automatically start and 
become ready. If the SG water level continues to decrease and reaches the low-low-
level, the corresponding safety injection control valve opens and the safety injection 
coolant injects into the SG (Chang, 1999). 
The main steps of the approach to develop the simulation model are:  




2) Identify process control parameters 
3) Develop process control equations 
4) Define inputs and outputs of the simulation model 
5) Develop object models for individual components and their relationships 
6) Develop integrated system model. 
Table 24: Object models for major components 
 
Figure 39 represents the block used in CREWSIM, which is the simulation model for 
the simplified feed water system. The input to the developed MATLAB Simulink 
block for the simplified feed water system is the action code that is transferred to the 
system via the equipment operators and the outputs of the block are a set of alarms 
which together determine the system state. These alarms include: Steam generator 
water level alarm, Flow mismatch alarm, Main loop integrity alarm, Intermediate 
loop integrity alarm, Output loop integrity alarm, Main pumps alarm, Emergency 




the system reaches its end state which is when the water level in steam generator falls 
below the threshold. The water level of steam generators in fact is not the only output 
value of the simulated system; the flow for each path at any time step is calculated 
and is available inside the model; The initial parameters for model set up include: 
initial water and steam level for steam generators, the water temperature and the 
boiling temperature, the head and flow values each pump provides, the water latent 
heat value, and the pressure under which system operates. 
5.1.3 Dynamics of the Hardware System 
This part provides details on how the dynamics of the hardware system has been 
modeled and lists the governing equations. In order to achieve the governing 
equations for water level regulation process, the first step is to recognize the critical 
system parameters. For a complete list of parameters used in this calculation please 
see table 25. Since the objective of the control system is to maintain the steam 
generator water level at a desired value by regulating the feed water flow rate, the 
governing equations for the variation in the water level need to be addressed. The 














Table 25: List of parameters 
Parameter Index
Boiler Feed Pump Head
(PMA,..,PMF)
Emergency Feed Pump Feed
(PMC,.., PMF)
Boiler Feed Pump Flow
(PMA,PMB)




Adjusting Factor for path RI1 , RM1 , ..




Density of Water ρW
Water Level in Steam Generators HW1, .., HW4
Steam Level in Steam Generators HS1, .., HS4
Heater Power
HA , HB 
HC , .., HF 
DA , DB





Please note that the factor R is just an adjustment to reflect what percentage of the 
flow is passing through the path; hence. By applying this factor, the flow value for 
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Considering the water head as point X and the steam head as point Y, the equivalent 





























The head values for steam generators are sum of the value of steam head and the 
























































































The water level of steam generators is not the only output value of the simulated 




check from the control panel; the signals for alarm activation are among other outputs 
for hardware system. The simulation parameters that need to be set before starting the 
simulation include: initial water and steam level for steam generators, the water 
temperature and the boiling temperature, the head and flow values each pump 
provides, the water latent heat value, the pressure under which system works and the 
density of water. 
5.1.4 Simulink Model for the Hardware System 
Figure 40 and Figure 41 describe the model in more detail; the associations among 
different classes of objects are clear in the model layout. The calculations are 
accomplished in a separate block which represents the dynamics of the system and 
generates the outputs. All parameters are accessible by clicking on the blocks (to 
change or to observe).  
 





Figure 40: Details of Simulink model for hardware system 
Figure 42 describes identified system states and undesired end states for the hardware 
system. See appendix B for a complete list of identified system states, decisions, 
authorized actions, authorized messages and possible errors in the context of the 
simplified feed water system. Different system states and associated parameters and 
events are summarized below. The undesired end states are considered as steam 







Figure 41: Details of Simulink model for Intermediate subsystem 
 




5.2 Crew Model 
A configuration of four operators is being studied as a reasonable approximation of 
an NPP operating crew while interacting with the feed-water subsystem. The team 
consists of the equipment operator (OAT2), located in the plant, the equipment 
operator (OAT1), the shift supervisor (ODM) and the shift technical-advisor (OCT), 
located in the control room. (Figure 43) 
 
Figure 43: Different roles for operating crew of the proposed hardware system 
Each operator is responsible for a variety of tasks, all following the general cognitive 
steps of IDAC, with different associated individual characteristics as well as 
responsibilities. The communication network is centralized around the decision-
maker. All operators take active roles in communication loops (as sender or receiver) 
interchangeably. The major tasks in a team context based on the IDAC framework are 
categorized as: plant status assessment including the task of collaborative information 
collection and the task of understanding the situation; response planning, which 




the task of implementing the decided response. There is also the major task of error 
management, which includes monitoring, review, feedback and back up. The process 
involves requesting or transferring observation, judgment, advice and confirmation on 
decision or action via proper messaging as well as acknowledgement. Cognitive 
modules are modeled in MATLAB Simulink via use of sequential function blocks. 
These functions operate on system information and/or messages from other crew 
members and ultimately produce new messages and/or control actions in a sequential 
manner. Figure 44 illustrates how team members communicate using messages. Each 
communication link carries the message and the message content. The message is in 
the form of an observation, a judgment, advice, a request or a report and an 
acknowledgment. The message content might be a piece of information, a system 
state, a decision or an action; it can also be advice on system state, advice on decision 
or advice on action.   
 




Based on IDA Infrastructure for individual operators, the basic cognitive activities of 
the operator have been developed as three sequential modules: Information 
processing module, Decision making module, Action execution module. The 
probability of failure of each cognitive function as well as the availability of the 
operator and plant information are characterized by a set of individual PSFs which 
have been introduced earlier. The probability of failure of communication (as a major 
team process) as well as the availability of the operator and the communication 
channel as well as the message are characterized by a set of communication (team-
related) PSFs. In addition to cognitive blocks, each operator has an embedded Error 
management module which in turn consists of Error detection module, Error 
Indication module, Error correction module. Similarly there is a probability of failure 
on demand associated with each module that is characterized by contributing 
performance shaping factors. The main system functions for each operator are listed 
in table 26. 
Table 26: Operator functions on the hardware system 
Operator Functions
Verify the status of system components or alarms
Change the status of system components
Turn on/ off heaters





Receive a message  
In CREWSIM, each operator inside the team is represented by a block (Figure 45). 
The inputs to this block are: The input message and the input message content which 




which is a code that helps the simulator trace errors inside team processes and the 
outputs of this block are the created message and its content. Output error is similarly 
a code that helps the simulator to trace errors inside team processes. 
 
Figure 45: Individual operator 
In addition to this, there is the input information channel from the plant and the output 
action channel that carries the performed action to its destination inside the plant. The 
block is customized by a set of performance shaping factors being set up using the 
model editor at the time of creating the object, which determine the characteristics of 





Figure 46: CREWSIM library in Simulink 
The developed MATLAB Simulink blocks for operator roles are shown in figure 47 
with the rest of the blocks developed in CREWSIM. The decision maker is linked to 
three other persons, hence there are three different communication channels 
associated with each team member and they have their own characteristics and 
parameters. The communication channels are in the form of face-to-face and verbal 




having a device based communication channel, the reliability of the device and the 
familiarity of operator to the application of device are important factors. These 
channels are used to exchange the message and message content between operators; 
the input and output errors to these channels are codes that help the simulator keep 
track of the errors. The developed MATLAB Simulink blocks for communication 
channels are listed in figure 46 as well. Figure 47 provides details on the simulation 
model for the operating crew of the proposed feed water system. For more 
information please see appendix A: CREWSIM User’s guide. 
 





The investigated accident scenario to practice the proposed methodology of this 
research is initiated by a pipe break. The model is designed in a way that this event 
can occur at any of the paths during any time step. However, since the emphasis of 
this research is on the operating crew, the pipe break event occurs in one of the 
intermediate subsystem paths. The operators are required to detect the problem, 
activate the emergency subsystem to correct the problem, and as a result the heaters 
are turned off and the broken path is isolated; otherwise the steam generator would be 
dried out or solid. Failure in accomplishing any of these functionalities is caused by 
one or more human function failure at a lower level. The different steps are of the 





Figure 48: Accident scenario 
5.4 Simulation 
Dynamic event-based systems are modeled using discrete events that cause the 
system to change from one state to another. The idea is to dynamically change the 




and generate possible time dependent scenarios. In our method, a simulation 
controller is responsible for assigning control parameters and simulation variables for 
each run. It is also responsible for actuating initiating events as well as recognizing 
that the end state is reached and the simulation needs to be stopped. The dynamics of 
behavior are captured by using a local controller inside each object structure that is 
responsible for branch generation.  
 
Figure 49: DDET and branch generation 
The simulation algorithm generates a dynamic event tree based on branch points 
associated with the internal and external error reference points and the lowest level 
functionalities of each simulated module. Each branch represents distinct 
combinations of system and operator states. Once a system end-state is reached, the 
scenario ends. The accident scenarios are created once certain conditions are met and 
associated branching points are activated. The unique path through the Dynamic 
Discrete Event Tree (DDET) branching points from the initiating event to an end state 




Simulation aims to walk through different scenarios to achieve possible end states of 
the system and calculate their associated probabilities by repeating this process. Each 
operator is involved in such scenarios by performing a chain of functions in a 
backward and forward manner. Each of these functions needs a couple of time steps 
to be accomplished by the operator, so there is a duration parameter associated to 
each function. The steps of scenarios recorded by the simulation reveal the 
mechanism that leads to each of the possible end states. The branching points in the 
model are designed such that the failure of system elements and their functionalities 
as well as the team-related errors as part of a team process generate different paths 
and scenarios in the system risk profile. During the simulation, the states of various 
subsystems and operator responses dynamically change and generate time-dependent 
scenarios. The overall observed performance of the operating team is investigated 
using a post-processing routine on documented simulation log files from two different 
perspectives; the accuracy of team actions with respect to timing, sequence, and 
taking inappropriate or unnecessary actions is evaluated via a reference target list, 
with the focus being on the pre-defined timeline for action completion. Also, based 
on the designed study that was discussed in the previous chapter, the performance of 
teams with different characteristics is compared. 
The simulation model provides branching rules and sequence termination criteria 
needed to construct the dynamic event tree. Such branching points are associated with 
accident initiating events, and active hardware failures as well as individual and team 
related issues. Individual human errors have been recognized within the context by 




emergency procedures as authorized actions.  The developed classification of human 
error in this context covers both omission and commission errors. Commission errors 
consider different aspects of information processing activities such as observing the 
wrong object, different dimensions of the decision making process such as delayed 
interpretation, as well as different aspects of action execution such as direction, 
timing, and sequence of actions. In the case of communication error, an omission 
error occurs when the message is not there, is missed or unavailable; while a 
commission error would result in an unknown message being transferred. Both 
situations would cause the receiver to create a recovery message requesting for 
resending of the previous message. Taking inappropriate or unnecessary actions or 
taking actions on the wrong object are classified as commission errors as well. Error 
Management Module is responsible for representing how individual errors are treated 
inside the team and how recovery messages and actions are created. For a complete 




Chapter 6:  Experiment & Results 
 
The research effort has been focused on conducting the simulation and analysis of 
simulation runs in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
complexities of team related issues and how they affect the entire system risk. To this 
end, a study was designed to simulate a number of team characteristics and their 
consequences and to compare the results with several theoretical models and 
empirical studies. The simulation example model was also used to demonstrate face 
validity and additional capabilities of the methodology that can be used in extended 
studies on team behavior. This chapter describes the conducted simulations and 
provides an analysis of the results. A sensitivity study on the SLIM method is 
included as well to justify the PSF quantification method used in this research. 
6.1 Design of the Study 
6.1.1 Objectives 
This research focuses on operator team members’ characteristics as well as team and 
organizational factors and how such factors impact a team’s performance. In order to 
relate observed performance to PSFs, for a selection of PSFs, the investigation 
attempts to realize whether the systematic differences in PSF manifestations can 
account for differences in performance among teams of operators. The objectives of 
this experiment are: 
• To demonstrate face validity of the modeling approach  
• To explore sources of variability among the operating crew 





• To determine the most important factors among PSF categories (Individual, 
Team and Organization) and communication means and to study and compare 
the mechanisms of their effect on team performance.  
• To compare finding of this research to existing theories and observations 
about NPPs operating crew behavior derived from literature 
6.1.2 Subject of the Study 
The basic configuration considered for the team consists of four people; two 
equipment operators, one located in the control room and the other located in the 
plant. The rest of the team includes the shift supervisor who is the main decision 
maker and the technical advisor who provides consultation and advice.  These 
characteristics considered include individual, team, environmental and situational 
factors. The following major categories have been considered as controllable 
variables in the simulation: 
• Individual characteristics: Personal and Role related 
• Team characteristics: Team related, Environment and Organizational  
• Team process characteristics: Communication, characteristics of sender, 
receiver, the communication link, and communication environment 
In addition, the initial probabilities of failure for plant components, initial states, and 
system process parameters such as temperature and pressure in the plant as well as 
initial probabilities of failure for basic human functions are among controllable 
variables. Dynamic performance shaping factors (time-based) are among 
uncontrollable variables. Situational and task characteristics are handled 




characteristics are time load and information load which are calculated dynamically at 
each time step and are considered known variables to the simulation controller. 
In order to restrict the number of cases generated by simulation, except for the first 
pipe in intermediate subsystem, all the other components in the plant model are set to 
“working normally”. (The simulation model, however, allows any other combinations 
of failure and success component failures).  
6.1.3 Method 
Since a total number of four operators have been defined in the CREWSIM model 
described in previous chapter, four sets of individual characteristics (Table 17), are 
assigned. Also since the crew includes an equipment operator located outside the 
control room, there are two different kinds of communication channels; device-based 
and face-to-face (inside the control room) (Table 30). There are 6 blocks for 
communication inside the team. Team factors include those factors that would impact 
the team as a unit and hence are applicable to all individuals in the team. Tables 16, 
17 and 18 and 30 list the controllable parameters in the crew model that are assigned 
by the user before each simulation round. The initial state of each of the operators is 
also set up before each simulation round by using an initial set up block in 
CREWSIM
11
. Each round of simulation was a set of 100 simulation runs. The total 
number of cases generated was 175, resulting in 17500 simulation runs. Since the 
models are graphical and in MATLAB Simulink environment, the input parameters 
were set manually via the model editor and different models were stored prior to 
                                                 




running the simulation. In the simulation platform, a simulation controller code runs 
different simulation rounds and stores the log files. 
The simulation log files are the outputs of this experiment. A post processing routine 
was used to quantitatively explore individual, team and ultimately collective 
performances.  
Table 27: Communication Channel 
Factor Level Factor Level



















Availability of device Communication skills of receiver
Accessability of device Format/ language of receiver
Ease of use
Communication Channel
With Device / Device Properties No Device (Face to Face) / General
How familiar is the sender with device? Communication skills of sender 
How familiar is the receiver with device? Format/ language of sender
 
6.1.4 Scenario 
All of the operating teams simulated had to follow the same scenario. In order to 
minimize the effect of variability associated with failure of components inside the 
plant, the initiating event was set as “pipe break in the first path of the intermediate 
subsystem of the proposed feed water system”. However, since all the active objects 
including key sub-systems and components have been fully modeled, the model is 




The initial probabilities of failure for most of the components inside the model are 
assigned subjectively. Since we did not intend to introduce any bias, these failure 
event probabilities have been set equally for such components. For example, the 
probabilities of failure for human cognitive functions are initially assigned equal; 
however, through the mechanism of influence of PSFs inside the model these 
probabilities are automatically modified to reflect the dynamically changing context 
and PSF values. The undesired end state is the steam-generator drying out which 
would happen during the scenario if the emergency subsystem is not activated by the 
operating crew during a specific period of time after the occurrence of the initiating 
event. The output of the integrated operating crew model is the action code that 
triggers the emergency subsystem.  
6.1.5 Questions of Interest 
The study aims to understand why and how flaws in each of the major categories of 
PSFs, listed in Section 6.1.2, would lead to the undesired state of the system.  
• How many times the undesired “end state” (SG Dry Out) is reached during a 
round of simulation? 
• Why and how the undesired end state is reached, with focus being on 
monitoring the timeline of the scenario including the time of the occurrence of 
errors, time of execution of wrong actions, time of execution of the recovery 
actions and time of the occurrence of the end state?  
• Which of the input factors have the strongest impact on the output and why, 





• How does the model results compare with findings documented in the 
literature based on similar situations involving real control crew via 
observational methods? 
6.2 Scenario Generation  
Using different combinations and arrangements of the three major categories of 
simulation parameters discussed earlier, different configurations of teams can be 
represented. We had to generate all possible cases and investigate them. The model 
allows the user to select three different levels of qualitative rating for input factors; 
however, with teams composed of 4 operators (each subject to 14-20 parameters) and 
6 communication channels (each subject to 4-10 parameters) and one set of team 
factors (subject to 20 parameters) and each of parameters having 2 or 3 levels, a sub 
set of variables and variations had to be selected to keep the number of required 
simulation runs under control. A screening test of 20 cases was set up and run 
initially. We considered an “average team” (in terms of PSFs and other 
characteristics) and at each round we set only one factor at low (bad) level (Table 31).  
Table 28: Initial screening 
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No Device With Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
1 Average Average Average Average Average Average Average 0
2 Average Average Average Average Average Average Bad 0
3 Average Average Average Average Average Average Good 0
4 Average Average Bad Average Average Average Average 48
5 Average Average Good Average Average Average Average 0
6 Average Average Average Average Average Bad Average 0
7 Average Average Average Average Average Good Average 0
8 Bad Good Average Average Average Average Average 0
9 Good Bad Average Average Average Average Average 0
10 Bad Bad Average Average Average Average Average 0







The number of Dry out situations was the key index to judge (at a high level) the net 
impact of the factor that was set to low value. The last column shows the number of 
Dry outs out of 100 simulation runs. Based on the generated 2000 simulation runs, we 
noticed that we are unable to observe the dried out situation in most of the cases. 
Such end states were only observed when the supervisor (ODM-decision maker) 
individual characteristics were set to lowest level. Therefore we decided to not to run 
cases for ODM characteristics set at high level, because of low chance that such cases 
would provide insightful data on Dry out situations.  
Additionally, it made sense to only look at the cases that the supervisor and/or the rest 
of team members are set to average or weak. We used the following criteria to limit 
our input variations: 
• Instead of randomly selecting different levels for each parameter for each 
block, we changed the parameters in a group setting. For example, having a 
bad action taker means all his individual characteristics are set at worst levels. 
Communication factors were also treated the same way; instead of looking at 
each link, we looked at two groups: verbal (face-to-face) communication 
inside team and device-based communication to outside the control room. 
This way, a bad communication means all communication factors that are 
associated with a specific link and similar links have been set up at their worst 
level. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the PSFs (within the SLIM 
method) to justify for this assumption. 
• Of the three levels for qualitative rating of model parameters, we used only 




that had an average or bad supervisor (ODM) and overlooked the rest of cases 
which we assumed would not provide important insights. In order to justify 
this assumption, we used Taguchi method for the design of the experiment 
and generated 27 representative cases and included good levels for parameters 
as well. We repeated the simulation and analysis for this set of cases and 
compared the results.  
6.2.1 Taguchi Method  
Factorial design intends to test all possible combinations of inputs, which is not 
practical when the dimensions of the problem are as big as they are in our case.  
Genichi Taguchi has proposed several approaches to manage experimental designs 
(Antony et al., 2004). He combined statistics and engineering to achieve rapid 
improvements in product designs and manufacturing processes. His efforts led to a 
subset of screening experiments commonly referred to the Taguchi Techniques or the 
Taguchi Methods. These methods utilize two-level, three-level, and mixed-level 
fractional factorial designs. We used JMP software to perform Taguchi method that 
produced 27 representative cases (Table 36). 
6.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis on PSFs Model  
In order to perform sensitivity and importance analysis on the contributing factors of 
the probability function (based on SLIM method), one may look at the partial 
derivatives with respect to each variable. In this case it is assumed that the base 
probability of failure (Pr0) is completely independent from the SLI, therefore the 
importance of these components can be accurately scaled by partial derivatives. If 
















































The base probability is in the interval zero to one, and SLI can be as low as 0 for all 
“bad” PSFs, 5 for “average” PSFs and 10 for all “good” PSFs as mentioned earlier. 
As shown above, the rate of change in probability due to changes in base probability 
is larger than the rate of change due to changes in SLI. This relative importance, 
however, depends on the base probability itself. For example if factor a is considered 
to be “1”, as evident in this equation the importance of the two will be in the same 
order of magnitude when base probability of failure is very high (i.e. close to one). At 
a more typical base probability of 0.1 (considered in the case study) the change in 
base probability is almost 10 times more important than the changes in SLI. As 
explained earlier the SLI is calculated based on performance shape factors as follows: 
 
 
If the same weights are considered for all shape factors, the SLI will be simply the 
average of contributing PSFs. Let us further assume that PSF is a random number, 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 10. In this case, according to central limit 
theorem, the standard deviation of the average of N samples (i.e. SLI) is proportional 
to the inverse of square root of number of samples N. This means that the variation of 
SLI is expected to reduce as more PSFs are included into the problem. This simply 




of PSFs increases. In other words, the probability of failure will no longer be sensitive 
to individual PSFs and may be only influenced when group changes in PSFs are 
observed.  
Monte Carlo simulation within possible ranges of the variables, including values of 
PSFs, number of PSFs, SLI, and base probability of failure confirms the above 
conclusions. For example assuming uniform distributions for base probability of 
failure and PSFs with three possible choices of 0, 5, and 10 as mentioned earlier 
reveals the same trends in final calculated probability of failure.  
Figure 50 shows the contour plot of the probability for different cases of base 
probability and SLI. As illustrated in this figure, the probability remains practically 
insensitive to SLI unless all PSFs indicate a very poor performance. The base 
probability, however, remains an important player in the full range.  
Figure 51 illustrates the central limit theorem concept. As shown in this figure, the 
standard deviation of SLI shrinks when more PSFs are influencing the performance. 
The mean PSF which is basically the SLI value converges to average of the range 
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Figure 51: Variability chart for SLI vs. No. of influential PSFs 
6.3 Simulation Results 
Beside the 20 cases that we initially used for screening and derived 2000 runs, we 




in 12800 simulation runs (since each of the cases includes 100 runs). Details of each 
run are recorded in simulation log files. The simulation log files are huge text files 
which record everything that happens in the system (crew, hardware and physical 
process variables) at each time step.  
The simulation log files were processed and the number of Dry out situations was 
derived from the text. As an example of the generated scenario, a part of the 
simulation log file associated with case No.4 in Table 32 is being provided in 
appendix C (From time step 1.8 to time step 2.2). In this scenario the communication 
between inside and outside the control room has failed due to device inefficiency and 
hence operator no.2 (OAT2) has not received the message from operator no.4 (ODM) 
correctly. The error recognition, indication and correction steps in the team 
(performed by the supervisor) are successfully accomplished by Operator no.4 
(ODM) and the supervisor asks the operator to resend the message (request for a 
recovery action). However, since the communication is ineffective, the field operator 
(operator no.2, OAT2) is not able to receive this message correctly either. In the next 
steps, ODM asks the control room operator (operator no.1, OAT1) to correct the 
situation by performing the required action on the system. Operator no.3 (the 
consultant) doesn’t have an active role in this part of scenario. 
Table 32 and Table 33 provide detailed data on the first 64 cases with the supervisor 
being set to “average” and by considering all possible combinations of other factors. 
By looking at the data it is clear that not all the cases result in SG Dry Out situations. 




repeated the study (2700 simulation runs). Hence, we have processed a total of 17500 
simulation runs on this layout of the team. 
Table 29: Average Supervisor (Part 1) 
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No Device With Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
1 Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Bad 68
2 Bad Bad Average Average Bad Bad Bad 0
3 Bad Average Average Bad Bad Bad Bad 75
4 Bad Average Average Average Bad Bad Bad 0
5 Average Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Bad 0
6 Average Bad Average Average Bad Bad Bad 0
7 Average Average Average Bad Bad Bad Bad 0
8 Average Average Average Average Bad Bad Bad 0
9 Bad Bad Average Bad Average Average Average 74
10 Bad Bad Average Average Average Average Average 0
11 Bad Average Average Bad Average Average Average 0
12 Bad Average Average Average Average Average Average 0
13 Average Bad Average Bad Average Average Average 0
14 Average Bad Average Average Average Average Average 0
15 Average Average Average Bad Average Average Average 0
16 Average Average Average Average Average Average Average 0
17 Bad Bad Average Bad Average Average Bad 68
18 Bad Bad Average Average Average Average Bad 0
19 Bad Average Average Bad Average Average Bad 0
20 Bad Average Average Average Average Average Bad 0
21 Average Bad Average Bad Average Average Bad 0
22 Average Bad Average Average Average Average Bad 0
23 Average Average Average Bad Average Average Bad 0
24 Average Average Average Average Average Average Bad 0
25 Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Average 78
26 Bad Bad Average Average Bad Bad Average 0
27 Bad Average Average Bad Bad Bad Average 64
28 Bad Average Average Average Bad Bad Average 0
29 Average Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Average 0
30 Average Bad Average Average Bad Bad Average 0
31 Average Average Average Bad Bad Bad Average 0







Table 30: Average Supervisor (Part 2) 
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No Device With Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
33 Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Average Average 68
34 Bad Bad Average Average Bad Average Average 0
35 Bad Average Average Bad Bad Average Average 0
36 Bad Average Average Average Bad Average Average 0
37 Average Bad Average Bad Bad Average Average 0
38 Average Bad Average Average Bad Average Average 0
39 Average Average Average Bad Bad Average Average 0
40 Average Average Average Average Bad Average Average 0
41 Bad Bad Average Bad Average Bad Average 78
42 Bad Bad Average Average Average Bad Average 0
43 Bad Average Average Bad Average Bad Average 64
44 Bad Average Average Average Average Bad Average 0
45 Average Bad Average Bad Average Bad Average 0
46 Average Bad Average Average Average Bad Average 0
47 Average Average Average Bad Average Bad Average 0
48 Average Average Average Average Average Bad Average 0
49 Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Average Bad 71
50 Bad Bad Average Average Bad Average Bad 0
51 Bad Average Average Bad Bad Average Bad 0
52 Bad Average Average Average Bad Average Bad 0
53 Average Bad Average Bad Bad Average Bad 0
54 Average Bad Average Average Bad Average Bad 0
55 Average Average Average Bad Bad Average Bad 0
56 Average Average Average Average Bad Average Bad 0
57 Bad Bad Average Bad Average Bad Bad 70
58 Bad Bad Average Average Average Bad Bad 0
59 Bad Average Average Bad Average Bad Bad 66
60 Bad Average Average Average Average Bad Bad 0
61 Average Bad Average Bad Average Bad Bad 0
62 Average Bad Average Average Average Bad Bad 0
63 Average Average Average Bad Average Bad Bad 0




Table 34 and table 35 list the rest of the cases in which the supervisor characteristics 
are all set to be “bad”. By looking at the data it is clear that there is a sudden increase 




Table 31: Bad Supervisor (Part 1) 
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No Device With Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
65 Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad 82
66 Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Bad 81
67 Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad 85
68 Bad Average Bad Average Bad Bad Bad 85
69 Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad 72
70 Average Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Bad 85
71 Average Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad 71
72 Average Average Bad Average Bad Bad Bad 74
73 Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Average Average 73
74 Bad Bad Bad Average Average Average Average 76
75 Bad Average Bad Bad Average Average Average 84
76 Bad Average Bad Average Average Average Average 82
77 Average Bad Bad Bad Average Average Average 81
78 Average Bad Bad Average Average Average Average 76
79 Average Average Bad Bad Average Average Average 79
80 Average Average Bad Average Average Average Average 81
81 Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Average Bad 84
82 Bad Bad Bad Average Average Average Bad 86
83 Bad Average Bad Bad Average Average Bad 84
84 Bad Average Bad Average Average Average Bad 85
85 Average Bad Bad Bad Average Average Bad 82
86 Average Bad Bad Average Average Average Bad 74
87 Average Average Bad Bad Average Average Bad 74
88 Average Average Bad Average Average Average Bad 75
89 Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Average 86
90 Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Average 81
91 Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Average 77
92 Bad Average Bad Average Bad Bad Average 84
93 Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Average 76
94 Average Bad Bad Average Bad Bad Average 81
95 Average Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Average 82







Table 32: Bad Supervisor (Part 2) 
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No DeviceWith Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
97 Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Average 78
98 Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Average Average 83
99 Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Average Average 81
100 Bad Average Bad Average Bad Average Average 81
101 Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Average 74
102 Average Bad Bad Average Bad Average Average 78
103 Average Average Bad Bad Bad Average Average 77
104 Average Average Bad Average Bad Average Average 71
105 Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Average 81
106 Bad Bad Bad Average Average Bad Average 87
107 Bad Average Bad Bad Average Bad Average 83
108 Bad Average Bad Average Average Bad Average 81
109 Average Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Average 86
110 Average Bad Bad Average Average Bad Average 81
111 Average Average Bad Bad Average Bad Average 73
112 Average Average Bad Average Average Bad Average 80
113 Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Bad 85
114 Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Average Bad 89
115 Bad Average Bad Bad Bad Average Bad 79
116 Bad Average Bad Average Bad Average Bad 83
117 Average Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Bad 71
118 Average Bad Bad Average Bad Average Bad 72
119 Average Average Bad Bad Bad Average Bad 82
120 Average Average Bad Average Bad Average Bad 73
121 Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Bad 81
122 Bad Bad Bad Average Average Bad Bad 81
123 Bad Average Bad Bad Average Bad Bad 82
124 Bad Average Bad Average Average Bad Bad 88
125 Average Bad Bad Bad Average Bad Bad 73
126 Average Bad Bad Average Average Bad Bad 71
127 Average Average Bad Bad Average Bad Bad 87










Table 33: Representative cases identified by Taguchi method  
Team Results
OAT1 OAT2 ODM OCT No Device With Device Team Factors No. of Dried Outs
1 −−−−−−− Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad Bad 82
2 −−−−000 Bad Bad Bad Bad Average Average Average 81
3 −−−−+++ Bad Bad Bad Bad Good Good Good 85
4 −000−−− Bad Average Average Average Bad Bad Bad 0
5 −000000 Bad Average Average Average Average Average Average 0
6 −000+++ Bad Average Average Average Good Good Good 0
7 −+++−−− Bad Good Good Good Bad Bad Bad 0
8 −+++000 Bad Good Good Good Average Average Average 0
9 −++++++ Bad Good Good Good Good Good Good 0
10 0−0+−0+ Average Bad Average Good Bad Average Good 0
11 0−0+0+− Average Bad Average Good Average Good Bad 0
12 0−0++−0 Average Bad Average Good Good Bad Average 0
13 00+−−0+ Average Average Good Bad Bad Average Good 0
14 00+−0+− Average Average Good Bad Average Good Bad 0
15 00+−+−0 Average Average Good Bad Good Bad Average 0
16 0+−0−0+ Average Good Bad Average Bad Average Good 73
17 0+−00+− Average Good Bad Average Average Good Bad 79
18 0+−0+−0 Average Good Bad Average Good Bad Average 76
19 +−+0−+0 Good Bad Good Average Bad Good Average 0
20 +−+00−+ Good Bad Good Average Average Bad Good 0
21 +−+0+0− Good Bad Good Average Good Average Bad 0
22 +0−+−+0 Good Average Bad Good Bad Good Average 86
23 +0−+0−+ Good Average Bad Good Average Bad Good 82
24 +0−++0− Good Average Bad Good Good Average Bad 74
25 ++0−−+0 Good Good Average Bad Bad Good Average 0
26 ++0−0−+ Good Good Average Bad Average Bad Good 0




6.4 Analysis & Comparison 
6.4.1 Examples of the Generated Scenarios 
In this section a number of representative and interesting scenarios generated through 
simulation of the case study have been selected, and have been portrayed with more 
details to demonstrate various types of information on timing, type of errors, causal 
factors and contextual characteristics produced by the proposed team behavior model 
and dynamic simulation methodology. These scenarios provide more detailed 
information about the complexities of human actions in interaction loops and how 
they contribute to the system risk. These  examples demonstrate the usefulness of the 




the team contributes to the evolution of an accident scenario from the moment that the 
initiating event occurs (or even before that) to the point that end state is reached.  
In studying these scenarios, note that these are scenarios that have been picked 
randomly to provide a better understanding of how team activities are modeled and 
are reflected in these scenarios. The tables list the highlights of the scenarios. The 
total time for the simulation of each model has been set to t=25. Since we are 
generating a discrete dynamic event tree, this time is being divided by MATLAB 
Simulink to a set of time steps (each =0.1) to provide a discrete concept of time. 
Hence by saying t= 1.1 we mean we are at the 11
th
 time step. Our model of error 
management by design allows for just two attempts to be made to recover from errors 
in a sequence because otherwise operators would have been engaged in loops. If the 
error situation is not recovered from after two attempts, the situation is declared 
unrecoverable and team fails in recovering from that error situation.  
1) Table 32, Simulation Case No.16 
 
Successful Case  
 
Summary: Extreme case: All operators and all factors are average 
This is one of the extreme cases in which all the operators and all of the factors have 
been set to be in nominal condition. There was no error observed in the operating 
crew.  
From t=0 to t=0.3 the system is at nominal state. The initiating event (a pipe break) 
happens at t=0.3, and is detected observations are made by OAT1 and OAT2 who 




being asked for any advice. At t=0.5 ODM receives both observations and issues 
instruction requests the right action from OAT1 to perform the required action. At 
t=0.7 OAT1 receives the command to activate emergency subsystem, executes the 
required action and sends the confirmation message back to ODM. At t=0.8 end state 
is declared to be reached and a dry out accident is successfully avoided. Scenario 
highlights are listed in figure 52. 
Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0.3 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made 
No Request
0.5 Observations received from OAT1 and OAT2
Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
0.7 Request from ODM is received
Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
0.8 End state (Safe)  
Figure 52: Scenario highlights, Simulation case No.16 




All operators are average, all communication and team factors are bad 
Summary: In this case all the operators are being set to be average (nominal), and all 
communication and team factors are set to be bad. 
In this case, immediately after starting the scenario, communication with outside the 
control room fails because of deficiency in device, and OAT2 is almost isolated. In 
this case the device used for communication to outside of the control room is faulty 
and the situation is considered to be unrecoverable. OAT2 tries to report this problem 
with communication to ODM; however, since the device is not working correctly, 
ODM keeps receiving unrecognizable messages from OAT2. ODM is successful in 




asks OAT2 to resend the message at t=0.1. But since the communication device is not 
working properly, OAT2 receives an unrecognizable message from ODM and is 
unsuccessful in recovering from situation at t=0.2. Since the system is in normal 
condition, this doesn’t have any impact on system state but this loop of OAT2 
sending unrecognizable message and ODM asking for message resending is being 
repeated. At t=6.9 a pipe break event occurs in the plant and the associated alarm is 
activated. OAT1 is successful in observing the event and reporting it to ODM. ODM 
has access to plant information, observes the event, diagnoses the system state to be 
“not normal” and recognizes the system state as “Intermediate loop lost integrity”. He 
plans to activate emergency trigger, but waits until he receives observation from 
OAT1. ODM keeps receiving unrecognizable messages from OAT2 but is successful 
in recognizing, indicating and correcting this error by asking OAT2 to resend the 
message. However, the problem with the device still exists. At t=7, OAT2 still sends 
unrecognizable messages. ODM requests for resending the message. OAT1 sends his 
observation on system state to ODM. At t=7.1 OAT2 is in the same situation. ODM 
declares that no recovery action is possible for OAT2. The team continues to operate 
without OAT2. At this time, ODM receives observation on system state from OAT1 
and asks him to activate the emergency system. At t=7.3, OAT1 receives request and 
performs the action on the system and sends a confirmation message to ODM. At 
t=7.4 end state is reached and Dry Out is successfully avoided. Scenario highlights 




Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0 D-B Comm fails Report sent to ODM
0.1 Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
0.2 Receives unknown message
Report sent to ODM
6.9 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made 
Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
7 Receives unknown message
Report sent to ODM
7.1 Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
No recovery possible
Observations received from OAT1 
Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
7.3 Request from ODM is received
Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
7.4 End state (Safe)  
Figure 53: Scenario highlights, Simulation case No.8 




Extreme Case, All Operator PSFs are set to Bad 
Summary: This case is another extreme Case; all operators and factors are set to be 
bad. 
At t=0 device-based communication fails in team due to device failure, and there is 
no possible recovery from this situation since the device is not repairable. OAT2 
reports the problem to ODM; however, since the device is not working correctly, 
ODM receives unrecognizable message from OAT2. ODM is successful in 
recognizing the problem (unknown message received) and as a recovery action he 
asks the message to be repeated. But since the device is not working properly, OAT2 
keeps receiving unknown message from ODM and is unsuccessful in recovering from 
situation. However, the system is in normal condition and this doesn’t have any 




A pipe break initiating event happens at t=0.7 and ODM receives the observation 
made by OAT1 and at the same time realizes that there is no recovery action possible 
for the device-based communication error, hence the team fails in recovering from 
this situation. The team needs to continue operation with just one equipment operator. 
ODM sends a request for activating emergency subsystem to OAT1. At t=0.8 OAT1 
does not attend to the input so he doesn’t receive the request from ODM, and misses 
the message. Without guidance from ODM and not noting the input from the system, 
OAT1 also fails to recognize the situation and hence he is not able to make a decision 
and waits undecided. ODM and OCT do not attend to input either and hence cannot 
follow the situation. In this situation a shared error has happened inside the team. At 
this time none of the team members are aware of the system state, and they all declare 
an unknown system state. (In a situation such as this case where a shared error 
happens, it is possible that an external interruption just distracted all operators at the 
same time.) The situation worsens since communication error happens inside control 
room among ODM, OCT and OAT1 and they unable to send and receive messages 
correctly, and keep receiving unknown messages from each other. ODM not only 
fails in recognizing the situation but all error management activities fail as well. 
Because the operators failed in diagnosing the situation and there is no guidance from 
ODM, OAT1 is unable to perform any actions on the system. Error recovery is not an 
option anymore since it failed at the individual and team level. In this case, all 
activities fail. The situation remains the same till t=20.1 when the steam generator 
water level reaches its lowest allowable value and the steam generators are declared 




Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0 D-B Comm fails Report sent to ODM
0.1 Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
0.2 Receives unknown message
Report sent to ODM
0.7 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made
Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
No recovery possible
Observations received from OAT1 
Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
0.8 Fails to attend to reports Fails to attend to request Fails to attend to inputs
Unknown system state is diagnosed
Error recovery fails
Receives unknown message Unknown system state Unknown system state
Report sent to ODM Error recovery fails Error recovery fails
20.1 End state (Dry out) No action No action  
Figure 54: Scenario highlights, Taguchi set, Simulation case No.1 (a) 
Successful Case: 
 
Summary: Device-based communication fails at t=0 and the initiating event (pipe 
break) happens at t=0; Since OAT2 keeps sending unrecognizable messages to ODM, 
ODM is engaged in error recovery and sends a request to OAT2 to resend the 
message. At t=0.2, ODM asks OAT2 to resend the message, but the problem with 
communication still exists. At this time, OAT1 sends the message about his 
observation on system state to ODM. At t=0.4 ODM receives the observation and 
asks OAT1 to perform the corrective action. He also declares that the problem with 
communication is not solvable and the situation is not recoverable. At t=0.6 OAT1 
performs the action and sends a confirmation message to ODM, and at t=0.7 the 
accident is successfully terminated. In this case, since the component failure occurred 
at the beginning of the scenario, the time load of the task was at a low level and 
operators were able to catch the course of events. In investigating a couple of other 
cases, we recognized that if the component failure event is combined with any of the 
operators being unavailable, the dry out situation cannot be avoided. Scenario 




Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0 D-B Comm fails
Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Starts error recovery Diagnosis made 
Receives unknown message from OAT2 No report
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
0.2 Receives unknown message Observation
Report sent to ODM Report sent to ODM
0.4 Receives unknown message from OAT2
Starts error recovery
No recovery possible
Observations received from OAT1 
Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
0.6 Request from ODM is received
Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
0.7 End state (Safe)  
Figure 55: Scenario highlights, Taguchi set, Simulation case No.1 (b) 
4) Taguchi Set, Simulation Case No.10 
 
Successful Case 
Summary: This is a case when the off-site operator OAT2, is set to be poor, and face 
to face communication is less than adequate. 
At t=1.2 OAT2 fails to attend to the input and system state is incorrectly reported as 
unknown state to ODM.  At t=1.3 ODM receives the wrong observation and since he 
has access to system information, as a recovery action asks OAT2  to resend the 
message. At t= 1.4, ODM receives the wrong observation once again but doesn’t 
perform any action and waits. At t=1.5 OAT2 receives request for resending the 
message but doesn’t perform action and waits. At t=1.6 Errors are all removed. OAT2 
attends to input from the system and recognizes a normal situation. At t=5.5 a pipe 
break event occurs, and observations made by OAT1 and OAT2 are sent to ODM. At 
t=5.7 ODM receives both observations and asks OAT1 to perform the corrective 
action (activation of the emergency subsystem). At t=5.9 OAT1 receives the 




message to ODM. This terminates the accident scenario successfully (at t=6). Scearo 
highlights are listed in Figure 56. 
Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
1.2 Fails to attend to input
Wrong observation
Report sent to ODM
1.3 Wrong observation Observations received from OAT2
Report sent to ODM Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
1.4 Observations received from OAT2
No message
1.5 Receives request from ODM
No message
1.6 No Error No Error
5.5 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made 
No Request
5.7 Observations received from OAT1 and OAT2
Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
5.9 Request from ODM is received
Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
6 End state (Safe)  
Figure 56: Scenario highlights, Taguchi set, simulation Case No.10 (a) 
Another Successful Case: 
 
From t=0 to t=1 the system is in nominal condition. At t=0.8 OAT2 fails in 
recognizing normal system state and falsely reports an unknown system state 
observation to ODM. At t=0.9 ODM realizes the error since he has access to the 
system state and asks OAT2 to resend he message (since he knows the system state is 
normal). At t=1 the pipe break event (imitating event) occurs and the accident 
scenario starts. OAT2 attends to the input, observes the event, recognizes the situation 
(system state is not normal) and reports it to ODM. However ODM is still receiving 
the false observation he sent in the precious time step and is unable to recognize the 
situation (he is engaged in team error recovery). As a first order recovery action, he 
asks OAT2 to resend the message. OAT1 also attends to the input from the system 
and is able to recognize the situation and reports his observation to ODM. At t=1.1, 




correct observation this time. OAT1 still sends his observation. At t=1.2, OAT2 fails 
to recognize the situation since he did not attend to the input (alarm) from the system. 
He is also unable to recover from this situation at the same time step.  ODM receives 
both observations sent from OAT1 and OAT2 (at previous time step) and collects the 
information from the system himself and recognizes the situation as “intermediate 
loop lost integrity” correctly. He asks OAT1 to activate emergency subsystem as 
called for by the emergency operating procedure. At t=1.3, ODM receives a wrong 
message from OAT2 since the operator did not attend to the input at the previous time 
step and was unable to send the right observations. However OAT1 still sends the 
correct observation from the system. ODM starts team recovery and attempts to 
recover from situation by indicating the error to the operators and asking for a 
recovery action. However since this is an attendance error, no recovery action is 
possible at the same time step.  At t=1.4 OAT2 is attending to the input once again. 
He starts to send the right observation on the system. OAT1 performs the requested 
action and sends the confirmation message to ODM. At t=1.5, OAT2 fails to 
recognize the situation since he did not attend to the input from the system once 
again. However, since the safe end state is already reached, the scenario ends at this 
step and the occurrence of undesired end state (dry out) is being avoided despite the 




Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0.8 Fails to recognize system state
Wrong observation
0.9 Observations received from OAT2
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
1 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made 
Starts error recovery
Requests for resending the message
1.1 Receives request from ODM Observation
Observation Report sent to ODM
Report sent to ODM
1.2 Fails to attend to input Observations received from OAT1 and OAT2
Error recover fails Diagnosis made
Request for action from OAT1
1.3 Wrong Observation received from OAT2
Observation received from OAT1
Starts error recovery
No recovery possible
1.4 Observation Request from ODM is received
Report sent to ODM Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
1.5 End state (Safe) Fails to attend to input  
Figure 57: Scenario highlights, Taguchi set, simulation Case No.10 (b) 




This is a case when the off-site operator OAT2, is set to be poor, and team factors are 
less than adequate. 
Summary 
This is a case that off-site operator OAT2 is set to be poor, and team factors are poor.  
From t=0 to t=0.5 system is in nominal condition. At t=0.6 the pipe break event 
(initiating event) occurs and the accident scenario starts. OAT2 attends to the input, 
observes the event, recognizes the situation (that the system state is not normal) and 
reports it to ODM. OAT1 also attends to the input from the system and is able to 
recognize the situation and reports this observation to ODM. At t=0.7, OAT1 and 
OAT2 send their observations on the system state to ODM. At t=0.8, OAT2 does not 
attend the system input (alarm) and error recovery is not successful either. ODM 




and asks OAT1 for activating emergency subsystem as the right action based on the 
procedures.  OAT1 sends his right observation on the system to ODM. At t=0.9, 
ODM receives a wrong observation from OAT2 since the operator did not attend to 
the input in the previous time step and was unable to send the right observations. 
However OAT1 sends the correct observation from the system. ODM starts team 
recovery and attempts to recover from the situation by indicating the error to the 
operators and asking for a recovery action. However since this is a case of attendance 
error, no recovery action is possible at the time step. At t=1.4 OAT2 is attending the 
input once again, and starts to send the right observation on system. OAT1 performs 
the requested action and sends the confirmation message to ODM. At t=1.5, OAT2 
fails to recognize the situation since he did not attend to the input from the system 
once again. However, since the safe end state is already reached, the scenario ends at 
this step and the occurrence of undesired end state (dry out) is being avoided despite 
the numerous errors committed by team. Scenario highlights are listed in Figure 58. 
Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0.6 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made 
No Request
0.8 Fails to attend to the input Observations received from OAT1 and OAT2
Wrong observation Diagnosis made
Report sent to ODM Request for action from OAT1
0.9 Wrong Observation received from OAT2
Observation received from OAT1
Starts error recovery
No recovery possible
1.4 Observation Request from ODM is received
Report sent to ODM Action Performed
Report (confirmation) sent to ODM
1.5 End state (Safe) Fails to attend to the input  
Figure 58: Scenario highlights, Taguchi set, simulation Case No.11 






ODM PSFs are set to Bad, All other Operators are Set Average and All Other Factors 
are Average 
Summary 
The shift supervisor ODM factors are set to be poor, all other operators are average 
and all factors are average. At t=0.9, ODM fails to attend the input from the system 
and incorrectly diagnoses the normal system state as an unknown (accident) 
incorrectly. He also fails in recovering from this error. At t=1.1 he receives 
observations from OAT1 and OAT2 incorrectly and decides to ask for an action on 
the system. However in reviewing this issue during self-review (error recovery) he 
recognizes the error and hence does not send any request or action to the rest of the 
team. The situation remains the same since ODM frequently fails in attending to the 
input from the system and gives false report on the system state. All team members 
are engaged in error recovery actions and their diagnosis on the system state jumps 
back and forth between normal and unknown system states. At t=3.8 component 
failure (pipe break) occurs. The observations are reported to ODM; however ODM 
fails in diagnosis of the situation and in planning for action and therefore is not 
successful in recovering from this situation and does not ask the consultant for advice. 
ODM fails in recognizing the system state and reports unknown system state to rest of 
the team. This situation stays the same until undesired end state (dry out) is reached at 




Time Event  Action Taker No.2 (OAT2) Decision Maker (ODM) Action Taker No.1 (OAT1) Consultant (OCT)
0.9 Fails to attend to the input
1.1 Observation Receives wrong Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Wrong diagnosis Report sent to ODM
Starts error recovery
No request for action
Wrong diagnosis Wrong diagnosis Wrong diagnosis
3.8 Pipe Break Observation Observation Observation 
Report sent to ODM Report sent to ODM Diagnosis made
Receives wrong Observation 
Wrong diagnosis
Error Recovery fails
Wrong diagnosis Wrong diagnosis
23.2 End State (Dry out) No action No action  
Figure 59: Scenario highlights, Simulation case No.80 
6.4.2 Variability 
The result of simulating the main test cases was analyzed from the variability point of 
view using the mean value and standard deviation for the occurrence of an undesired 
state as the parameter of interest. The analysis was performed using JMP software 
tool. We were interested in the source of variability which is basically a factor that if 
kept constant, would result in a lower standard deviation; meaning that the source of 
variability is captured. For instance, figure 60 shows the analysis for just the “Team 
factors”. We categorized cases based on this criterion: “Team factors” being “bad” or 
“average”. The large value of standard deviation means this factor is not a source of 





Figure 60: Variability chart for No. of Dry outs- Team factors 
Then we included more factors to examine different combinations from the variability 
perspectives. Figure 61 shows a combination of team and communication factors. 
Since the standard deviation is still high, none of these factors can be considered 















Figure 62: Variability chart for No. of Dry outs - Operators (a) 
 
Figure 62 and 63 show the different configuration of team members and how the 
number of dry outs is changed by these factors. The standard deviation values are 
rather small, meaning the team performance is dependent on these factors. The 
standard deviation is the smallest when the supervisor (ODM) is weak, so this is one 








Figure 63: Variability chart for No. of Dry outs- Operators (b) 
Figure 64 shows a combination of team factors and operators. It is clear that a weak 
consultant (OCT) produces a large standard deviation compared to other factors so 







Figure 64: Variability chart for No. of Dry outs - Team factors & crew 
Figure 65 provides details of the combinations of communication factors and 
operators. Figures 64 and figure 65 provide indication that the supervisor is a source 
of variability in the team, because the value of the standard deviation is the lowest 
while this factor is fixed at a certain level, i.e. considered as average or bad. This is 
what we expected since all activities inside the team are centered on the supervisor 









In case of the Taguchi set, similarly the supervisor (ODM) turned out to be the source 
of variability in the team. We also processed the cases where no dry out was 
observed; in 100% of such success cases, the ODM was set to “average” or “good”. 
So there was not a single case that ODM was set to “bad”, without resulting in dry out 
























Figure 67: Variability chart for No. of Dry outs, Taguchi method (b) 
6.4.3 Importance 
Since the number of dry out situations has been used as the main performance 
measure on output, we used the success case (No. of dry outs = 0) to extract 
additional information on the sensitivity of performance on operator’s roles inside the 
team (Figures 68 and 69).  It is clear that in all success cases the qualitative 
evaluation of ODM individual factors has been set to “average”. In other words, if 
there is a success case one can be sure about the level of PSFs for the supervisor of 
the team. All other findings make sense since all operators have been actively taking 




one realizes that the effect of team factors and face-to-face communication could not 
be captured using this method.  
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Figure 71: Success and failure scenarios, Team factors 
 
6.5 Limitations & Sources of Errors 
The simulation cases were conducted mainly to demonstrate that the behavior of the 
operating crew could be investigated by using models of team dynamics and the 
operators based on methodology proposed by this research. The main objective was 
to show the capabilities of the model; however, the model provides a large set of 
capabilities and not all those could have been explored by this study. For instance, 
there are huge simulation log files containing much detail about what happened in the 
scenario at each step. Simulation log files contain extensive information about the 
timeline of operators’ actions and errors as well as error recovery activities. They can 
also be investigated from the communication perspective to derive performance 
measure for communication complexity based on the number of back and forth links 
recorded (Sasangohar et al., 2010) and (Stachowski et al., 2009). In addition, the 
analysis can be improved in order to get more accurate results for future studies:  




mask rare events; the reason for having a rather small set of simulation runs was that 
the very large magnitude of the simulation log files that would require analysis.  
Additionally, the base probabilities used here are assumed and have not been based 
on any operating history or calibrated method. We also used a set of different initial 
probabilities between (0.01 and 0.1) and ran the simulation for the worst case again. 
However this time we could not observe any dry out end states, so we kept the values 
at 0.1 as way of bumping up the number of interesting cases (standard approach in 
numerically biasing simulation cases).  
Another limitation is that we just modeled explicit communication where the message 
is basically transferred via a verbal (face-to-face) or device-based channel. However, 
research has shown that non-explicit communication plays a major role in team 
performance (Waller et al., 2004), (Stanton et al., 2000) and (Kolbe et al., 2009). 
Errors in our framework have been defined based on the procedures and regulations 
so the error list needs to be refreshed with any change in the organization. In addition, 
the cases that contained a combination of two extreme levels (“good” and “bad”) 
have not been included in the simulation exercise except during the screening stage. 
We only studied a subset of all possible combinations of levels (“average” and 
“bad”). The research attempted to address this issue by using the Taguchi samples 
discussed earlier. However, fully exploring all possible cases may provide new 
insights.  
6.6 Comparison & Validation 
It is clear that the simulation results produced are essentially reflective of the team 




is encouraging that the macro-behavior of the simulated team built from a large 
number of model elements seems to be realistic. Many of the model elements have 
credible roots in theories and observations; however, different sets of model 
assumptions can change the results. In this section the findings of this model are 
compared with some of the most important observations in the literature about 
operating crew performance. Our observations and findings by conducting this case 
study fall into two categories: the importance of the supervisor and the effect of 
communication on the performance of the team. As a complementary effort a 
comparison was made between data extracted from reports and records of Halden 
international exercises, and data extracted from the simulation log files which is being 
discussed in section 6.6.1. The objective was to verify the model with data from real 
control room operators. Section 6.6.1 summarizes the result of this study. Section 
6.6.2 reviews some of the statements made by other researchers in the field and 
Section 6.6.3 discusses the observations we made.  
6.6.1 Model Validation 
Halden Reactor Project conducted a new HRA benchmark called the “International 
HRA Empirical Study” (International HRA Empirical Study, NUREG/IA-0216, 
2009). This study used insights from earlier HRA benchmark efforts and applied both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses to provide identical initial information to 
different HRA analysis teams, including information about the operating crews who 
were the subjects of simulator exercises. This study used performance shaping factors 
to allow comparison of degraded operator performance, and provides a template to 




Fourteen nuclear power plant (NPP) crews participated in the study at the HAlden 
huMan-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB), a full scope NPP control room simulator. 
These operating teams included a licensed reactor operator, an assistant 
reactor/turbine operator, and a shift supervisor. Two types of simulator scenarios 
were selected for the operating crews; a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, 
and a loss of feed water (LOFW) event. Both scenarios had a simple (or base) case 
and a more complex case, in which the familiar scenario was complicated by 
secondary malfunctions. The performances of the operating crews were observed and 
documented during simulator runs. The documentation provides a standardized set of 
contributing elements based on selected performance shaping factors, short 
operational summaries of the crew actions, and the success or failure of the crews to 
complete specific actions, within a predefined time window. The objective was to 
compare the results of HRA analyses produced by the different HRA analysis teams 
to the actual crew performance results documented in the simulation runs, thus 
allowing a direct comparison between the empirical data and model predictions. As 
part of the challenge, the operating crews had to complete their tasks within a 
specified time, as expected by their training.  
The Halden empirical study was the only accessible empirical data which could serve 
as a basis for validation of some of the macro-level performance of the simulation 
model proposed in this research. We note that the nature of the Halden exercise, 
accident scenarios, system characteristics, and data collected through the experiments, 
significantly limit the scope of this validation effort. Additionally we are limited to 




of the more relevant information for our comparison. For instance the Halden data 
does not include insights into complexities of PSF causal factors and error 
management activities that are introduced by our methodology.  Due to these 
limitations our comparison is made at a macro behavior level. This comparison does 
allow some insights regarding strengths and weaknesses of the method in providing a 
basis for observing and evaluating the crew behavior. 
In order to perform the comparison, comparable teams had to be found among the 
vast number of team configurations and characteristics offered by our model, and the 
14 Halden crews participating in the experiment. We used the data available from 
Halden “base case” on the fastest and slowest groups from a performance point of 
view (time for completion of tasks) and compared this data to the best and worst case 
of operating crew configurations offered by our methodology.  
Based on the description provided in Halden “base case” on the general 
characteristics of the slowest and fastest crews, we selected two of our cases based on 
similarities found in corresponding PSFs. There are two fast crews and one slow crew 
among the crews in Haden exercise. Figure 72 provides a summary of the description 
of fastest and slowest teams in Halden exercise and the associated performance 
shaping factors. In order to provide a basis for comparison we selected two 
representative crews from our cases. A configuration of average crew with a bad 
supervisor and a configuration of average crew (all operators are nominal) under the 




Fast Crew Slow Crew
Good match of procedure to scenario Good match of procedure to scenario
Low complexity of Scenario Low complexity of Scenario







Good coordination and communication No difficulty with observation or diagnosis 
Good Procedure work
Shift supervisor is decisive
Shift supervisor keeps good overview
Crew easily identifies initiating event
High degree of familiarity with procedures
Good training








Shift supervisor easily interrupted
Ineffective use of large screens
Problems with thoroughness and attention  
Figure 72: PSFs matrix for Halden base case (NUREG/IA-0216, 2009) 
We used the data from our simulation log files on these two cases and extracted (100) 
data points for each crew. Note that since our simulation is a generic simulation, 
instead of real time, time steps are being used and our data on response time was 
based on these time steps. However the data from Halden exercise is in the format of 
real time. The objective of this validation process was to prove that our simulation is 
able to provide approximately the same ratio between the response times of the fastest 
and the slowest crews. Figure 73 summarizes the result of this comparison. Note that 
the distribution fitted to our data for the response time extracted from our simulation 
is a lognormal distribution and the figure just provides 5% and 95% boundaries and 
the median of the distributions. The left hand side axis in the figure shows the 
response time for our cases in the form of simulation time steps and the right hand 




crew) in minutes. In order to better demonstrate the ratio, the right and left hand side 
axes are in logarithmic scale.  
 
Figure 73: Comparing fastest & slowest teams, Halden exercise & simulation model 
The conclusion is that under same circumstances when appropriate real time scale is 
introduced in the simulation, the simulation is able to predict the same trend in 
response time as evident by red crosses being not only within the range but also very 
close to the median of predictions by simulation.  
6.6.2 Comparison with Theoretical Findings  
As discussed in previous chapters, some of the observations already made by other 
researchers include:  
1. Harrington et al. (1993) investigated the effect of team skill training on 




ultimate responsibility for the safe operation rests more with SRO (senior 
reactor operator, aka supervisor) than with the rest of the crew. 
2. Stanton et al. (2000) noted that wheel (star) network communication model is 
the optimized type of communication for faster performance, however for the 
person in the hub (center) which is the often supervisor of the team, it can be 
overloading and sometimes leads to censoring and poor decision making.  
3. Petkov et al. (2004) and Ilgen et al. (2004) mentioned the team leader as the 
most influential person in the team and emphasized the impact of this role on 
the performance of the team. Petkov et al. (2004) mentioned most of the 
reliability models describing the operating crew use the leader as the center of 
the team processes with all monitoring and feedback activities accomplished 
using communication channels with the leader.  
4. Carvalho et al. (2005) mentioned that the supervisor holds the ultimate 
responsibility and serves as the main communication channel for inside and 
outside the control room. They also recommended using a senior operator to 
help the supervisor with his tasks. 
5. Bernnen et al. (2007) listed monitoring, feedback, and back up as main team 
activities; they realized the optimize case for knowledge distribution inside 
operating crew is when the knowledge of the supervisor who is performing 
monitoring is the highest.  
6. Broberg et al. (2008) reckoned the shift supervisor leadership style as the 
major factor in qualitative evaluation of PSFs; they defined good leadership 




responses without consultation. However they didn’t find any clear patterns in 
communication style of fast and slow groups. So they concluded that this 
factor should be connected to other PSFs and that it could explain the 
differences in performance between crew behaviors all by itself. 
7. In a recent study by Kim et al. (2011) it is stated that teams with a higher ratio 
of inappropriate communications tend to have a lower performance score. 
They used a full scope simulator and five kinds of operator, including shift 
supervisor, shift technical advisor and equipment operators, and recorded all 
communications between operators both in the audio and video format. They 
measured the number of tasks completed by the operators and the team and 
used subjective analysis to weight the tasks. They calculated the performance 
score based on operator’s behavior such as communication, and control 
actions. 
Our findings show similarities to conclusions by Petkov et al. (2004), Ilgen et al. 
(2004), Carvalho et al. (2005) and Broberg et al. (2008), and highlight the role of the 
supervisor in comparison with other team members. The sensitivity of results to the 
supervisor characteristics corresponds to work of Harrington et al. (1999) and Stanton 
et al. (2000), since the communication network implemented in our model is a wheel 
(star) network centered on the supervisor. There are some comments we would like to 
make on the theory proposed in the work of Kim et al. (2011) from the timing 
perspective of actions. They evaluate performance based on the performance scale 
which considers the number of completed tasks and, in fact, the time for action is not 




necessarily relate to performance; since activities are performed in a team context, 
there might be repeated works and error recovery actions which definitely lengthen 
the scenario time. The consideration of time is a really important aspect of modeling 
any dynamic entity. In our research the water level of steam generator is the main 
criteria for the occurrence of the dry out situation. If the operators make frequent 
delays or are too engaged in error recovery activities, the system reaches its end state 
at a certain time. Hence, we prefer the timing to be included in measuring 
performance of the team before any general conclusions about the effectiveness of 
communication can be made. We cannot comment on work of Bernnen et al. (2007) 
either since we did not investigate the optimal case for team configuration; however, 
our findings show that having a good supervisor reduces the probability of occurrence 
of undesired state to a great extent.  
Since we did not find communication to be very impactful on the outcomes, we agree 
with Broberg et al. (2008) that this factor should be connected to other PSFs and 
cannot explain the differences in performance between crew behaviors all by itself. 
However, we found the quality of communication with device to be a critical factor. 
As mentioned earlier, we have modeled a redundancy between operators inside and 
outside control room. This redundancy was a major factor in reducing the amount of 
observed dry out situations. However, it highlights the effect of communication with 
device; hence, in some cases, when the failure of the communication device and the 
control room equipment operator occurred at the same time, the dry out situation took 
place even though the plant (on-site) operator’s performance was fine. This finding is 




(2006), Sasangohar et al. (2010), Carvalho et al. (2008), Juhasz et al. (2011) and 
Firth-cozen (2004).  
Team and organizational factors did not turn out to have a major impact on the 
performance while the group and the individual characteristics of team members 




Chapter 7: Summary & Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a brief review of the research findings. Furthermore, this 
section outlines how this work expends the knowledge and builds upon existing 
findings by researchers in the same filed.  
7.1 Summary of Work & Results 
This research has proposed a framework and model of the dynamic behavior of an 
operating crew and complexities arising from their interactions, using model-based 
simulation. The domain of interest in this work is the class of operating crew 
environments that are subject to structured and regulated guidelines with formal 
procedures providing the core of their response to accident conditions.  
The Extended IDAC model developed in this research focuses mainly on the team 
aspects of operating crew behavior. It not only adds features to the IDAC’s models of 
individual operator cognitive processes and the team’s shared problem-solving 
activities, but also adds communication-related aspects and additional model elements 
to cover error management activities at the individual operator and team levels.  
The Extended IDAC also introduces a significantly expanded model of PSFs that 
characterize the individual and team responses, and form the basis for quantification 
of human error probabilities in team context.  
In developing the cognitive models for the operators and teams of operators, their 
behavior and relations, this research integrates findings from multiple disciplines such 




A team error management framework was introduced together with a set of associated 
PSF models providing a more explicit causal explanation of the crew behavior. 
Except for a few theoretical frameworks, error management activities have not been 
considered fully and explicitly in previous efforts. Collaborative information 
collection method developed and implemented in this research simulate the 
contributions of various team members in gathering important information under the 
supervision of the team leader.  
A team decision-making model responsive to dynamic changes in situational context 
was also designed and implemented, covering team discussions and consultation 
activities inside the team. In addition, a distributed action execution model was also 
defined and implemented to cover the complexities associated with assigning tasks to 
team members and the effect of including redundancy in operator’s roles on team 
performance.  
To provide a rich contextual environment for the team response, the Extended IDAC 
model simulation was fully integrated with a detailed hardware model in order 
simulate accident scenarios involving hardware and crew interactions. The resulting 
simulation platform (CREWSIM), developed by applying object-based 
methodologies is a practical tool for simulating crew behavior in response to system 
abnormalities. A simulation model of human interaction with complex system can be 
also utilized as a discovery instrument. One specific aim might be to uncover the 
critical aspects of the system that may need better probing to collect quality data in 
the future. Object-based simulation is a proper choice to fulfill this vision. This is 




predefined scenarios. The level of knowledge and autonomy provided to the objects 
allow them to interact in simulation environment to explore all scenarios that might 
have been very difficult if not impossible to envision in the modeling stage. 
While the CREWSIM model library in MATLAB Simulink was developed primarily 
to represent key roles of the operating crew of a NPP control rooms with capability to 
build different team compositions, configuration, and characteristics, it can be used to 
represent many other operating teams and contexts by relatively minor changes. Such 
changes are made easy through CREWSIM’s graphical model building and editing 
features.  
We aimed at demonstrating the crew model’s ability to produce macro-behaviors that 
have high degree of face validity and are traceable to root causes that have theoretical 
or empirical basses. The simulation platform developed are in this work can serve as 
a “laboratory “ to test an operating team’s performance under varying contextual 
factor set as input conditions.  
Extensive simulation runs and quantitative and qualitative examination of the 
resulting scenarios provided ample evidence of face validity of the proposed team 
model and simulation platform. Further, while performing experiments with real 
crews and real scenarios to validate the model was not feasible due to resource 
limitations and other practical constraints, the International Empirical Study 
conducted at Halden Laboratories in Norway provided an opportunity to perform a 
limited comparison of the proposed model behavior with actual performances of the 
crews participating in the exercise.  This comparison showed the explanatory power 




performance. Finally, the simulated scenarios in the case study of this work reproduce 
a number of macro-level behaviors identified in several of the theoretical frameworks 
discussed in the literature.   
It is clear that the simulation results produced are essentially reflective of the team 
model and the underlying theoretical perspective adopted in this research. However, it 
is encouraging that the macro-behavior of the simulated team built from a large 
number of model elements seem to be very realistic and of face validity. Many of the 
model elements have credible roots in theories and observations; however, different 
sets of model assumptions can change the results. 
We were able to comment on some of the existing theories in the literature since the 
model enabled us to observe the same behavior. More comprehensive reports on 
complexities of team related issues and how they affect the entire system risk can be 
produced by using the data provided in simulation log files. This includes timing 
properties of the operator’s actions, error recovery process and related actions and 
their effect on the number of undesired system state, timeline of the scenario, and 
complexity of communications with respect to number of people involved in each 
communication, and the number of communications before an action is actually 
accomplished.   
7.2 Future Work 
This research was focused only on the simulation modeling of team dynamics and the 
impact of individual and team PSFs on team performance. Currently, there are 
intriguing and unexplored research opportunities in using the developed modeling 




communication patterns and different team configurations. Understanding how to 
create efficient and effective teams, and how to train them as a team, remains an 
important area of research. This research represents an initial step in that direction. As 
a further research step, a separate study has been designed to use the developed 
models to compare the performance of three teams of operators with different 
communication patterns for the same situation. Following is a list of recommended 
topics to continue this line of research: 
1. Develop a post processing routine in order to derive a number of different 
communication measures that reflect the quantity, directionality, timing and type 
of communications that occur. These measures are being tracked per unit time, 
and can be captured at the individual level or at the team level.  
 
2. Explore the frequency and complexity of interaction patterns used by the team for 
sharing knowledge, directing attention and determining next steps, among others. 
Ideally this would be done with respect to the number of team members and the 
number of communication loops, in order to derive measures for determining the 
complexity of interaction patterns and the impact of such complexities on 
performance.  
 
3. Use CREWSIM library to developed models of teams with different sizes and role 





4. Use operating data and experimental settings to perform more extensive 
calibration and validation of the model. Since many features of the crew model 
and simulation rules are generic, the sources of validation data that can be tapped 




Appendix A: CREWSIM User’s Guide 
 
Getting Started 
This document provides guidelines for using CREWSIM 1.0, a library developed in 
MATLAB Simulink which provides tools for modeling the control crew of a four 
steam generator feed water system. The hardware system is a simplified version of 
the feed water system. Through using this document one learns how to understand the 
existing simulation model, how to use Simulink model editor and CREWSIM library 
blocks to define simulation models for different configurations of control crew as 
well as how to customize different blocks in the library to best reflect the diversities 
inside the team of operators; in addition this document provides guidelines on how to 
change the parameters of the simulation and perform different simulation runs; while 
the input of the simulation process is the model with customized parameters which 
are based on the desired configuration and structure,  the output is the simulation log 
files.  
What is CREWSIM? 
CREWSIM is a custom defined library in MATLAB Simulink.  CREWSIM 1.0 is the 
first version designed and developed by the “University of Maryland Center for Risk 
and Reliability” and aims at helping users develop models of operating crew and run 
simulations on such models in order to investigate the dynamic behavior of operating 
crew in the context of a nuclear power plant. The current version is focused on the 
operating crew of a simplified feed water system in a four steam generator plant. 
CREWSIM is developed inside MATLAB Simulink environment and is based on the 




and passive objects in the context of the system and viewing the system as a network 
of connected objects.  The idea is to translate the system into a representative model 
consisting of reliability block diagrams. CREWSIM includes the representative 
blocks for different roles inside the operating crew of a typical representation of feed 





Simulink® is an environment for multi-domain simulation and Model-Based Design 
for dynamic and embedded systems. It provides an interactive graphical environment 
and a customizable set of block libraries that let you design, simulate, implement, and 
test a variety of time-varying systems, including communications, controls, signal 
processing, video processing, and image processing. Simulink provides the tools to 
model and simulate almost any real-world problem. Simulink has a graphical user 
interface (GUI) for building models as block diagrams. Simulink also includes a 
comprehensive block library of components, and connectors and you can also create 
your own blocks. The interactive graphical environment simplifies the modeling 
process. Models are hierarchical, so one can build models using both top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. The system can be viewed at a high level, and then double-
click blocks to see increasing levels of model detail. This environment provides 
insight into how a model is organized and how its parts interact. After defining a 
model, one can simulate its dynamic behavior using a choice of mathematical 
integration methods, either from the Simulink menus or by entering commands in the 
MATLAB Command Window; for example CREWSIM uses various developed 





blocks of embedded MATLAB codes and functions inside Simulink which 
characterize the dynamics of system. Simulink menus are convenient for interactive 
work, while the MATLAB command line is useful for running a batch of simulations. 
Using scopes and other display blocks, one can see the simulation results while the 
simulation runs. One can then change parameters and see what happens for "what if" 
exploration. The simulation results can be put in the MATLAB workspace for post 
processing and visualization. Simulink software is tightly integrated with the 
MATLAB environment. It requires MATLAB to run, depending on it to define and 
evaluate model and block parameters. Simulink uses MATLAB features in order to 





Operating Requirements  
CREWSIM is currently developed in MATLAB Simulink version 7.14.0.739 
(R2012a); Simulink is a toolbox integrated into MATLAB software hence it is only 
available via MATLAB environment; hence it is only available via MATLAB 
environment. The following table
13
 lists the minimum system requirements. 
Operating System Processors Disk Space RAM 
32-bit MathWorks Products 
Windows XP Service Pack 2 
or 3 
Windows Server 2003 
Service Pack 2 or R2 
Windows Vista Service Pack 
1 or 2 
Windows Server 2008 
Windows 7 
Intel Pentium 4 and 
above 










(At least 1024 MB 
recommended) 
64-bit MathWorks Products 
Windows XP x64 Service 
Pack 2  
Windows Server 2003 x64 
Service Pack 2 or R2 
Windows Vista Service Pack 
1 or 2 
Windows Server 2008 
Windows 7 









(At least 2048 MB 
recommended) 
Operating System Processors Disk Space RAM 
32-bit MathWorks Products 
Mac OS X 10.5.5 and above 
Mac OS X 10.6 and above 
All Intel-based Macs 360 MB  
(MATLAB only) 
512 MB  
(At least 1024 MB 
recommended) 
 
MATLAB needs to be running before one can open the Simulink Library Browser. 
Simulink is included in any default installation of MATLAB. Once the user installs 
the MATLAB, activates it and runs it, Simulink model editor becomes available. 
MATLAB Simulink can be opened by clicking its icon on the Simulink icon on the 
                                                 




upper left hand side of the main MATLAB environment (Highlighted in the picture) 
or by typing “Simulink” in MATLAB command window. 
  
 
Model Development in MATLAB Simulink Environment 
In Model-Based Simulation, a system model is at the center of the simulation 
activities. The model is an executable specification of the system. There are six steps 
to model any technical system: 
1. Defining the System 
2. Identifying System Components 
3. Modeling the System Dynamics with Equations 
4. Building the Simulink Block Diagrams 
5. Running the Simulation 
6. Validating the Simulation Results 
The first step in modeling a dynamic system is to fully define the system. If a large 
system is being modeled that can be broken into parts, one should model each 
subcomponent on its own. Then, after building each component, one can integrate 
them into a complete model of the system. The most effective way to build a model 




The second step in the modeling process is to identify the system components. Three 
types of components define a system: 
• Parameters : System values that remain constant unless you change them 
• States : Variables in the system that change over time 




In Simulink, parameters and states are represented by blocks, while signals are 
represented by the lines that connect blocks. For each subsystem that is identified, the 
following questions need to be answered: How many input signals does the 
subsystem have? How many output signals does the subsystem have? How many 
states (variables) does the subsystem have? What are the parameters (constants) in the 
subsystem? Are there any intermediate (internal) signals in the subsystem? Once 
these questions are answered, by using a comprehensive list of system components 
you are ready to begin modeling the system. There are different predefined libraries 
included in MATLAB Simulink. Simulink automatically opens the library browser 




in order to define the simulation model using the methodology proposed by this 
research. CREWSIM can be accessed by typing “CREWSIM” in MATLAB 
command line. With the help of CREWSIM library, as well as predefined Simulink 
blocks such as logical operators, Input/Outputs, Displays, Clocks, Memory blocks 
and Embedded MATLAB function blocks the complex system of interest can be 
modeled by following the basic steps of modeling process. The first three steps of 
modeling process need to be performed outside of the Simulink software environment 
and based on the technical development approach presented in the main report. Once 
the system is fully studied and the infrastructure of the system including the low level 
objects as well as their relationships and association links are studied and identified 
and a high level model for system configuration is developed, CREWSIM is being 
called in Simulink environment by using the Simulink library browser and is being 
used to develop the model inside the Simulink model editor. 
Why using CREWSIM Library? 
Since the simulation model needs to be defined by the user in model editor, the 
application of custom-defined libraries facilitates the process of defining the 
simulation model. This research has developed CREWSIM as a library in MATLAB 
Simulink that facilitates defining the model and running the simulation in such that 
context. The target application domain for this research is the control room of a 
complex environment such as a nuclear power plant. CREWSIM library developed 
for such applications is a collection of pre-defined models of human operators, and 
different hardware components. Such pre-defined classes of components can be 




domain. By assigning states and manipulating the set of attributes and operations for 
these classes the user is able to obtain system model. The methodology developed by 
this research, highly depends on the transformation of reliability block diagrams into 
object-based diagrams to represent the structure of subsystems; the objects are 
instances of higher level classes that usually represent a specific entity. Once the 
objects are constructed and submitted to the system, the associated blocks (simulation 
models) can be customized. The system is defined with a detailed infrastructure as a 
network of connected abstract block diagrams; and just the simple question, 
"connected or not?” identifies the links. 
In order to use CREWSIM to define the simulation model for a complex hybrid 
system the following steps need to be taken: 
• Developing hardware model by customizing the low level object models of 
hardware components  
• Developing the operating crew model by customizing the object models of 
operators and their associated communication links 
• Integrating these  models into the final hybrid system model by using the 
interfacing code 
 
The Modeling Methodology behind CREWSIM 
The first step of any simulation approach is system modeling which means to create a 
virtual model of the system with the exact functionality and appropriate level of 
details.  In object-based modeling approaches to simulation, objects are the low level 




dynamically change based on simulation parameters. Hence, based on the level of 
familiarity with the system, the majority of active objects need to be identified. In 
case of complicated systems, a hierarchical decomposition and study of system and 
subsystem structure is very helpful to identify the objects. Such objects are supposed 
to fully reflect different components and their behavioral characteristics. In the object 
based modeling methodology, every entity in the system represents an object which is 
an instant of an abstract class. General object classes are defined based on objects 
categories. This includes system main components, individual human elements and 
software elements. The attributes of each class have to be identified. Since the study 
targets the operating crew of industrial plants such as nuclear power plant, a model of 
the crew and their communication links needs to be developed additionally. 
After objects in each group are identified, their behavior needs to be modeled. The 
simulation environment, MATLAB Simulink provides a wide range of capabilities 
for simulation modeling; this environment supports block diagram style object 
modeling and embedded MATLAB functions for modeling the behavior. Since 
CREWSIM library is used, the general characteristics of the dynamics of behavior for 
each objects in the associated domain is captured by using an inside controller. The 
controller is responsible for branch generation. However in order to capture the 
dynamics of system for the plant one needs to code the equations and for the 
operating crew, one need to code the rules of behavior separately via using an 
embedded MATLAB functions. This step requires deep knowledge about system 
elements and the rules for their internal behavior and external interactions. The 




differences are accounted for in this modeling technology by using different 
quantities for basic attributes and performance shaping factors. These models are then 
incorporated together to form the integrated simulation model. This approach reflects 
the complexity of all kinds of relationships including access, control and 
communications between blocks of different nature. 
The second step in the simulation approaches is the knowledge acquisition for 
scenario generation, which is basically to acquire additional information about the 
system and its environment; this knowledge is used to automatically generate risk 
scenarios. In case of object based models, this step includes translating the success 
logic into failure logic, assigning the probabilities of failure for objects or 
functionalities at each time step, and to identify a primary set of failure modes for the 
system. The level of details for failure logic is driven by the PRA objectives and the 
availability of data. Having the states of components and events, the failure logic of 
the system and enough rules and conditions, the final state of the system is available 
in any given condition. In order to replace a piece of system with its representative 
model for simulation goals, the properties such as time to failure distributions, and the 
probability of failure per demand as well as common cause failures should be 
included in the model; in addition the model needs to fully mimic the element’s 
behavior; each component model needs to include knowledge about failures, keep 
history of its previous states and be able to share information with simulation 
environment or other elements. In CREWSIM there are certain failure probabilities 
assigned to basic human functions such as cognitive functions and error management 




as initial values; these values have been assigned subjectively by using expert 
judgments. Some of these values change over the course of the scenario and some 
remain constant. Nonetheless all of them are adjustable before the simulation starts to 
desired values in order to be able to reflect different cases.  
The third step is the risk scenario generation. The simulation controller code is 
responsible for actuating accident initiating events and plant hardware failures as well 
as setting up other simulation parameters such as where to store the simulation log 
files and how to terminate the sequences.  
The fourth step is the simulation. This step includes running the simulation model, 
which results in the generation of scenarios in the format of simulation log files. 
Since this research is interested in the investigation of scenarios that lead to system 
failure, failure scenarios are studied and the interaction-based failure modes are 
highlighted. 
The structure of a complex system permits delivery of desired functionality through 
specific component interactions or behavior. CREWSIM is capable of representing 
the desired functionality of the individual components, their structure, as well as their 
interactions. The components in this modeling methodology do not act in isolation 
but instead interact with each other. A common source of error or system 
vulnerability is a mismatch at the interface of the blocks/components where data is 
interchanged that can lead to system failure in the form of an incident/accident. The 
complete communication model of the system elements can be developed by using 




operational knowledge of the complex multi-dimensional system, and to apply this 
knowledge for obtaining representative models for its elements via using CREWSIM 
Library.  
Using CREWSIM in Simulink Model Editor  
Since we are modeling a nuclear power plant control room, there are three different 
groups of objects that work together: the hardware system composed of hardware 
elements such as pumps and valves; the operating crew composed of individual 
human operators such as the senior operator and reactor operator; and the control 
panel (interface) which consists of alarms and indicators and the process for 
activating those elements based on plants parameters. There are active and passive 
objects. An example of active objects (actors) is the senior operator and an example 
of a passive object is a message from senior operator to the operator asking for an 






In order to use CREWSIM simulation library, the first step is to develop the hardware 
system; the hardware system is part of a complex system which consists of different 
subsystems and hardware components depended on the application, hence the model 
for hardware system would be the integration of the model of all its subsystems. Each 
of these subsystems are in turn a configuration of many hardware objects such as 




CREWSIM library. The major identified hardware components in this system are: 
Pumps, Heaters, Valves and Steam generators; these components are connected 
together via Pipes. The scenario of interest is initiated by a pipe break event occurring 
in either main or intermediate subsystems. The operating crew needs to perform the 
accident mitigation steps correctly and in time, otherwise the steam generators would 
become either solid or dried out. Pumps, Valves and Heaters can fail on-demand 
randomly and with a constant failure probability during the system operation; such 
events are the basis of branch generation in the simulation of the plant. Once a 
component fails it is assumed unrecoverable. Components are modeled as objects to 
reflect their different nature and characteristics of elements and to improve model 
reuse. The picture shows different types of valves including check valves and control 





Once the appropriate hardware component is selected and put in the model editor, the 
associated characteristics of it can be set by clicking on it and setting up the 
parameters. The above picture illustrates the modeled hierarchy of a redundant system 
of 4 pipelines and 12 valves and their associated characteristics. A set of adjustable 



























Boiler Feed Pumps 
There are two types of pumps modeled and ready to use in CREWSIM; boiler feed 
pumps and another type of feed pumps that are considered as auxiliary or emergency 
pumps. In order to instantiate a pump, there are six characteristics that need to be 
defined to customize the pump: name, initial state: i.e. whether the pump is 
functioning or not when the scenario starts, initial status: i.e. whether the pump is on 
or off when the scenario starts, probability of failure, maximum head and maximum 








In order to instantiate a heater, there are five characteristics that need to be defined 
and together they would customize the heater: name, initial state: i.e. whether the 
heater is functioning or not when the scenario starts, initial status: i.e. whether the 
heater is on or off when the scenario starts, probability of failure, maximum power 






There are two types of valves modeled and available to use in CREWSIM, Control 
valves and Check valves. In order to instantiate a control valve, there are five 
characteristics that need to be defined and together they would customize the valve: 
name, initial state: i.e. whether the valve is functioning or not when the scenario 
starts, initial status: i.e. whether the valve is open or closed when the scenario starts, 
probability of failure, and the adjusting factor for the valve, which is basically the 
ratio of the flow that the valve would allow to pass. Check valves don’t have this 













In order to instantiate a steam generator, there are four characteristics that need to be 
defined and together they would customize the steam generator: name, maximum 







Pipe Break Event 
Since the initiating event in our case study is considered to be a pipe break, such 
events have been modeled as well. There are three characteristics that need to be 
defined in order to define a pipe break event: name, initial state: i.e. whether the pipe 
is broken upon the start of the scenario or is going to break during the scenario, and 





Once the main objects of the hardware system are instantiated and set up, the 
dynamics of the system needs to be modeled. In our case study this was done by 
developing a MATLAB code which uses the parameters that are provided by 
hardware components and embeds the equations which mimic the dynamics of the 
system. This would be different for each system configuration based on the set of 




Embedded MATLAB file blocks which would place pieces of MATLAB code inside 
model wherever is needed. The system dynamics in our case is basically a block with 
inputs being the states and status of all different object blocks of the hardware system 
and the outputs being a set of eight alarms each of which represents a major issue in 
the hardware system. There is also an indication of when the end state event has 
occurred inside the system. This information is available to all operators. The 
developed model of the plant which includes a block which encapsulates the 





The plant in its highest level of abstraction is being represented by a block which is 
shown in the picture below. The outputs of this model are simply a set of alarms 
which together determine the system state. 
 
Crew Model 
CREWSIM helps to define the crew operating on a subsystem in a nuclear power 
plant by providing individual blocks to represent the following roles; the “Decision-
Maker” role, the “Action-Taker” role and the “Consultant” role. Operators are 
connected via two sided communication links, each of which is uniquely 
characterized by different features of the sender and the receiver. Different blocks in 
CREWSIM library that are related to the crew model are listed and explained in 
details in the following sections. Each section is followed by a review on the process 
of setting up the block parameters which mainly includes how to customize the block 
and use the built-in features in order to represent different configuration of teams and 
other simulation parameters to represent different teams with different characteristics. 
Decision Maker 
This block represents the role which the shift supervisor takes during the scenario. 
The decision maker is the team supervisor and is responsible for managing team 




distributing the decided action course to different operators. All communication loops 
are centered on the decision maker and he plays the most important role inside the 
team which involves leadership and managing different team activities. He is also 
responsible for team error management activities. This block is activated by a trigger 
and in turns calls other blocks by activating their associated triggers in the output. 
This block is capable of triggering other blocks depended on the desired functionality 
and type of conversation to be established between blocks. Other inputs to this block 
are team factors, information channel which provides the information on hardware 
system, and communication channels for input messages from different operators 
inside the team. Other outputs of this block are the actual action codes sent to the 
operators and communication channels which carry the output messages to different 
operators.  
By clicking on this block a set of parameters can be set which together represent the 
individual characteristics of the shift supervisor. Each of these parameters can be set 
by choosing among different levels provided for the specific feature based on 
qualitative and comparative judgment; such levels are for instance high, normal or 
low or in some cases demonstrate less than adequate, average and special training, 








This block represents the role that the equipment operator takes during the scenario. 
He is mainly responsible for the operation on hardware components. He also reports 
the various observations made on the system to the decision maker. There are two 
different types: the equipment operator located in the plant and the equipment 
operator located in the control room. This block is being triggered by incoming input 
information or by other blocks. Other inputs to this block are the information channel 
which provides the input information from the hardware system, team factors and the 
communication channel which carries the input message from the decision-maker. 
This block is capable of triggering the decision-maker block for a conversation. Other 




communication channel which carries the output message to the decision-maker. By 
clicking on this block a set of parameters can be set which together represent the 
individual characteristics of the equipment operator. Each of these parameters can be 
set by choosing among different levels provided for the specific feature based on 
qualitative and comparative judgment; such levels are for instance high, normal or 
low or in some cases demonstrate less than adequate, average and special training, 







This block represents the role that the shift technical advisor takes during the 




on system status and decisions on the appropriate action course. This block is being 
triggered by the decision-maker. Other inputs to this block are the information 
channel for providing the information on hardware system, team factors and the 
communication channel for the input messages from the decision-maker. This block 
triggers the decision maker block for a conversation; the other output of this block is 
the communication channel which carries the output message. By clicking on this 
block a set of parameters can be set which together represent the individual 
characteristics of the shift technical advisor. Each of these parameters can be set by 
choosing among different levels provided for the specific feature based on qualitative 
and comparative judgment; such levels are for instance high, normal or low or in 









Team Performance Shaping Factors 
This block represents the performance shaping factors which affect the team behavior 
in general and are related to the organization, the workspace environment and etc. 
This block does not have any inputs because all the contributing factors are 
considered as parameters of the simulation and are being adjusted by clicking on the 
block and selecting among three or two different qualitative levels for the parameter 
based on the judgment of the user on a comparative basis. This block includes a 
special mechanism to calculate quantities as outputs which represent the contribution 
of factors that equally affect all team members and are related to the context of the 
team such as the organization and environment. These values also represent the 
mutual feelings that team members have toward each other in an overall sense. These 
values are inputs to all blocks for all team operators. 
By clicking on this block a set of parameters can be set which together represent a 
certain team. Each of these parameters can be set by choosing among different levels 
provided for the specific feature based on qualitative and comparative judgment; such 
levels are for instance high, normal or low or in some cases demonstrate less than 









In order to model the feedback loops inside the team, memory blocks (delay blocks) 
has been used intensively in this approach; hence a specific block has been modeled 
and included in the library for setting up and assigning initial values to input ports of 
any operator block; this block prepares the operator blocks to be used in the next 
coming cycles. The use of this block becomes particularly important at time zero and 
a few time steps after time zero. By clicking on this block one can define the initial 
condition for the operator; including the input message and input error just at the 









In order to model the interactions of the operating crew inside the control room, and 
the field operators outside the control room, there is another category of objects in 
CREWSIM that are related to communication and represent the characteristics of 
communication links. The communication between inside and outside the control 
room is not a face-to-face verbal communication and special devices are used to 
establish such communication links, e.g. wireless devices; thus such communication 
links need to be modeled via a device-based communication block. Any 
communication link includes three important elements: Sender, Receiver and the 
Message. Characteristic of the sender, receiver and the message are foundations to a 
successful communication. Hence, a communication fails when: the sender fails to 
send the message or not being trusted to send the message, the receiver distorts or 
misperceives the message, and the message is inaccurate and distorted. CREWSIM 
provides two different types of communication links: Verbal (face-to-face) and 
Device-based. The parameters of each communication link are based on 
characteristics of the sender, characteristics of the receiver and the nature of the 




Verbal Communication Link 
This block represents a communication process that is taken place inside the control 
room. This link is triggered by the sender when a conversation starts and its main 
functionality is to pass the input message to the receiver as an output. If the 
communication is successful the receiver block would be triggered by this block. 
Other inputs to this block include the contributing factors that are coming from the 
team factors block and directly impact the communication quality. 
By clicking on this block a set of parameters can be set which together represent the 
individual characteristics of the sender and receiver. Each of these parameters can be 
set by choosing among different levels provided based on qualitative and comparative 
judgment; such as less than adequate, average and good. This block is focused on 
individual characteristics of the operator that would directly affect the quality of 






Device Based Communication Link 
This block represents a communication process that is taking place between operators 




therefore is affected by the quality of the device and the environment in which the 
communication is taking place as well as other factors. This link is triggered by the 
sender when a conversation starts and its main functionality is to pass the input 
message to the receiver as an output. If the communication is successful the receiver 
block would be triggered by this block. Other inputs to this block include the 
contributing factors that are coming from the team factors block and directly impact 
the communication quality. 
By clicking on this block a set of parameters can be set which together represent the 
individual characteristics of the sender and receiver and the quality of device. Each of 
these parameters can be set by choosing among different levels provided for the 
specific feature based on qualitative and comparative judgment; such as less than 
adequate, average and good. This block just like the previous block is focused on 
individual characteristics of the operator that would directly affect the quality of 









After the blocks are selected and connected together, the model parameters need to be 
adjusted using the model editor environment by clicking on each block and setting up 
the associated parameters; After the development of the simulation model is complete 
(see the picture), a simulator module (code) is used to assign control parameters and 
simulation variables for each run; this includes the time for each simulation run and 
the number of simulation runs in a round. The model of the system is loaded using 
this code and the location of the output file is provided for MATLAB Simulink by 
this code; hence the output which is the simulation log file is ready after a round is 
completely executed.  This code basically calls the model in a loop and diaries the 
simulation logs in an output file. These simulation log files are then investigated to 
better understand the behavior of the operating crew and are the basis for post-
processing of the simulation generated scenarios. This simulation model is developed 
to cover a wide range of possibilities in order to provide a complete and consistent 




behavior of the system based on the multilevel simulation model. Each transition for 
system state is conditioned on its duration, time, state of another component and other 
parameters. The branching points in the model are designed such that not only the 
failure of system elements and their functionalities but also the interaction-related 
errors such as miscommunication and misunderstandings, which generate different 
paths and scenarios in the system risk profile. During the simulation the states of 
various subsystems and operator responses dynamically change and time dependent 
scenarios are generated.  
In the case study that has been designed based on the capabilities of CREWSIM, the 
major identified hardware components include: Pumps, Heaters, Valves and Steam 
generators; these components are connected together with Pipes. The scenario of 
interest is initiated by a pipe break event occurring in either main or intermediate 
subsystems. The operating crew need to perform the accident mitigation steps 
correctly and in time, otherwise the steam generators would become either solid or 
dried out. These end-states are determined based on the level of water in the steam 
generators which should always be above a certain threshold. Pumps, Valves and 
Heaters can fail on-demand with a constant failure rate during the system operation; 
such events are the basis of branch generation in the simulation. Once a component 
fails it is assumed unrecoverable. Components are modeled as objects to reflect their 
different nature and characteristics of elements and to improve model reuse. There are 
four operators with different roles and they are responsible for mitigating the accident 
scenario, by deciding on the situation and performing right actions. There are 




point from the simulation perspective but not necessarily would lead to an accident 
scenario. The parameters of interest are: number of accident scenarios, the time of the 
each scenario and time of operators’ important actions. These values are extracted 
from simulation log files for each case with different team configurations. The final 





Appendix B: Reference Tables 
 
This appendix provides reference tables for the case study used in this research. 
Tables included are: Information provided by the plant, list of system states, list of 
operator’s decisions and actions as well as exchanged messages, the contents of 
messages and the list of possible errors and recovery actions that are designed, 
implemented and used by this case study. 
Table below lists the identified plant information provided by alarms and indicators.  
Information
Info 8001: No new information
Info 8002: SG water level is low
Info 8003: SG water level is OK         
Info 8004: Flow mismatch alarm is on
Info 8005: Flow mismatch alarm is off  
Info 8002: Main loops integrity alarm is on
Info 8006: Main loops integrity alarm is off   
Info 8007: Intermediate loops integrity alarm is on
Info 8008: Intermediate loops integrity alarm is off    
Info 8009: Output loops integrity alarm is on
Info 8010: Output loops integrity alarm is off
Info 8011: Main feed pumps are off
Info 8012: Main feed pumps are on
Info 8013: Emergency feed pumps are off
Info 8014: Emergency feed pumps are on
Info 8015: Heaters are off
Info 8016: Heaters are on
Info 8017: Emergency subsystem is off  






System State 7001: Normal
System State 7002: Flow mismatch
System State 7003: Main loops lost integrity
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity
System State 7005: Output loops lost integrity
System State 7008: Loss of heat source
System State 7009: loss of main pumps
System State 7010: Loss of emergency pumps
System State 7011: SG water level is not stable
System State 7012: Emergency feed pumps are off
System State 7013: Emergency feed pumps are on
System State 7014: Heaters are off
System State 7015: Heaters are on
System State 7016: Emergency subsystem is off
System State 7017: Emergency subsystem is on
System State 7018: Broken subsystem is not isolated
System State 7019: Broken subsystem is isolated.
System State 7200: Not normal
System State 7000: Unknown system state  
The table below lists the identified decisions for the operating crew of the proposed 
feed water system.  
Decision
Decision 4001: No decision
Decision 4010: Close intermediate valves
Decision 4020: Open intermediate valves
Decision 4030: Turn off heaters  
Decision 4040: Turn on heaters
Decision 4050: Turn on main pumps
Decision 4060: Turn off main pumps
Decision 4070: Turn on emergency pump
Decision 4080: Turn off emergency pump
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem
Decision 4000: Unknown decision
 
The table below lists the identified actions performed by the operating crew on the 





Action 5900: No action on s ys tem
Action 5950: No pos s ible recovery action on sys tem
Action 5010: Veri fy main pumps  s tatus
Action 5012: Veri fy emergency pumps status
Action 5016: Veri fy heaters  s tatus
Action 5020: Veri fy intermediate s ubs ys tem va lves  status
Action 5024: Turn off main pumps
Action 5025: Turn on main pumps
Action 5026: Turn off emergency pumps
Action 5027: Turn on emergency pumps
Action 5030: Turn off heaters
Action 5031: Turn on heaters
Action 5034: Close intermediate s ubs ystem valves
Action 5035: Open intermediate subsystem va lves
Action 5400: Activate emergency trigger
Action 5500: Unknown action
Action 5950: No possible recovery action on system
Action 5525: Repeat message processing
Action 5515: Repeat information processing
Action 5530: Verify system information  
The table below lists the types of messages used by the operating crew. 
Message
Mess age 6000: No mess age
Mess age 6001: Observation from s ystem
Mess age 6002: Request for more information
Mess age 6003: Request for action on system
Mess age 6004: Request for advice on s ystem s tate
Mess age 6114: Request for advice on decis ion
Mess age 6005: Advice on sys tem state
Mess age 6006: Advice for decis ion
Mess age 6007: Judgment on system s tate
Mess age 6008: Judgment on decis ion
Mess age 6100: Confi rmation for receiving obs ervation
Mess age 6102: Confi rmation for receiving advice
Mess age 6103: Confi rmation for receiving judgment
Mess age 6104: Confi rmation for performing reques t
Mess age 6210: Report of the error
Mess age 6120: Request for res ending the mes sage
Mess age 6125: Request for Repeat mes sage proces s ing




The table below lists the content of the messages used by the operating crew. 
Message Content
If the message is an observation on system: The content is Information code.
If the message is a judgment on system state: The content is the System State code.
If the message is a judgment on decision: The content is the Decision code.
If the message is an advice on system state: The content is the Advice code.
If the message is an advice on a decision: The content is the Decision code.
If the message is the request for an action on system :The content is the Action code.
If the message is erroneous: The content is irrelevant/unknown.




The table below lists the identified errors in the context of the operating crew. 
Error
Error 9010: Operator is not available
Error 9020: Information is not available to operator
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator
Error 9040: Operator missed the object information
Error 9050: Operator received partial information on object
Error 9060: Operator observed wrong object
Error 9070: Operator observed object with delay
Error 9080: Operator missed the message
Error 9090: Operator received an incomplete message
Error 9100: Operator received wrong message
Error 9110: Operator received message with delay
Error 9120: Operator is unable to diagnose the situation
Error 9130: Operator made a faulty diagnosis
Error 9140: Operator is unable to make a decision
Error 9150: Operator made a wrong decision
Error 9160: Operator made a delayed decision
Error 9170: Operator is unable to perform the action
Error 9180: Operator performed the wrong action on object
Error 9190: Operator performed the action on wrong object
Error 9200: Operator performed the action in wrong time
Error 9210: Operator is unable to send the message
Error 9220: Operator sent an incomplete message
Error 9230: Operator sent the wrong message
Error 9240: Operator sent the message with delay
Error 9900: No error  
Error 9000: Unknown error
Error 5000: Error has not been recognized by operator
Error 5100: Error has not been indicated because it was not recognized by operator
Error 5200: Error has not been indicated by operator to the rest of the team
Error 5300: Error has not been corrected because it was not recognized by operator
Error 5400: Error has not been corrected because it was not recognized & indicated by operator 
Error 5500: Error has not been corrected because it was not indicated by operator





Appendix C: Sample CREWSIM Simulation Log File 
 
component no.821 has already failed. 
Time = 1.8 
_______________________________________________ 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Input error: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
System State 7000: Unknown system state. 
Error 9120: Operator is unable to diagnose the situation. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9140: Operator is unable to make a decision. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9170: Operator is unable to perform the action. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Error 9610: Error has not been corrected by team because it was not 
recognized & indicated by anyone. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
start:********* 
    1.8000 
 
start:********* 
    1.8000 
 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message (from operator no.1,no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error (from operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 




Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Output error (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9006: Unknown message. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Operator is recognizing the error. 
Error 9006: Unknown message. 
Operator is indicating the error. 
Indication message: 
Error 9006: Unknown message. 
Operator is correcting the error. 
Error is being corrected. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Message 6120: Request for resending the message. 
Error 9900: No error. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
Communication in team.1 failed. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
No error. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7001: Normal. 




Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output error: 




component no.821 has already failed. 
Time = 1.9 
_______________________________________________ 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Input error: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
System State 7000: Unknown system state. 
Error 9120: Operator is unable to diagnose the situation. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9140: Operator is unable to make a decision. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9170: Operator is unable to perform the action. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Error 9610: Error has not been corrected by team because it was not 
recognized & indicated by anyone. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
start:********* 
    1.9000 
 
start:********* 
    1.9000 
 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message (from operator no.1,no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error (from operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 




Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6003: Request for action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Output error (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Operator is recognizing the error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is indicating the error. 
Indication message: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is correcting the error. 
Error is being corrected. 
Recvery Action 5950: No possible recovery action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
Communication in team.1 failed. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
No error. 
start:********* 








Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7001: Normal. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output error: 




component no.821 has already failed. 
Time = 2 
_______________________________________________ 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Input error: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
System State 7000: Unknown system state. 
Error 9120: Operator is unable to diagnose the situation. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9140: Operator is unable to make a decision. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9170: Operator is unable to perform the action. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Error 9610: Error has not been corrected by team because it was not 
recognized & indicated by anyone. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
start:********* 
     2 
 
start:********* 
     2 
 
start:********* 









Input message (from operator no.1,no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error (from operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6003: Request for action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Output error (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Operator is recognizing the error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is indicating the error. 
Indication message: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is correcting the error. 
Error is being corrected. 
Recvery Action 5950: No possible recovery action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
Communication in team.1 failed. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 











Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7001: Normal. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output error: 




component no.821 has already failed. 
Time = 2.1 
_______________________________________________ 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Input error: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
System State 7000: Unknown system state. 
Error 9120: Operator is unable to diagnose the situation. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9140: Operator is unable to make a decision. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output Error: 
Error 9170: Operator is unable to perform the action. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Error 9610: Error has not been corrected by team because it was not 
recognized & indicated by anyone. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
start:********* 
    2.1000 
 
start:********* 











Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message (from operator no.1,no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6001: Observation from system. 
Message 6200: Unknown message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error (from operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4090: Activate emergency subsystem. 
Output Error (to operator no.1,no.2,no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Message 6003: Request for action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Output error (to operator no.1, no.2 and no.3): 
Error 9900: No error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Start of Error Recovery-------------------------------- 
Operator is recognizing the error. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is indicating the error. 
Indication message: 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
Operator is correcting the error. 
Error is being corrected. 
Recvery Action 5950: No possible recovery action on system. 
Message 6000: No message. 
Error 9030: Message is not available to operator. 
End of Error Recovery--------------------- 
Communication in team.1 failed. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6003: Request for action on system. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7004: Intermediate loops lost integrity. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 




Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6104: Confirmation for performing request. 
Action 5400: Activate emergency trigger. 
Output Error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
No error. 
start:********* 





Recognizing the situation: ---------- 
Input message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Input error: 
Error 9900: No error. 
System State 7001: Normal. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Making a decision: ---------- 
Decision 4001: No decision. 
Error 9900: No error. 
Executing action: ---------- 
Output message: 
Message 6000: No message. 
Action 5900: No action on system. 
Output error: 











The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) used by the operating crew of the case 
study (Chapter 5) are described in this appendix. 
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